This Quaderno has been made possible by the support of TEPAV and the Compagnia di San Paolo, IAI’s strategic partner.
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Since 1999, EU-Turkey relations have become the focus of growing academic and policy interest in Europe. Yet the valuable research results produced have by and large failed to inform and influence the political, media and wider public debate on EU-Turkey relations. On a whole, the quality of the debate is rather poor. In some member states there is hardly a debate at all, while in other member states public debate is often poisoned by misperception, misinformation and at times by outright prejudice.

The underlying rationale of this project is precisely to begin filling the gap between research and public debate on EU-Turkey relations by unpacking the public discourses there where they exist and understanding the factors underpinning these positions, debates or non-debates as the case may be. A major contention advanced here is that debates on EU-Turkey relations often act as proxies for views either on Turkey or the EU and its member states, rather than on the relationship between them. Stemming from this observation, we have selected two issues that occupy much of the space in the public debate on EU-Turkey relations, namely EU conditionality towards Turkey and the impact of Turkey’s EU accession. We analyse conditionality and impact by uncovering how different interests, perceptions and at times prejudices in different national contexts colour these debates, generating opinions both in favour and against Turkey’s accession.

The benefit of this exercise we believe is first and foremost that of gaining a deeper understanding of the motivations, assumptions and politi-
cal significance of these debates, including those which may appear as the most irrational, populist or even nonsensical. We hope this understanding can contribute to reversing the vicious circle of mistrust and miscommunication which has bedevilled EU-Turkey relations, particularly in recent years. Mistrust has hindered the effectiveness of EU conditionality towards Turkey and it has skewed ideas about the prospective impact of Turkey’s EU membership. If this debate can now be moulded into a more frank, open and enlightened discussion, it can however become beneficial to the future evolution of EU-Turkey relations. It can concomitantly desensitize the political climate surrounding the Turkey question and foster a greater sense of joint responsibility and destiny in both the EU and Turkey.

This publication features a report, which in turn draws from and organizes the arguments presented in the chapters that follow. The chapters discuss how and why the questions of conditionality and impact are or are not tackled in different member states and how interests, perceptions and prejudices influence these debates. The reports are authored by analysts whose expertise does not necessarily lie in Turkey or EU-Turkey relations; but who have a deep understanding of how the Turkey question has been debated in their specific national contexts. Rather than opting for a comprehensive coverage of each and every member state and EU institution, we have selected ten cases, of which many reflect a single member state, some more than one state, and one a view from Brussels. Collectively, we believe the arguments presented in these chapters are largely representative of the EU-wide debate on Turkey. By organizing these arguments, the report provides an analytical lens with which to decipher them and understand their political significance. In addition the report draws heavily from the debate in the workshop held in Rome in March 2007, at which the draft papers were presented and discussed amongst the members of the EU-Turkey network launched by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Turkish Economic Policy Research Institute (TEPAV) in 2007.

N.T.
1. Filling the gap between research and public debate on EU-Turkey relations

Since Turkey was accorded candidacy, EU-Turkey relations have become the focus of growing academic and policy interest both in Turkey and in several member states. A large body of research papers has been published and long series of conferences, seminars and workshops organized, debating the intricacies of EU-Turkey relations. Surprisingly perhaps, although the political decision to grant Turkey candidacy was taken in 1999, the research interest that followed largely focussed on whether Turkey should join the European Union rather than on how Turkey’s accession could take place. Hence, although the fundamental political decision on the eligibility of Turkey’s membership was already taken, the research that followed concentrated on the adequacy of that decision rather than on the nuts and bolts of Turkey’s accession process. Moreover, the valuable research results produced in recent years have by and large failed to inform and influence the political, media and wider public debate on EU-Turkey relations. On a whole, the quality of the debate on Turkey in the EU has been rather poor. In some member states, there is hardly a debate at all, and a lack of information prevails. In other member states, the debate gathered steam after 2002, that is three years after the launch of Turkey’s accession process. Yet there where a debate exists, it has evolved on a parallel plane detached from the growing body of research on EU-Turkey relations, and it is often poi-
soned by misperception, misinformation and at times outright prejudice. The main exponents of this debate, whether in favour or against Turkey’s accession, often have little or no acquaintance with Turkey and rarely ground their arguments on existing research. Likewise in Turkey, while the public debate on the EU began much earlier and has enjoyed far greater resonance than in member states, those with a deep understanding of the Union and the implications of Turkey’s membership are still a minority.

The underlying rationale for this report follows from these observations. There is a visible disconnect between the research on EU-Turkey relations and the political, media and public debates and opinions in both Turkey and EU member states. The major contention advanced here is that the reason for this disconnect lies in the fact that public debates on Turkey largely act as proxies for debates and views on either Turkey or the EU, rather than on the relationship between them. Within Turkey, the EU debate mirrors different political views about the desirable political, social and economic development of Turkey itself. Within member states, the debate on Turkey largely reflects different ideas about the desirable evolution of the Union, and, in turn, of the member state in question.

Starting out from this premise, the aim of this report is not to present new research on a particular aspect of EU-Turkey relations. Rather, it is to unpack the discourses within several member states on the Turkey question, seeking to understand from where these discourses derive and what their political significance is. In particular, we have selected two issues that occupy much of the space in the public debate on EU-Turkey relations, namely EU conditionality towards Turkey and the impact of Turkey’s EU accession. We analyse conditionality and impact by revealing how different interests, perceptions and at times prejudices colour and condition these debates, triggering opinions both in favour and against Turkey’s accession. We try to disentangle where possible the ‘content’ of these debates from the political views, perceptions and prejudices in which they are embedded. We also seek to understand the extent to which these perceptions and prejudices are ‘uninformed’ or ‘informed’, that is whether they stem from an absolute lack of knowledge and contact, or whether they are founded on selective information and ad hoc contact. From a policy perspective, disentangling the two is of utmost importance in so far as informed and uninformed perceptions and misperceptions often require radically different remedies.

The benefit of this exercise, we believe, is first and foremost that of gain-
ing a deeper understanding of the motivations, assumptions and significance of these debates, including those which may appear as the most irrational, populist or even nonsensical. We hope this understanding can contribute to narrowing the mistrust and miscommunication which has developed, particularly in recent years, between Turkey and several member states. Mistrust fuels the tendency – especially in Turkey – to presume that any argument has little meaning in and of itself, but simply reflects European prejudices and double standards against it. This reduces the credibility and transformative potential of EU conditionality, stifles the debate on both Turkey’s inclusion and its exclusion from the EU, and reinforces misperceptions of Europe within Turkey. To narrow mistrust and miscommunication, we believe that the media holds a major role and responsibility. Beyond political elites and official policy circles, journalists in fact represent one of the prime target audiences of this project. Unlike politicians and officials, inevitably entangled in political deadlines and timetables, the media, together with academia and other segments of civil society, can be critical in bringing greater clarity to the EU-Turkey debate, elevating it beyond short-term political horizons and interests.

By unpacking the discourse on conditionality and impact, we also wish to provide a tool for future policy research on EU-Turkey relations; a tool for presenting and disseminating research results in a language that resonates in different domestic contexts and can be more fruitfully used to inform the public debate on Turkey. This debate, while belated and often misinformed, is now unstoppable. If it can be moulded into a more frank, open and enlightened discussion, it might become beneficial to the future evolution of EU-Turkey relations. It could concomitantly desensitize the political climate surrounding the Turkey question and foster a greater sense of joint responsibility and destiny.

2. Conditionality: a technical or a political process?

EU accession conditionality – that is a policy whereby the successive steps in the accession process of a candidate country depend on the candidate’s fulfilment of specific conditions – is often presented in both the EU and Turkey as a purely technical and objective process. But is this really the case? And what are the implications of flagging the technical nature of an inherently political process such as conditionality?
2.1 Conditionality as a technical process: the potential...

Within Turkey, the pro-EU political class and administration often portrays the technical nature of EU conditionality mainly in reference to the obligations embedded in the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*. Within the EU, the European Council has repeatedly affirmed the objectivity of conditionality, applied equally to all candidates at all times. Finland has insisted upon the objectivity and non-negotiability of the accession criteria, first and foremost the Copenhagen political criteria. A theoretically technical bureaucracy, the Commission, is moreover entrusted with the task of implementing conditionality by abiding to ‘objective’ and ‘non-political’ standards. The technical or objective character of conditionality is emphasized in Turkey and the EU for good reason. For conditionality to be taken seriously by the recipient party, it requires an aura of technicality and objectivity. This allows for the specification of clear and measurable benchmarks, for the effective monitoring of compliance, for a detached appraisal of performance and for an ‘objective’ decision to proceed with the successive steps in the accession process. In other words, perceived ‘objectivity’ allows for a game of mutual trust and dependable expectations between Turkey and the EU. ‘Objective’ conditionality also encourages the de-politicization of sensitive political issues, making these more amenable to solution. Couching political conditionality in technical and seemingly objective language has indeed helped desensitize and has made it possible to tackle problems that were formerly taboo in Turkey, such as the abolition of the death penalty or the liberalization of languages other than Turkish. More generally, the manner in which the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria was ‘objectified’ through Commission progress reports and accession partnership recommendations in the run-up to the opening of accession negotiations, acted as a key external anchor to the reform process in Turkey. This reform process, while still incomplete and deficient in many respects, is unprecedented in the history of republican Turkey.

