The relations between Türkiye and Armenia have long been complex, marked by both positive developments and significant challenges. Despite these issues, recent developments - especially Azerbaijan’s decisive victory in the Second Karabakh War (September 2020) - have created a unique opportunity for renewed dialogue. Both Türkiye and Armenia have recognized the potential benefits of stabilizing the region through normalization and lasting peace in the South Caucasus.
The normalization process officially began with the appointment of special envoys: Ambassador (Ret.) Serdar Kılıç for Türkiye and Deputy Speaker of Parliament Ruben Rubinyan for Armenia. The first meeting within this framework was held in Moscow in January 2022.
During the initial round, the parties exchanged views on the overall framework of the process and agreed that the ultimate goal was full normalization, which should proceed without preconditions. This understanding marked a significant shift in the diplomatic trajectory of both countries.
Following the initial meeting in Moscow, the special envoys held three additional meetings in Vienna. The fifth round of talks took place on July 30, 2024, for the first time at a direct contact point: the Alican/Margara border gate.
Within this phased and unconditional process, which aims to build mutual trust, several concrete steps have been taken. These efforts can be described as confidence-building measures. One notable achievement was the resumption of direct flights between Türkiye and Armenia, facilitating air cargo transportation and trade. Additionally, technical arrangements were made for the potential reopening of the Akyaka/Akhurik railway border line—a critical component of regional connectivity.
Türkiye and Armenia also reached an agreement on the joint restoration of the Ani Bridge, a key historical landmark on the Silk Road, symbolizing their growing cooperation. In a positive move toward improving people-to-people relations, Armenia lifted the internet access ban for Turkish users, excluding official state websites.
One of the major topics agreed upon during the talks was the reopening of the Alican/Margara border gate, which Türkiye had closed in 1993 following Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territory. Currently, the border gate is set to reopen for third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders. Furthermore, in March 2025, with Türkiye’s support, the Armenian government temporarily opened the gate (from March 21 to 31) to send humanitarian aid to Syria. Meanwhile, Türkiye is completing preparations for its potential permanent reopening.
A recent field study conducted by TEPAV in the area indicated that permanently opening the border would lead to substantial economic opportunities and bring considerable benefits to local stakeholders in both countries, with Armenia likely being the primary beneficiary. For instance, the increased accessibility of Armenian historical sites in provinces such as Van and Kars for tourists visiting Armenia could significantly boost regional development. Moreover, the PKK terrorist organization’s decision on May 12, 2025, to dissolve itself and lay down arms is expected to foster a more peaceful and secure environment, encourage tourism-related visits, and positively impact the regional economy.
On the other hand, it is occasionally emphasized that the Türkiye–Armenia normalization process is essentially a bilateral initiative and does not involve multilateral negotiations. However, it is known that Azerbaijan has expressed concerns regarding the reopening of the border. The long-standing tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia necessitates that Türkiye manage the normalization talks cautiously and in a manner sensitive to regional dynamics. From the beginning, Türkiye has acted in close coordination with Azerbaijan. Moreover, in the context of reshaping transportation corridors in the South Caucasus, discussions surrounding the Zangezur Corridor are considered a strategic element influencing Türkiye-Armenia normalization. Iran’s reservations about this project and Russia’s pragmatic approach also necessitate that the process proceed in a balanced manner, considering all regional actors.
Another important factor is the Armenian diaspora—particularly in the United States—which is known to attempt to undermine the normalization efforts of the Pashinyan government. The diaspora continues to propagate negative narratives and accusations against Türkiye, complicating diplomatic efforts. Additionally, unresolved constitutional issues in Armenia - especially articles seen as incompatible with the spirit and terms of the recent peace agreement with Azerbaijan - are considered obstacles by Baku and will need to be amended.
Ultimately, the Türkiye–Armenia normalization process should be seen not only as a bilateral matter but also as a critical milestone for the future of the South Caucasus. Its success depends on close coordination with Azerbaijan and maintaining sensitivity to regional balances. Given the uncertainty about how long the current favorable international climate will last, achieving swift results through effective diplomacy and strong Azerbaijani support is of paramount importance.
