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tepav@tepav.org.tr / tepav.org.trTEPAV veriye dayalı analiz yaparak politika tasarım sürecine katkı sağlayan, akademik etik ve kaliteden ödün vermeyen, kar amacı gütmeyen, partizan olmayan bir araştırma kuruluşudur.
The changing nature of the clashes indicates Syria is drifting into a  civil war. Long-lasting fights mean more pain for Syrian people.  However, without foreign intervention, regime change and a solution seem  difficult. 
How long the fights last will depend on the Syrian  military. Unless middle and low ranking officers who form the backbone  of the military desert, the military can resume operations to preserve  its position. The civilian bureaucracy is also an important factor in  that sense. The attitude of the countries that support Bashar and his  regime is also important: China, Russia and particularly Iran are extending the current Syrian regime’s life. 
The  political culture and character of the regime indicate the fights will  last a long time. In particular the lack of a culture of rapprochement,  feelings of insecurity and memories of violence between various parties  are factors that complicate finding a compromise. 
Another factor  is geography, since Syria cannot allow one party to fully gain control  in a short time due to its size, topography and borders. As events  spread all over the country, Bashar’s army would wear out and, being  upset, would become more dangerous and aggressive. Perhaps after a while  it would try to defend some strategic regions while withdrawing. This  would show us that the military has become homogeneous and come to a  stage where the ethnic / sectarian divide has deepened and weakened it. 
The  way to decrease civilian casualties and establish lasting peace is  through accelerating regime change. But this does not seem possible  without military support “from outside.” Even though there are some  desertions from the military at the moment, instigating a disciplined  and effective struggle and achieving success in a short time does not  seem possible. In that case, who would provide help and how? The U.S.  does not want to engage in this. The U.K. and France are not keen. The Arab League seems a little unsure and rocky. It is true that Turkey is in everybody’s mind. So here is the question: How and under what conditions could Turkey intervene in Syria?
It  seems the Turkish government’s position regarding intervention in Syria  “has come to a specific maturity” thanks to the hard work of the U.S.,  U.K. and some Arab countries. Erdoğan, Gül, Davutoğlu and Arınç keep  signaling this. Thoughts like “Muslims [Sunni, of course] are being  killed” or “the al-Assad regime is cooperating with the PKK” are useful  arguments for preparing the Turkish public for an intervention. Despite  all those efforts, the Turkish public still does not seem entirely ready  for the intervention idea. 
An important question concerns the  new position of the military that would be provided by the prospect of a  “military intervention.” What kind of a performance the Turkish Armed  Forces would give is another issue. Negative effects of the past few  years’ continuing “locking the officers and generals up policy” might be  seen. Finding commanders who would conduct covert operations and take  responsibility in such a complicated issue might be hard, since no  commander would like to shoulder responsibility nowadays. Still, if the  U.S. and U.K. want to take their chances, they should lose sight of France and enable the PKK to stay silent for a longer time.
This commentary was published on 09.02.2012 in Hürriyet Daily News.