2.2 … and the pitfalls

However, highlighting the technicality of conditionality jeopardizes the ability of EU institutions, member states as well as reformist forces in Turkey to tackle clearly political problems in Turkey. While effective in promoting broad-brush individual human rights and democratic reform,
conditionality has been largely silent about specific political problems in Turkey, such as the ten percent electoral threshold, the return of the internally displaced, the amnesty to former PKK militants or the headscarf issue. Furthermore, when moving beyond the established area of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and turning to more complex questions such as minority rights or the role of the armed forces, the EU itself displays a variety of different models. In the case of minority rights for example, the Union presents diametrically opposed models, ranging from the Belgian quasi-confederal system to the Greek or the French emphasis on the unitary nature of the state and nation. Added to the need to forge EU consensus when identifying conditions and conditionalities, this raises the difficulty of clear-cut and agreed upon EU policies in these areas. In other words, there where political problems cannot be automatically resolved through legislative reforms in the established area of individual human rights, ‘technical’ conditionality, which hinges on an established and uniform basis of law and practice across Europe, cannot be the answer in Turkey.

EU conditionality is also relatively ineffective in promoting change in Turkey in terms of practical implementation. While successful in triggering two sets of constitutional reforms and eight legal harmonization packages, conditionality has been far less successful in terms of actual implementation on the ground. Simply put, this is because implementation requires a far deeper process of change than a simple elite re-calculation of the costs and benefits induced by EU conditionality. Beyond a change in laws and institutions, implementation requires a genuine absorption of these new rules by society, altering its political, economic and social behaviour. It entails a radical transformation of the interests, beliefs and ways of doing things of all sectors of society, including those ‘underground’ sectors in Turkey (the ‘deep state’ – *derin devlet*) that still represent fundamental obstacles to deep-rooted progressive change in the country.

Finally, underlining the technical nature of conditionality after the opening of negotiations means loosening the link between the accession process and political reforms in Turkey. For all candidate countries, the accession process requires the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria before the opening of negotiations. During accession negotiations instead, conditionality refers principally to the adoption of the obligations of the *acquis*. Hence, the opening and provisional closure of the thirty-five chapters of negotiations, should call for fulfilment by the candidate country of specific and spelled-out *acquis*-related conditions. Yet
in practice, compliance with the wide-ranging Copenhagen political criteria is all but complete by the time accession negotiations begin. In the 2004 enlargement round, notable cases in point were the rights of the Russian minorities in the Baltics or the reunification of Cyprus. The same applies to Turkey. Indeed when proposing the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004, the Commission explicitly stated that Ankara only ‘sufficiently’ fulfilled the political criteria and that much work remained to be done. Yet beyond stating that the Commission would continue to monitor reforms and engage in a political dialogue with Turkey that would be fed into negotiations, little detail was provided as to how the accession negotiations would be conditioned to ongoing political reforms in Turkey. Instead, the specific conditions and benchmarks laid down by the Commission in the screening process referred to the nuts and bolts of the negotiation chapters. Having highlighted the technical nature of political conditionality up to that time however, when member states such as France, Austria, Greece and southern Cyprus continued criticizing Turkey’s political shortcomings and when EU institutions linked progress in Turkey’s accession negotiations to political conditions (e.g., eight chapters were suspended in 2006 on the grounds of Turkey’s refusal to open its air and sea ports to southern Cyprus), this was harshly criticized in Turkey. Turks argued that the EU was now attempting to ‘politicize’ political conditionality, thereby undermining its legitimacy and credibility. In other words, EU actors fell into their own ‘rhetorical trap’ concerning the technicality of political conditionality. Having emphasized its technicality of conditionality and the Commission’s prime role in the process, when several member states began voicing their conditionality concerns, these were read as blatant signs of discrimination in Turkey. Hence, while the emphasis on technical conditionality had been effective in spurring reforms in Turkey until 2005, it became powerful ammunition in the hands of those resisting change in Turkey thereafter. The accession process with Turkey now risks proceeding slowly and with interruptions, and being progressively emptied of its political transformationist potential.

2.3 Conditionality as a political process: the realities

But not only is the articulation of political conditionality as a technical process problematic in terms of effectiveness, it also fails to capture the realities of conditionality, thereby fuelling misunderstanding and mis-
trust between the EU and Turkey. Conditionality is an inherently political process when viewed from the perspective of the candidate country. As the precedent of the eastern enlargement shows, the manner in which conditionality works itself into domestic dynamics, triggering political, economic and social change, is above all political. Conditionality changes the internal power balances within a candidate country between political actors with different worldviews and aspirations. It does so both by altering the legal and institutional framework in which domestic actors operate and by empowering one set of actors over another, as the ousting of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in 1997 or the election of Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat in 2005 demonstrate.

When it comes to Turkey, it is thus of key importance for EU actors to understand how conditionality plays into Turkish politics. It is the changing internal balance between conservatives and reformists, establishment and periphery, nationalists and liberals, civilians and military, or between secularists and ‘Islamists’ which determines the nature and pace of Turkey’s reform process. The task for the EU is thus to understand how its conditionality, coupled with other domestic (e.g., elections), regional (e.g., the war in Iraq) and wider international developments (e.g., the ‘war on terror’), influences these internal Turkish balances and ensuing reform efforts. By emphasizing the technical rather than political nature of conditionality, many of these domestic intricacies are lost. This leaves EU actors at a loss in trying to understand when and why conditionality succeeds in producing specific results in Turkey and therefore how conditionality can be refined to empower reformist actors in the country and obtain better reform results in the future.

Conditionality is also a highly political process when viewed from an EU perspective. Despite the much acclaimed objective nature of conditionality, conditionality is a political means for the EU to pursue its foreign policy goals, particularly those with an alleged ‘normative’ content such as the promotion of peace, democracy and human rights. In so far as foreign policy is a prime area in which the European publics would like to see the EU develop, an effective policy of EU conditionality can also help bringing the Union closer to its citizens.

More specifically, the EU’s interpretation of its normative goals and accompanying political conditions inevitably changes in response to the changing goals and interests of the member states and the changing political, economic and security-related developments in the neighbourhood. Hence for example, in the case of the eastern enlargement, the
Commission flagged minority rights conditionality in view of the minority and border tensions in the Baltics, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. In the case of the Western Balkans, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia became an explicit condition for progress in the stabilization and association process and in the ensuing accession process. More precisely, some member states with particular interests in certain candidate countries (e.g., Germany viz Poland, Finland viz Estonia, or Slovenia viz Croatia) inserted and channelled their national requests into the EU’s framework of political conditionality.

Likewise in the case of Turkey, the interests and views of several member states have led to internal EU pushes to ‘condition’ Turkey’s accession process to obligations relating to Armenia, the Aegean and Cyprus. Other member states have placed specific attention on conditionalities regarding questions such as women’s rights, the rights of non-Muslim minorities, the abolition of article 301 of the Turkish penal code and civil-military relations, while neglecting others, such as Turkey’s socioeconomic inequalities, the rights of its Muslim minorities, or the transformation of the informal economy. The choice of which conditions to emphasize, how to interpret them and what benchmarks to set is inevitably subjective and ‘political’. It results from specific national interests, debates and worldviews and the precise regional and international context in which enlargement unfolds. At EU-wide level instead, the crisis over the Constitutional Treaty, a perceived ‘enlargement fatigue’ and widespread fears of expanding towards the turbulent ‘East’, have all raised the need to tighten accession conditions towards candidate Turkey amongst EU elites and publics alike. In other words, the politicization of conditionality is inevitable the product of changing national debates and interests, and the manner in which these intersect in the EU’s complex decision-making machinery.

The point here is not whether EU conditionality on these and other questions is viewed, legitimately or not, as misplaced or discriminatory. Rather, it is that changing political conditions, interpretations and weights attributed to the fulfilment or violation of these conditions inevitably result from changing national interests, the evolving EU project and developments in the regional and international context in which EU policies are formulated. Failing to appreciate this fact by overemphasizing the ‘objectivity’ or ‘technicality’ of an inherently political process such as conditionality risks increasing miscommunication and mistrust between the EU and Turkey. The task is that of retaining as much as possible the quality of credibility engendered by technical con-
ditionality, without concealing the political attributes of this policy; attributes which if effectively channelled and articulated can serve the double purpose of helping transform candidate Turkey and bringing the European publics closer to the Union.

3. The Impact of Turkey on the European Union

3.1 Impact… of what?

The discourse on Turkey’s impact in Brussels and other European capitals often takes for granted the answer to a fundamental question: ‘the impact of what?’. More precisely, European politicians, the media, civil society and the Commission (in its 2004 Impact Study on Turkey) all unmistakeably focus on the impact of Turkey’s inclusion in the EU. As detailed below, some actors focus on Turkey’s impact on the EU’s institutional structure and budget, others discuss the impact on EU public opinion or migration flows, while others still debate the impact on European policies. What all these debates have in common is their focus on the costs and benefits of Turkey’s inclusion in the EU. Focussing on inclusion is the natural corollary of the enlargement policy, whose declared intent is full membership. The accession process – as opposed to the neighbourhood policy or alternative proposals for privileged or unprivileged partnerships with Turkey – is expressly intended to pave the way for Turkey’s entry into the EU. Yet given the long-term and uncertain nature of the accession process, ‘the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed’, as spelt out in Turkey’s Accession Negotiations Framework, it is nonetheless notable that hardly anyone in the EU raises the question with respect to the opposite scenario: the impact of Turkey’s exclusion from the EU. For the EU, the consequences of deciding to exclude Turkey from the EU are equally, if not more important than those of deciding to include Turkey. Especially if the decision to exclude Turkey occurs outside the rule-bound and ‘technical’ framework of the accession process (e.g., through referendum results in France or Austria), the implications for the EU’s credibility, its political identity, its economy and its foreign policy would be as, if not more significant than the impact of Turkey’s inclusion. The implications would relate both to how Europeans view and understand themselves, and to how outsiders perceive the nature, mandate and spirit of the Union. The implications of Turkey’s exclusion from the EU receive far greater
attention in Turkey itself. Perhaps in view of the Turkish public’s lack of confidence that the accession process will result in full membership, far more often than EU member states and institutions Turks debate the consequences of Turkey’s exclusion. Here, the different worldviews within Turkey visibly come to the fore. Turkish liberal and progressive forces fear that if the Union ultimately turns Ankara a cold shoulder, Turkey could see the re-empowerment of nationalist and conservative forces, moving back on the progress made in political and economic reforms. Turkish secularists and establishment forces warn against an impending resurgence of political Islam. On the other end of the spectrum, Turkish Eurosceptics, nationalists and conservatives highlight Ankara’s geostrategic alternatives both across the Atlantic, in the Middle East and Eurasia, as well as further afield towards India or China; they emphasize the benefits of retaining full sovereignty over Turkey’s development path, and thus downplay the costs of Turkey’s exclusion from the EU.

3.2 Impact… on what?

A second EU-Turkey question, which receives far greater attention in the EU, is that of the ‘impact on what?’. Here the debate is often confusing and a definite cost-benefit balance sheet has not been convincingly presented. A clear cost-benefit calculus regarding Turkey’s EU accession can only be speculative, given the impossibility of making precise impact assessments regarding an entry date lying sometime after 2014. It is unreasonable to expect a definite answer as to what Turkey’s impact on EU institutions will be, when the EU itself is in a deep state of flux, and its constitutional status lies at a critical juncture with its future difficult to predict. By the same token, it is unreasonable to speculate on the precise levels of future Turkish immigration in other member states, given the pace of Turkey’s political, economic and social development. This makes ‘Turkey 2014’ impossible to predict. It is even more unreasonable to attempt impact assessments in areas where both Turkish and EU variables are rapidly changing, such as in the realms of the economy and foreign policy.

Moreover, a cost-benefit calculation can only be highly subjective, in so far as it hinges upon an *a priori* subjective choice of the specific areas upon which Turkey’s accession will impact. In other words, responding to the question: ‘impact on what?’, depends upon a subjective view of which areas are deemed most important. In debating the impact of
Turkey’s membership, different actors within the EU and Turkey have focussed on very different issues. In the economic sphere, the discussion has focussed on a set of disparate issues ranging from the impact on the EU’s role in the global economy to the impact on the EU’s budget, labour markets and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In the political and social spheres, the discussion has also touched upon a large variety of questions, including Turkey’s impact on European institutions, public opinion, foreign policy and political identity. What explains how different actors go about analysing and speculating about Turkey’s future impact? As elaborated below, a useful key to understanding which aspects and spheres different actors focus on when debating the impact of Turkey’s accession is to look at the different levels at which the debate takes place.

3.2.1 The impact of Turkey’s accession on the EU’s role in the world

A first level is that of Turkey’s impact on the EU’s role in the world. Here the debate focuses predominantly on the economic and foreign policy domains. Those examining this level of analysis, including key constituencies in member states such as the UK, Finland, Poland, Slovenia and Turkey itself are rather positive about Turkey’s expected impact, highlighting the assets that Turkey’s membership would bring to the EU’s role in international relations and the global economy. Turkey’s growth, its rising productivity, its young and growing labour force, its rising trade levels and growing FDI inflows are brought to the fore, emphasizing how these would contribute to the fulfilment of the EU Lisbon agenda and better equip the Union to face rising competition from emerging economic giants such as India or China. Business and pro-EU political circles in Turkey, as well as key business constituencies in the EU with interests in Turkish markets also emphasize how these economic benefits would risk serious dilution if the EU were to insert permanent derogations to the full liberalization of the four freedoms for future member Turkey. Turkey’s role as an energy and transport hub, facilitating the EU’s much sought energy diversification is also underlined, especially by eastern European member states which remain almost entirely dependent on unpredictable Russian supplies, as well as by European energy companies with interests in transit routes through Turkey. Finally, political and civil society elites in member states like the UK, Greece, Finland, Poland and Slovenia, as well as the Commission or foreign policy specialists across Europe, highlight the assets that Turkey’s inclusion could bring to bear
upon the fledging European foreign policy, in terms of location, logistics and ties to neighbouring regions such as Russia, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East. Many also highlight how Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries carefully watch the evolution of EU-Turkey relations, focussing especially on the expected growth in the EU’s actoriness in these regions in view of Turkey’s accession.

3.2.2 The impact of Turkey’s accession on the Union’s internal governance, society and economy

A second level of analysis highlights the impact of Turkey’s accession on the EU’s internal institutional, political, social, cultural and economic set-up. Here the arguments emphasize the expected costs of Turkey’s accession far more than the benefits. Beginning with institutions, both France and the Commission have placed much attention on the impact of Turkey’s accession on EU institutions. Here the most commonly found arguments – which paradoxically resonate the most in France, whose ‘no’ to the Constitutional Treaty triggered the Union’s current crisis – is that the EU would function less with a greater number of member states, particularly large ones that allegedly do not share the Union’s ill-defined ‘esprit communautaire’. Hence, even in the area of foreign policy, where the impact of Turkey’s membership is normally associated with key benefits for the Union, the greater internal diversity brought about by Turkey’s accession would arguably hinder the EU’s external capabilities and actoriness in the current institutional framework. Moreover, especially if demography is going to have growing weight in determining member states’ decision-making power, then the newest member state, Turkey, will also be the most important one, a situation which the Union’s founding members and France in particular view with great unease. Hence, the argument goes, before even considering Turkey’s membership, the Union has to put its house in order and equip itself with the necessary ‘absorption capacity’ to digest Turkey and operate effectively. The Turkey question coupled with the post 2004 enlargement situation in the EU has in fact reawakened the long-standing ‘widening versus deepening’ debate in Europe. Here, many exponents particularly in continental Western Europe adamantly espouse the view that, while not necessarily competing, enlargement raises the stakes in deepening the Union in order to assure its continued effectiveness. Others, and in particular the eastern European member states cast this reasoning into question. Enlargement alone has not noticeably compli-
cated the EU’s institutional workings they argue. Intra-EU divisions hindering effective policy-making remain the ones between ‘old’ member states. Several ‘small’ member states such as Denmark or Finland have argued that it is easier to digest one big member than a number of small or micro states. They suggest that the entry of another large member state would make relatively little difference to the current balance between small and big. Finally others still, including the Commission, have highlighted that the EU’s institutional and constitutional reform is expected to take place well before Turkey’s entry, and that Turkey’s accession process can act as a further external push factor inducing a successful EU reform process.

Yet the worries of many in France and in particular of French liberals go well beyond the concern that Turkey’s accession would complicate the EU’s institutional functioning. The fear – coupled with a strong sense of nostalgia for the past – is that Turkey’s accession and ongoing enlargements will ring the death bell of the Union’s federalist aspirations. More generally it would seal the end of the political project as conceived by the Community’s founding fathers, as well as the role that France played in that project. As European federalists would argue, it is only those who abhor the prospect of a federal Europe (e.g., British conservatives) or those who have lost all hope in it (e.g., German Christian Democrats or the Italian centre-left), who may be prepared to accept Turkey in the European fold. Indeed according to some, if deepening were to become directly correlated to widening, some anti-federalists who are now favourable to Turkey’s accession would turn against Turkey’s EU aspirations. Their Euroscepticism would easily trump their support for Turkey’s accession.

France is also at the helm of arguments doubting Turkey’s membership on the grounds of contrary public opinion. Here the argument takes different tones. Some argue that the need to rectify the Union’s disconnect from the demands, desires and expectations of EU publics is as great as ever. The French and Dutch ‘nos’ to the Constitutional Treaty are attributed to the rejection by European societies of an increasingly elitist EU project. By the same token, others argue that ‘enlargement fatigue’, first and foremost with respect to Turkey, is partly explained by the inability of EU elites to engage the publics in the debate over the eastern enlargement. The Union, it is argued, went through its biggest enlargement ever in 2004 and 2007, with the entry of twelve member states which almost two decades ago belonged to and constituted Europe’s much feared ‘other’. A plethora of Western Balkan states and Turkey are now chan-
nelled in the same accession process. Beside them are a number of aspiring applicants, insistently knocking at the Union’s door. Yet all this has happened and continues to happen without the remotest engagement of the public, a lack of engagement which has rendered ‘Brussels’ ever more alien and distant in the minds of EU citizens. It is with these arguments in mind, that some in France, for instance, criticize the Commission’s inertial and technical progress in enlargement and its alleged stifling of the European-wide debate on Turkey’s accession.

Yet others, including Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, rebuke many of these points. Rehn, in a speech at the University of Helsinki on 27 November 2006, forcefully suggested that the political debate on Turkey runs the risk of undermining the credibility of EU policies towards Turkey. If the Union’s right hand lectures Turkey on the Copenhagen criteria arguing that these are the sine qua non for EU entry, while the left hand engages in highly politicized and often populist debates over the desirability of Turkey’s entry, then the Union’s credibility in Turkey risks being seriously undermined. Others argue that the need to engage with European publics is certainly real and pressing and is, incidentally, a need that has always accompanied the highly elitist EU project. Yet those very actors who keep reminding of the importance of taking European public opinion into account are doing little to insert greater clarity and cool-headedness in the European public debate on Turkey. Far more often, raising the issue of contrary public opinion, and calling for national referenda on the Turkey question, appears to be more of a shield to hide the absence of strong leadership than a genuine concern for the Union’s democratic deficit.

Turning to a different aspect of Turkey’s expected impact on European societies, another common strand of arguments links Turkey’s accession to the EU’s multiculturalism and the question of a ‘European identity’. As the cases of Denmark and Germany highlight, in public debate, Turkey’s integration in the EU is mirrored to the integration of Muslim migrant communities in Europe, with positive and negative repercussions. Here views differ depending on the different understandings of a European identity. To those highlighting the essentialist features of a European identity, including culture, religion and history, as many in Austria or the European Peoples Party do, Turkey’s accession represents the nemesis of a much-sought European identity. Turkey, it is argued, cannot integrate into the EU, just as ‘non-European’ Muslim migrants have failed to integrate into their respective host European countries.
Hence, accepting Turkey into the European fold would entail abandoning aspirations to forge the Union’s identity, defined through history, culture and religion. Others, including key constituencies in the UK and more recently in Germany, refute the claims that a European identity is and can be premised on monocultural interpretations. They emphasize the importance of fostering unity in diversity, encouraging the development of an EU identity based precisely on multiculturalism. Following a different line instead, several commentators in France doubt Turkey’s membership not on the basis of its ‘different’ religion or culture per se. Rather, they express concerns on the one hand about Turkish secularism which is viewed as contrary to the French understanding of laïcité, and on the other hand about the threat of resurging political Islam in Turkey. A related question which receives rising attention across the EU is the link between identity and borders. To those viewing a European identity through culturalist lenses, geographical borders represent an integral element separating and defining ‘us’ and the ‘other’. Hence, Turkey should be kept out of the EU on the basis of its ‘different’ culture, religion and history. Its ‘otherness’ would be physically expressed through the delineation and consolidation of the EU’s borders well within the boundaries of the European continent. Unsurprisingly, actors within ‘core’ member states such as Austria or Germany are far more receptive to this interpretation of borders than members lying on the ‘periphery’ of the Union such as Finland, Italy, Spain, Portugal or the UK. The French also place much emphasis on the question of borders, yet they have downplayed its cultural dimension. The definition of the EU’s borders, the argument goes, is a critical political step in the formation of a European identity. Yet the delineation of these borders is conceptualized as an arbitrary and purely political fact, rather than as a preordained inevitability. In other words, for reasons of political interest and identity, the European polity would choose not to extend its borders to Iraq, Iran and Syria by refuting Turkey’s accession. The EU’s borders would be determined on the basis of their functional political utility in pursuing the Union’s interests, defining a European identity and allowing the European polity to live in a comfort zone, protected by friendly buffer states such as Turkey. The underlying political outlook permeating these views is strongly Eurocentric. ‘Europe’s world’ is predominantly confined to itself and its neighbouring ‘other’, in contrast to the more global outlook espoused by arguments highlighting the EU’s role in the world. A last set of arguments relating to the impact of Turkey’s accession on the internal nature and functioning of the EU relates to the economic
realm. As opposed to the rather pro-Turkey arguments embedded in analyses focussing on the EU’s role in the global economy, more inward-looking economic arguments tend to be far more sceptical of Turkey’s accession. A prime issue mentioned most notably by the Commission relates to the budgetary costs of Turkey’s accession, given Turkey’s size and level of economic development. Yet rather than the absolute cost to the EU budget, which in terms of individual member state contributions is unlikely to change radically, it is the relative distribution of Community funds which would alter as a result of Turkey’s accession. Hence, structural funds would be redirected away from current recipients in eastern Europe and, much to France’s displeasure, the CAP would risk being seriously affected by the entry of a large new member state with a significant agricultural sector. Arguments focussing on budgetary issues are especially speculative and prone to populist fear-mongering. Not only is it entirely fictional to speculate about the EU budget or the CAP in 2020, but the rate of change in Turkey’s economy is such that predicting Turkey’s impact on the EU’s budgetary, cohesion or agricultural policies with any reasonable degree of precision is almost impossible.

3.2.3 The impact of Turkey’s accession on the member states

A third level of analysis favoured by many national commentators within the EU is the impact of Turkey’s accession on member state economies, societies and security. Here two primary aspects are raised in public debate. The first and most important source of member state concern is that of Turkish immigration, particularly within member states such as Germany and Austria which already host large Turkish communities. In countries like Germany, populist slogans principally rouse economic fears, with arguments about the invasion of ‘Turkish plumbers’ now replacing former worries about eastern European migrants swamping the EU. Opinion polls in Germany confirm that most of those opposing Turkey’s membership do so for economic reasons. While still dormant in view of the low levels of Turkish immigration, similar worries could also become a factor tilting the now relatively favourable attitudes towards Turkey in member states such as Italy, Spain or the UK. In member states such as Germany and Austria instead, migration worries are also linked to wider fears about economic globalization and the erosion of the welfare state, despite the fact that the immigration of young Turkish
migrants could help ageing European states confront their monumental pension system problems. Others still in member states like France, Austria and Holland cast their arguments about Turkish immigration in the more emotional language of societal integration or lack thereof. Unlike arguments pitched within the framework of ‘Europe’s role in the world’, these arguments focussing on Turkey’s impact on member state economies and societies view Turkey’s size and demography as a threat rather than an asset. It is these concerns that induce member states to pre-empt the future by inserting the possibility of ‘permanent derogations’ to the full liberalization of the four freedoms in future member Turkey. This opens the worrying prospect of Turkey’s second-class membership in all but name.

A second element of member states’ understanding of the costs and benefits of Turkey’s accession relates to the realm of security. For some countries such as Greece or Cyprus, the understanding of national security principally hinges on relations with Turkey itself. Indeed for Greece, national security is the primary reason why Turkey’s accession is accepted, yet only on the basis of Turkey’s fulfilment of what Greece would like to see framed as clear-cut conditionalities relating to Greek security interests. These conditions would include issues directly related to Greek interests such as the Aegean, Cyprus or the rights of the Orthodox community in Turkey, as well as issues indirectly connected to Greek interests such as the rebalancing of Turkey’s civil-military relations which would allow, amongst other things, Greece to cut its defence budget. It is precisely because Turkey’s accession is conceptualized through the lens of national security that other ‘unsecuritized’ issues pertaining to Turkey-EU relations, irrespective of whether they are viewed as assets or liabilities, are considered non-issues in Greece. A similar argument applies to Cyprus, where the impact of Turkey’s accession is discussed exclusively within the framework of the Cyprus conflict. Far more so than Greece however, Greek Cyprus is more inclined to use all sticks at its disposal lest Turkey refuses to toe the Greek Cypriot line on the conflict.

In the case of other member states such as the UK, the security impact of Turkey’s accession is framed in relation to other threats and interests. Turkey’s accession process and the impact of its membership is viewed positively because of the prospects for deepening Anglo-Turkish police and intelligence cooperation over terrorism. The 2003 Al-Qaeda bombings in Istanbul created a close bilateral tie
between the Turkey and the UK, inducing especially the British defence community to emphasize the security benefits of Turkey’s accession to member state Britain.

3.2.4 The impact of Turkey's accession on Turkey

A last variable, unsurprisingly discussed very little in the EU, while receiving greater albeit still limited attention in Turkey, is the impact of Turkey’s accession on Turkey itself. The primary observation to make here is that the impact of the accession process on Turkey hinges upon the nature and extent of the domestic transformation engendered by the accession process, thus creating a critical link between the effectiveness of conditionality and the expected impact of accession. The impact of accession or rather of the accession process on Turkey is already being felt, not only in the domestic political realm, but also in the economic and foreign policy domains. Since the beginning of Turkey’s accession process, the levels of trade between Turkey and the EU have steadily risen, European FDI in Turkey has gathered steam, and Turkey’s production cycles are increasingly following those of the EU economies. Also in the realm of foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy allegedly approximates increasingly that of the EU, as revealed by positions adopted by Turkey and the EU in multilateral fora such as the UN. In other words, the accession process is already impacting upon the Turkish domestic political system, economy and foreign policy in a manner that could make the question of membership and its impact far less salient over the accession years.

This is not to say that Turkey’s accession process and the expected impact of membership is cost-free. It is striking that little attention is paid not only in the EU but also in Turkey to the potential losers of membership in Turkey. The impact of the accession process on ordinary citizens is seriously under-researched, yet the waning support for membership in Turkey (as in other candidates before it) suggests that key sectors of society could seriously lose out from the accession process. Turkish citizens are already being deeply affected by rising living costs and economic restructuring. These changes, while being generally associated to the consequences of modernization and economic globalization, are more specifically linked to the EU accession process. Unless carefully tackled, these costs could seriously undermine the public support necessary for a monumental transformationist project such as EU membership.
4. The Conditioning Factors Pitching the Discourse: Stakeholders’ Interests, Perceptions and Prejudice

What explains why some EU and Turkish stakeholders pitch their arguments on one level and not another? Why has the UK focused on foreign policy, Finland and the Commission on conditionality, Slovenia on energy, France on institutions and public opinion, and Germany, Austria or Denmark on immigration? Why was negative public opinion not raised as a source of concern in Austria with respect to Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria’s membership, but emphasized as a prime problem in the case of Turkey? Why is Turkey an issue in public political debate in France, Germany, Austria, Greece or Cyprus and not in Finland, Italy, Poland, Slovenia or the UK?

When unpacking the discourses in Europe on Turkey and vice versa, three principal factors condition when and why some stakeholders focus on some issues and not on others: interests, perceptions and prejudice. Naturally these three factors are closely interlinked: the underlying interests of different constituencies shape the formation of perceptions and prejudices on Turkey and the EU; those interests in turn are moulded on the basis of prevailing perceptions and misperceptions about the EU and Turkey.

4.1 Domestic politics and interests

A first conditioning factor influencing the public debate in different European countries is the manner in which the Turkey question intersects with the goals and interests of different constituencies in member states, including political parties, bureaucracies, the media, civil society, Diaspora and migrant communities, business, industrial or agricultural lobbies, foreign policy specialists and defence establishments. In order to delve into the EU-Turkey discourse, it is of prime importance to understand the domestic political rationale of the Turkey debate in different member states, and the main constituencies with a stake in that debate, constituencies which may either generate or diffuse ideas in favour and against Turkey’s accession, at times for reasons which are often unrelated to EU-Turkey relations.

One key factor influencing the domestic political rationale of the EU-Turkey debate is the extent and manner in which this debate is linked to national identity politics in different member states. Wherever the Turkey question is part and parcel of the debates on national identity,
the EU-Turkey question is often an issue in domestic politics. In France for example, the Turkey debate is inextricably tied to the domestic political ‘battle’ between secularists and Catholics, whereby the former appreciate Turkey’s secularism while being wary of the Turkish state’s control of religion, while the latter highlight Turkey’s religion as an argument either in favour of Turkey’s accession in a multi-religion Europe or against Turkey’s accession on essentialist grounds relating to Turkey’s different religion. In Germany, Austria and Denmark instead, the debates on national identity are related to the different views on the role of existing Turkish and Muslim migrant communities in the definition of national identities. In other words, particularly in Germany – the member state with by far the largest Turkish Diaspora in Europe – the debate about Turkey’s EU accession reflects the different views about the German identity itself, ranging from Kohl’s explicit emphasis on Christianity as opposed to Fischer’s or the Greens’ emphasis on multiculturalism, the latter being linked in no small measure to Germany’s change in its citizenship law in 1999. By contrast, and in view of the small Turkish communities in Finland, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden or the UK, debates about national identity in these countries have little or nothing to do with Turkey, explaining in part the lack of public debate on Turkey beyond expert elite levels. Yet if the Turkey question were to become an issue in the contested definitions of national identities in these countries, its level of attention in public debate could rise, not necessarily to the benefit of EU-Turkey relations.

Another issue shaping the extent and nature of the debate on Turkey is the level and type of contact with Turkey itself. Again, depending on the degree and nature of contact and acquaintance with Turkey, views on the EU-Turkey question may radically change. In countries such as the UK and Poland, the Turkey question is debated predominantly within private elite circles, in which expert discussion encourages a relatively detached and fine-tuned assessment of the pros and cons of Turkey’s accession. In other contexts instead, the contacts and interests of specific groups shape the nature of the debate on Turkey. The large Armenian Diaspora in France or the defence establishment in the UK critically feed and generate ideas shaping national views on the EU-Turkey question. Geographical proximity also plays a role in determining the degree and type of contact between different EU actors and Turkey, shaping the interests or non-interests regarding EU-Turkey relations. For obvious geographical reasons, Turkey plays a far more prominent role in the public debate in Greece than it does in Finland. Despite incomparable differ-
ences in terms of absolute size and weight, to Finns the expected impact of Estonia’s accession was far greater than that of Turkey, explaining the differences in the levels of public debate in Finland about the former case compared to the latter. Economic and social contact is also important. The rising trade levels between the UK or Germany and Turkey, growing British and German business and property investment in Turkey, and rising levels of British and German tourism in Turkish coastal resorts, all contribute in diffusing ideas about the expected positive impact of Turkey’s accession in Britain and Germany. This contrasts to other member states such as Austria, whose business and trade links with Turkey are still rather low. Finally historical ties also play a critical and often negative role, rendering Austria or Greece’s instinctive attitudes towards Turkey far more sceptical than those of other member states.

4.2 Perceptions of ‘Europe’

A second conditioning factor shaping the debate on EU-Turkey relations is the different perceptions of Europe within the EU and Turkey. Different ideas of what the EU is or should be critically shape the manner in which different actors view Turkey’s accession. Simply put, differences in attitudes depend on whether the EU is perceived as a matter of domestic or foreign policy.

Where the EU is viewed through the lens of domestic policy, the focus of attention rests on the ‘inside’, that is on factors affecting the EU’s internal set-up in terms of institutions, society, economics, identity and culture. It is the widespread perception of the EU as a matter of domestic policy that raises the stakes of questions such as Turkey’s impact on EU institutions, budget, social cohesion and agriculture. This is especially the case in member states such as France and Germany, as well as in the Commission, whose mandate deals primarily with internal EU policies. The perception of the EU as an internal political project by many in France and Germany also heightens the importance attributed to such issues as Turkey’s impact on migration flows within the enlarged EU. Rising and changing migration patterns have implications on the formation of the EU’s internal identity, an identity emphasized much by those who focus on the Union as a political project. For others, such as British conservatives, it is precisely the dilution of the European political project entailed by ongoing enlargements that consolidates support for Turkey’s accession.

By contrast, those who view the EU primarily through the lens of for-
eign and security policy tend to focus on different issues, with correspondingly different positions on EU-Turkey relations. Many in the UK, Finland, Poland, Slovenia and Turkey itself, perceive the EU as a matter of foreign policy. As such, they are far more inclined to highlight the impact that member state Turkey would have on the EU as an international actor in neighbouring regions such as the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. As opposed to those who view the Union as a matter of domestic policy and express concern about extending the Union’s identity and borders to Iraq, Iran or Syria, viewing this very fact through the lens of foreign policy encourages different and often more positive views about Turkey’s EU membership. Seen from a foreign policy angle, Poles, Germans and Slovanes praise Turkey as an asset in promoting Europe’s energy security; British and Danes emphasize Turkey’s collaboration in the fight against terrorism; British argue that EU member Turkey would strengthen EU-NATO cooperation as well as EU-US relations; and security specialists highlight Turkey’s contribution to EU defence capabilities, referring to Turkey’s participation in European defence efforts in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Macedonia and the Congo. To these actors, the internal dimension of the EU is of secondary importance. Hence for example, even if a Polish security specialist appreciates that Turkey’s membership may entail a redistribution of structural funds away from Poland, he/she may well favour Turkey’s accession in view of the positive implications it would have for the EU as a foreign policy actor.

4.3 Misperceptions and Prejudices about Turkey

A third conditioning factor shaping views on EU-Turkey relations are perceptions, misperceptions and prejudices about Turkey itself. Particularly after the attacks on 11 September 2001, Turkey is frequently viewed both by supporters and opponents of its EU accession as a Muslim or ‘Islamic’ country. The current geopolitical context encourages many in Europe and Turkey to highlight religion as a main defining feature of what Turkey is, what it can contribute to Europe and what instead it detracts from it. Yet this essentialist understanding of Turkey makes these arguments, whether in favour or against Turkey’s membership, equally problematic. Either way, misperceiving Turkey primarily through the lens of ‘Islam’ means assuming that Turkey is the ‘other’; an assumption which in the long-run could hinder Turkey’s European integration.

Most frequently, viewing Turkey as ‘Islamic’ works directly to the detri-
ment of EU-Turkey relations. In a historical moment when civilizational prisms often shape Europe’s self-understanding, Turkey falls into the ‘wrong’ category, lumped together with millions of other people, with their respective religions, traditions, languages and cultures, into the black box of the ‘other’. Turkey’s European integration is resisted by those who associate it to the failure of integrating Muslim migrant communities in Europe. This expected failure of integration fans fears about the negative impact of Turkey’s accession to the EU, as well as the inability of EU conditionality to transform the inherently ‘different’ Turkey into accepting European values, beliefs and codes of action. In some instances, these arguments verge on outright racism and xenophobia. This is often the case when the understanding of Turkey as the ‘other’ is transposed into the realm of security, encouraged by fears about ‘Islamic terrorism’. In other instances, these arguments are simply ill-founded. There is no concrete reason why Turkey’s integration into the EU should mirror in any way the integration of Pakistanis in the UK, Algerians in France or Moroccans in Spain. Believing this to be the case not only arbitrarily ascribes primary importance to one definition of identity, i.e., religion, but also presumes causal links which simply do not exist.

Less frequently, Turkey’s ‘otherness’ is used as an argument in favour of its EU accession. To those viewing the EU as a matter of domestic policy, the integration of Muslim Turkey could aid the integration of Muslim migrants into the EU, regardless of whether these communities have any connection to Turkey beyond the loose link of religion. To those viewing the EU as a domain of foreign policy instead, the integration of a ‘different’ member state such as Turkey could help the EU confront its security threats and seize the opportunities in the turbulent East. Turkey, the argument goes, could act as a ‘litmus test’ demonstrating that Islam and democracy can be compatible, and can thus represent a ‘model’ or an ‘inspiration’ to other ‘Islamic’ countries. Premised on the assumption that there is an inherent tension between Islam and democracy, Turkey is mentioned as the quintessential test case demonstrating how this tension can be resolved; Turkey becomes the exception that confirms the rule. To others instead, Turkey can act as a ‘bridge’ to the ‘Islamic world’. Many have suggested that Muslim Turkey could help the Union ‘enter’ the East, allowing it to hedge and confront the security threats emanating from this region, ranging from terrorism to illegal migration. Yet these ‘positive’ arguments about Turkey’s potential role are based on precisely the same mental categories, the same forms of
‘othering’, as negative arguments shunning Turkey in view of its ‘different’ identity. In other words, the mental categories used are the same, irrespective of whether the arguments are set in the framework of the ‘clash of civilizations’ or benign variants of an ‘alliance’ or ‘dialogue’ of civilizations. In both cases, two main identity boxes are artificially classified and defined, leaving Turkey in the uncomfortable position of having to act as a ‘litmus test’ reconciling the two or as a tenuous ‘bridge’ between these hypothesized radically different worlds. These arguments are problematic not only because they are superficial and prejudiced, but also because they hinder a deeper understanding between the EU and Turkey, necessary for the accession process to succeed.

5. Closing the Circle: the Links Between Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice

Many of the arguments presented in this report are closely interlinked. There is a circular relationship between several of the arguments about conditionality, impact and prejudices discussed above. By way of conclusion, several of these interconnections are brought to the fore, indicating the possible vicious and virtuous circles underpinning discourses on Turkey’s European integration.

EU conditionality towards Turkey is closely tied to European debates about Turkey’s impact on the EU. When the debate about Turkey’s impact is framed as an additional condition in Turkey’s accession process – a condition that is up to the EU and not to Turkey to fulfil (i.e., the debate about the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’) – then the credibility and effectiveness of EU conditionality diminishes. For conditionality to be credible and effective, it must essentially be viewed as the prime determining factor shaping the evolution of the accession process. When other factors, lying beyond the volition of candidate Turkey, are flagged as determinants of Turkey’s European future, then Turkey’s incentives to transform in line with EU conditions are dramatically reduced. In this respect, Greece’s position towards Turkey, while being amongst the most hardline in Europe, is also amongst the most credible. Particularly since 1999, Greece has credibly demonstrated to Ankara its genuine interest in seeing Turkey enter the EU, albeit following Turkey’s fulfilment of conditions that Athens would like to see increasingly framed through EU conditionality. By contrast, the French and Austrian decision to hold referenda on the Turkey question as and when Turkey will
have completed its accession process seriously undermines the credibility of conditionality towards Turkey.

To a lesser extent, the very debate on the desirability of Turkey’s EU membership also hinders the effectiveness of conditionality. Much as the European debate on Turkey cannot be stopped or stifled, that debate does tarnish the Union’s credibility in Turkey. The political debate on Turkey should ideally have taken place before 1999, that is before the political decision was consensually taken by the Union to embark upon an accession process with Turkey. Casting into doubt that primary political decision over the course of the accession process cannot but reduce the effectiveness of the accession process in Europeanizing Turkey.

The success of conditionality in terms of its transformation effect on Turkey also affects and may determine Turkey’s impact on the EU. As noted above, Turkey’s impact will depend largely on which Turkey enters the EU, in terms of its political system, its society, its economy and its foreign policy. A credible and effective EU policy of conditionality can strongly influence whether Turkey’s impact on the EU is positive or negative.

Conditionality and prejudice are also closely interlinked. The widespread perception in Turkey of anti-Turkish prejudice in Europe reduces the credibility of EU conditionality. Rather than being viewed as the sine qua non of the accession process, EU conditionality, particularly when changing in response to political contingencies, is viewed in Turkey either as European double standards, or as evidence that whatever Ankara says or does, prejudiced Europe will never accept Muslim Turkey into its fold. This deep-rooted belief reduces the effectiveness of EU conditionality, ignites a sense of rejection and alienation in Turkey, reawakens Turkey’s ‘Sèvres syndrome’, and in doing so provides ammunition for those in Turkey who abhor the prospect of a Europeanized country.

On the other side of the coin, European prejudice against Turkey has put Turkey in the difficult position of having to meet EU standards without EU confidence that it is able to do so. By viewing Turkey as ‘different’, European expectations are on the one hand that the Union cannot afford to compromise on conditionality towards Turkey, and on the other hand that Turkey is unlikely to meet the Union’s ‘standards of civilization’. Hence, any violation of EU values and conditions committed by Turkey, such as the prosecution of novelist Ohran Pamuk or the assassination of journalist Hrant Dink, are seen as evidence of Turkey’s incorrigible unEuropeanness; its unbridgeable civilizational gap with ‘Europe’. Likewise, when in the run-up to the opening of accession
negotiations in 2004, Turkey considered re-penalizing adultery, the event was widely reported in Europe as irrefutable proof of Muslim Turkey’s backwardness, ignoring the fact that the penalization of adultery persisted in Christian Austria until 1997. Turkey is thus trapped between the Scylla of EU conditionality and the Charybdis of European prejudice.

Finally, the existence of anti-Turkish prejudice in Europe, as well as Turkish assumptions about European prejudice against it, discredit the value of arguments about Turkey’s prospective impact on Europe. Turkey’s accession can have both positive and negative impacts on the different dimensions of the EU. So far, debating these impacts has served more to undermine than to enhance Turkey’s accession process. Unless these vicious discursive circles are broken, Turkey’s accession process is likely to remain at best bumpy and uncertain; at worst it runs the risk of serious setbacks. However, if these public debates on Turkey can be articulated with greater clarity and understanding, they can also bolster Turkey’s accession course. Lucidly debating the Turkey-EU question can help both the Union and Turkey identify the areas of possible costs and benefits, in order to work during the accession years to strengthen the former while hedging against the latter. Rather than focussing on static and rather abstract notions such as ‘absorption capacity’, a debate about what Turkey and the EU can do so that Turkey can be successfully absorbed and integrated into the Union could significantly raise the likelihood of success of the accession process. A shared public debate across Europe could also increase solidarity between the peoples of the EU and Turkey, that sense of solidarity upon which the European project is founded.
1. Introduction

On several occasions Polish authorities have publicly stated that they support Turkey’s membership in the EU. Opposition parties do not seem to be inclined to formulate their final stance on this issue. In general, the future of Turkey is being discussed in Poland among experts and academics rather than by politicians. Obviously, the interest for Turkey is growing, especially among academics. The prevailing mood in seminars and conferences where Turkish EU membership is debated is positive.

The rationale of our government’s positive approach has not been lucidly explained to the public. Therefore, one can only speculate why Polish politicians have chosen to take a pro-Turkish position rather than locate themselves safely within a larger group of those who prefer to ‘wait and see’ or to say ‘in principle yes, but…’. I believe that the reasons are rooted in the ideological premises of our major political party. In foreign policy, leaders are security driven. From a security perspective, Turkey’s value is hard to match in Europe. This is not only because of the country’s military potential, but also for its vicinity to oil and gas fields in the Middle East and Central Asia (where Poland is in a desperate quest for diversified deliveries of energy carriers). The Polish President and Prime Minister have been rather vague about their preferences for the EU’s institutional construction. Nonetheless, their preference seems to be beyond doubt for a loose confederation of nations, in which each mem-
ber state preserves as much sovereignty as possible. Turkey’s entry would in their eyes probably not be beneficial for the deepening of the Union and this is not viewed in a negative light. Beyond these considerations, there are few historic and cultural ties between the two countries. The few that exist however fuel negative feelings amongst the public, when compared to the generally positive attitudes towards Turkey’s accession ambitions of the Polish political class. One may expect that Poland’s position may however become tougher when Turkey becomes part of the debate about the distribution of structural and cohesion funds within the next financial perspective.

2. Conditionality

In the political realm, challenges are rather well identified, serious and manifold. Turkey’s membership perspective has made it possible to introduce profound reforms in Turkey and to break taboos that seemed hitherto untouchable. The accession process however cannot play the role of an unwavering stabilizing anchor for the domestic situation, since Turkey faces more profound dilemmas in its internal politics, in its relations with the EU as well as in ties to specific member states than any candidate in the past.

On the surface, the conditions put by the EU to Turkey are not different from those applied to other candidates. In the political sphere, the most frequently discussed Turkish problems have been: the role of the military, the Kurdish question, the judiciary and detention system, gender policy and limitations in the freedoms of non-Muslim religions.

Formally, the position of the military in politics has been reduced in the process of the reforms (i.e., through reforms in the composition and competences of the National Security Council, the radio and Television Board and the Higher Education Council). Yet the army remains an influential player, with sufficient power to limit and sometimes control the decisions of the government. Opinion polls confirm that the army is the most trusted state institution and its unique role in political life is accepted by a large segment of the Turkish population. To the secular establishment, which suspects the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of an Islamist ‘hidden agenda’, the generals are perceived as defenders of the Kemalist national ideology and the integrity of the state. Further limitations of army competences – necessary from the point of view of the division of functions within a democratic state –
seem therefore unlikely. In turn, EU actors have been put in the awk-
ward situation of having to choose whether to side with the Turkish gov-
ernment or to tolerate the intervention of the military. Notable cases in
point have been divergences between the AKP and the military over the
use of headscarves in offices and schools, or the access of religious *imam-
hatip* school graduates to universities). In the context of a possible
reawakening of orthodox Islamism and a wave of nationalism in the
country, finding the right balance between the AKP’s reform plans and
the concerns of the generals is no easy task. Thus, for the EU it is cru-
cial not only to promote firmly the concept of democratic and civilian
control of the army, but also to find effective instruments for commu-
nication with Turkey’s political forces, military and public opinion in
order to facilitate gradual, steady and safe progress of the reforms.
Doubts concerning the likelihood of Turkey’s EU membership cast a dark
shadow over hopes for the solution of the protracted Kurdish problem.
Since granting Kurds more rights and freedoms is one of the preconditions
of EU accession, we are caught in a vicious circle. There are significant
groups in different political, administrative and media institutions in Turkey
accusing the EU of pushing for reforms in this area, thereby instigating the
territorial disintegration of the Turkish state. At the same time, amongst
Kurds, one can find extremists who exclude any compromise with Ankara.
Bearing in mind the 2007 election climate in Turkey, it would be rather
naïve to expect the government to take the political risk of making substan-
tial concessions on this question in the short term. Part of the problem is
that there are no powerful Kurdish political groupings, distancing them-
selves from extremists, which enjoy the legitimacy and standing to negoti-
ate with central authorities. Unfortunately, the government does not
encourage the formation of moderate Kurdish elites. This is not least
because the Turkish authorities are exposed to the attacks of nationalists,
even from within the governing party. The task is that of reaching the nec-
essary consensus, with the aid of external policies, to decentralize the state
apparatus in a manner that would not threaten Turkey’s territorial integrity.
The EU’s weakness in promoting change in this area however has a
more general character and is linked to the Union’s lack of influence
over developments in Iraq. The Union has a very modest say in shaping
the regional, national and religious structures of the crumbling Iraqi
state. Therefore it is not in a position to propose a set of viable guaran-
tees that PKK militants would not be trained in northern Iraq, an issue
which is and will be of vital importance to any Turkish government in
dealing with the Kurdish question.
By contrast, in its consecutive Regular Reports, the European Commission acknowledges substantial improvements in the area of human rights. One of the most important results of the legal changes adopted in 2001-2006 is a rapid growth of civil society in Turkey (7m Turks are now associated to different NGO initiatives). These reforms concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms have not yet caused negative reactions by major formal or informal political groupings. This fact allows for optimism as regards further changes in the future. Turkish authorities still have to remove restrictions on the activities of non-Muslim (and Alevite) religious communities. Improvement should be achieved in other areas as well, such as freedom of speech, the position of women in the legal and social realms, or the removal of restrictions on the functioning of trade unions. Yet the really acute challenges have to do with the internally displaced persons, many of whom live in extremely precarious conditions. Here enhanced joint efforts of Turkish authorities and the EU are urgently needed.

The accession negotiation chapters do not directly tackle issues of political reform, but during the last enlargement rounds, the Copenhagen criteria were accepted as preconditions for starting an effective negotiation process. They were not invented to make Turkey’s life difficult and should not come as a surprise to Turkish negotiators and politicians. Therefore, EU institutions can legitimately pose questions and advance recommendations to Turkish partners and expect reforms aimed at strengthening democratic institutions, fundamental freedoms and the respect of human rights. While tracking the progress of legal and institutional reforms, EU institutions should do as much as possible to make Turkish citizens on the ground aware of their rights. Unlike in Russia, Turkish NGOs are not prohibited from cooperating with foreign counterparts and many of them are keen to do so. A good information policy on what EU norms mean for Turkish citizens would help consolidate the line and aims of reformers.

The situation is more complex when it comes to EU political expectations which go beyond the Copenhagen criteria. In the case of Cyprus, Brussels is pressuring Turkey to open its harbors and airports while not allowing products from Northern Cyprus to enter European markets. People on the street do not understand why Turkish Cypriots are penalized for hav-

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1 However, there is a question of double standards if the fourth criterion, i.e. the readiness of the EU to absorb a new member, gains more weight in the case of Turkey than in previous enlargement rounds.
ing accepted the Annan Plan and why Cyprus succeeded in joining the EU without meeting the first Copenhagen criterion calling for democracy and the stability of institutions. There is no doubt that if the EU does not undertake steps to help the Turkish Cypriots, its credibility will continue to drop. Many Turks perceive the EU’s upgrading of the Cyprus question, the Aegean dispute and acknowledgement of the Armenian genocide as membership prerequisites for Turkey, as clear proof that the Union does not genuinely want Turkey’s negotiations to succeed. The drop in support for EU membership in Turkey (from 75% to 55%) does not help pro-EU Turkish politicians pursue their reform project.

At this stage, the second Copenhagen criterion concerning the existence of a functioning market economy does not seem to pose major problems on the Turkish side. After the disastrous financial crisis of 2001, Turkey’s economy has recovered impressively. The customs union is functioning without major difficulties and Turkish entrepreneurs are proving their ability to face European competition. Nevertheless, further reforms are needed. The most urgent is an effective regional development plan. While the Aegean southern coastal regions of Turkey do not differ much from average EU living standards, the eastern and central regions of Turkey remain underdeveloped, with poor education and health care services and meager employment opportunities. Aware that a substantial part of these handicapped regions are populated by Kurds (and Arabs), it is imperative to recognize that the problem is not solely economic but also political and that it needs to be addressed in all its complexity.

As was the case with the last two enlargement waves, the ability to implement the acquis communautaire – the third Copenhagen criterion – remains, paradoxically, a yardstick characterized by somewhat doubtful precision. Due to their historic experiences and social traditions, different EU member states attach different degrees of attention and importance to specific legal regulations adopted or not adopted in candidate Turkey. For some, equal gender rights are of crucial value. Others may be more sensitive to corruption and to the ineffective judiciary system. The reality is thus subjective, whereby different actors place different value on the different achievements and faults in Turkey’s adherence to EU legislation and practice.

3. Impact

Hypothesizing on the impact of Turkish accession is a risky undertaking. In reality, we might be talking about a fairly distant future, since more
concrete EU analyses of the ability to absorb Turkey will be possible only after the current financial perspective (i.e., after 2013), when the member states, the Commission and the European Parliament decide whether to cover new members in the coming budgets. More importantly, there is no legal framework in existing EU Treaties allowing for enlargement beyond Romania and Bulgaria. Those advocating Turkey’s membership will have to keep their fingers crossed for a successful turn in the EU’s constitutional future following the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty. Today any evaluation of Turkey’s possible inclusion in the EU necessarily has a highly speculative character. Even at this early stage of negotiations, it is obvious that Turkey’s membership perspective has yielded very positive results for Turkey itself. The country has progressed on the path of democratizing its state and social fabric. More transparency, an improved banking system and privatization have translated into solid GDP growth, lower inflation and an unprecedented inflow of FDI. Although the pace of reforms was slower in the last year, both the political class and society are aware and have experienced that deep changes are attainable in a short time-span.

As far as the EU is concerned, previous enlargements have always brought a positive stimulus to the EU economy. There is no reason to believe that Turkey’s entry would have a different effect. Turkey is a huge and dynamic market, with a promising growth potential. Additionally, Turkey, via its pipeline system, could offer Europe access to the oil and gas deposits of the Caspian Sea basin. If and when the political situation in the Middle East stabilizes, Turkey could also become a natural transit route for hydrocarbons from that region. This network could be accompanied by railway connections, realizing an important part of the European TRACECA project.²

Two outstanding issues will have to be resolved and will require political and psychological preparation. In negotiations with the last twelve candidates, the EU refused to concede permanent derogations from the acquis communautaire. In the case of Turkey however, it is the EU itself that has declared that the final accord could include derogations from some EU laws, meaning a possible exclusion of Turkey from the free flow of labor and from the Common Agricultural Policy. Today, we are still far

² Turkish politicians’ recent talks with their Kazakh partners on filling the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline with Kazakh oil and using the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway connection are promising in this respect.
from requiring solutions to these problems, but it is not too early to ask if we really want this kind of ‘incomplete’ membership for Turkey. While it may reduce fears in Europe, it is difficult to forecast the impact of such an approach on Turkey’s future reform efforts in the sensitive areas of social and regional policy. It should also be calculated that our ageing Europe will need an influx of fresh blood, and Turkey could contribute much to this quest. Central and East European members do not have the demographic potential to ease the Union’s problems in this area.

The prospect of Turkey’s inclusion in the European system makes institutional reforms of the EU even more urgent. Paradoxically, ‘the menace of approaching Turkey’ might be helpful in reforming decision-making procedures in the Council, the composition of the Commission and the role of the Parliament in line with the challenges facing Europe. Perhaps, keeping in mind Turkey’s membership could make it easier for European politicians to gradually remove and reform the outdated Common Agricultural Policy, whose extremely protective instruments have blocked WTO agreements and harmed developing economies. Moreover, assuming the EU really wants to develop a CFSP and adopt the necessary institutional set-up to do so, a co-operative Turkey, or even better, a Turkey playing ‘in our team’, would be of inestimable value. With Turkey – which has good relations with Israel as well as different Palestinian factions, with close ties to the Jordanian establishment, ready to take part in the settlement of the Lebanese conflict, having solved touchy issues in its relations with Syria – the EU’s posture in the Middle East would be qualitatively different. With EU funds and Turkey’s natural resources and proximity, the Middle East water question could be solved. For the Caucasus, Turkey is ‘the Western neighbour’, a good trading partner and, for some, the only tangible alternative model to a post-Soviet centralized and personalized system of governance. In the early 1990s, Ankara overestimated its potential in post-Soviet Central Asia, but returning to the region with the EU would make Turkey a far more attractive partner. The EU’s influence on Iran’s nuclear programme would also rise given Turkey’s relatively good relations with Tehran. In the Balkans, Turkey has already shown that it is a reliable partner for the EU. Turkey does have eminent problems in its vicinity (Cyprus, Armenia, Northern Iraq), but for the sake of Turkey and of Europe those questions could be disentangled far more easily if Turkey were to have a guaranteed perspective of full membership.

In some European capitals there are fears that Turkey’s inclusion would strengthen Washington’s hand in the Euro-Atlantic equilibrium. This
argument could have been valid some five years ago. Partnership with the US remains amongst the highest priorities in Ankara, but in several important instances, Turkish politicians took positions much closer to those of Paris or Berlin than those of Washington (e.g., regarding Iraq, Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). At the same time, Turkey appreciates stable and strategic US-EU relations, which are in line with the dominant view in Europe as well.

In time, negotiations with Turkey will probably revitalize the internal debate on Europe’s identity. If unity in diversity is still the right description of what Europe is about and what Europe’s power of attraction is, then Turkey’s inclusion would mean enriching rather than distorting that identity. If we reject Turkey because it has a different religion, culture, art, cuisine and way of life then we will have to redefine the very concept of ‘Europeanness’.

When we consider making negative use of the fourth Copenhagen criterion – i.e., the readiness of the EU to take in another member state – our credibility seems to be at stake. Until now, starting negotiations has meant that both parties have shown commitment to finalizing the process with full membership as an outcome. Meeting the ‘objective’ Copenhagen criteria has amounted to an effective guarantee of entry. European presidents and heads of states were fully aware of this in 1999 when they granted Turkey candidate status.

4. Prejudice

The nature of anti-EU prejudice in Turkey is manifold and has many causes. Turkish scholars have done an excellent job in exploring the minds of their compatriots. My personal observation is that many of those who support reforms in Turkey have difficulties in promoting their pro-EU policies whenever Turkey is referred to by Western politicians and media as an outsider, as something distant and different in culture. Whatever the temporary difficulties with membership negotiations, it is in the EU’s interest that Turkey feel it is an insider in the European family in dealing with broader regional and geopolitical challenges. Nationalistic feelings in the ‘refused and alienated’ Turkey are on the rise. Fundamentalist Islam can triumph if Turks are rejected as not fitting into the Christian European Club. For different reasons, while having progressed substantially in many crucial political and economic areas, Turkey is now in the difficult position of problematic relations with both its Western partners: the US over Iraq and the EU over
Cyprus. Only if underlying prejudices are effectively tackled can a positive balance be reinstalled and can Turkey serve as a key element in the transatlantic alliance of ideas and interests.

Prejudices and negative feelings about Turkey’s accession are not uniformly distributed in Europe. They are stronger in countries with sizeable Muslim communities (France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Austria). Those preconceptions differ in character. They stem partly from the failure of integration policies in some Western European countries. There, immigrants preserve their distinct culture, habits and religions, and at times have ostentatiously rejected the Western value system. However, disapproval of Muslim immigrants increased after the rise in terrorist attacks and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. This has occurred alongside a revival of nationalism (and sometimes chauvinism) in the politics of some European countries. Often those who mistrust the ‘Muslim aliens’ also neglect the fact that Turkey, like other countries, is unique in its own way.

However, in Central and Eastern Europe, anti-Muslim prejudices are contained. Several of the smaller eastern member states such as Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and the Czech Republic have been negative towards Turkey’s membership for reasons mainly linked to the fear that membership would entail a shift of resources away from them. Prejudices and preconceptions are weaker amongst political and cultural elites. This may raise some hope that a good information policy could limit the impact of underground and prejudiced opinions on the conditions of Turkey’s accession.
2. CONDITIONALITY, IMPACT AND PREJUDICE IN EU-TURKEY RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM SLOVENIA AND ‘NEW EUROPE’

Borut Grgic

1. Overview

Turkey’s future in the EU is uncertain largely due to the rise in recent years of the political conservative centre in Europe. This is especially true in ‘old Europe’, not least in view of its struggle with the consequences of certain aspects of globalization. In some respects, the Turkish issue in Europe is both endogenous to the Turkey-EU relationship itself, and exogenous to it, i.e., it is linked to Europe’s wider relationship with global market trends and geopolitics. With economic considerations at the forefront of European politics, coupled with France’s uncertain role within changing intra-European balances, Turkey’s relationship with the EU; is unlikely to advance smoothly in the period ahead.

The new EU member states are unlikely to feature prominently in the EU-Turkey debate for at least three reasons. First, unlike in France, Germany and Austria, new member states have not had direct experience with the Turkish people. The Turkish population in new EU member states is small. The eastern European members have also not had much contact with the Muslim world more broadly. By contrast, the political, economic, societal and cultural issues connected to the presence of Turkish and Muslim communities in Europe have become domestic electoral issues in ‘old Europe’. At times these questions have also been factors determining electoral outcomes. In Eastern Europe instead, the debate on Islam and Turkey remains confined to intellectual circles and think-tanks. If anything, Turkey in ‘new Europe’ features
most commonly in discussions couched in the anti-Russian and energy prisms. Most actors in ‘new Europe’ see the added value of Turkey’s EU accession in its ability to stand as a reliable non-Russian energy transport hub to the Caspian basin, rich in gas and oil. In terms of energy security ‘new Europe’ is sensitive to the impact of Turkish membership, but missing a local Turkish contingent, there is less prejudice built into the ‘Turkey debate in ‘new Europe.’’ Second, trade between Turkey and ‘new Europe’ is far below the volumes reached between Turkey and several old member states such as Germany. For one, new EU economies are much smaller in size. This also means that there are less well established economic interest groups supporting or opposing Turkish membership in these countries. For example, labour unions in old Europe have often spoken against Turkish membership, in view of their concerns against the swamping of EU labour markets with low-skilled and low paid Turkish workers. These actors and their arguments have represented powerful political vehicles in shaping political trends in old Europe. This is not at all the case in ‘new Europe.’ The labour unions are far less sensitive to arguments concerning the prospective impact of Turkey’s membership on the labour market. Finally, defining and promoting the EU’s Black Sea dimension is currently not a top priority issue for the EU. The present lack of strong EU external ambitions in the Black Sea undervalues Turkey’s overall strategic weight in intra-European discussions. Only when Romania, Bulgaria and Greece will be able to push the Black Sea dimension up the EU’s ‘to-do’ list will Turkey’s leadership be able to cash in fully on its regional position with respect to the EU. At present, the EU has no clear concept of the Black Sea region due to the internal inconsistencies on how to deal with Russia, and how to balance Moscow’s role in the Black Sea and further to the east. There is profound disagreement between new and old Europe on how to manage Russia. With leadership changes expected in France, the UK and Russia, and with German Chancellor Merkel constrained by the broad coalition supporting her government, one should expect no new clarity in EU-Russia relations, and this will continue to impact – at least indirectly – on the EU-Turkey relationship. Above all, the perception of Turkey in new Europe is driven by intellectual discussion of impact and security rather than by internal politics and established interest groups. This has at least two implications for Turkey. First, it is unlikely that east European countries will feature as central players in the EU debate on Turkey. Second, in so far
as the debate on Turkey’s future EU membership remains confined to the question of impact, the end game remains uncertain and vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. The perceptions of security are subject to change and the discussion on impact is readjusted to the changes in the external environment. For this reason, the political support in new Europe for Turkey’s EU membership is likely to be volatile over the medium term.

2. Public Opinion in New EU

Analyzing public opinion in Eastern Europe suggests that there is little consistency on the Turkey question. The Polish public for example is supportive of Turkey’s EU endeavours, but this is not the case in Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary or the Czech Republic. The fact that all of these economies are growing, while their publics remain firmly opposed to Turkish membership, suggests there is no direct correlation between the state of the economy and (negative) public opinion on Turkey. However, there is a degree of difference in how each of these states perceives its energy security, in particular how each manages its energy dependency on Russian gas. Poland sees itself most vulnerable but also best positioned – politically – to break Russia’s monopoly on gas supplies to east Europe. Slovakia for its part deals with Russia with greater ease. There is a degree of cooperation between the two states, also in the gas sector. This suggests that the impact of Turkish membership on energy security in EU and new Europe is less relevant to Slovakia’s thinking on Turkish membership than to the calculations made in Poland.

Second, there is hardly a link being made between Islam and Turkey in the public debate in new Europe. Poland, which is one of the most politically pro-Christian countries, is the one most openly supportive of Turkey’s EU accession.

Turkey also enjoys strong support in Bulgaria and Romania. This however has more to do with the Black Sea dimension than with Turkey’s EU perspective itself. Again, the impact of Turkey’s membership and its Black Sea dimension is case specific to Bulgaria and Romania. It is not likely that this dimension holds the same degree of impact in central and east EU countries. For this reason, the public support for Turkey in Bulgaria and Romania is positive, and unlikely to fluctuate in the medium term.
3. Conclusion

There are two conclusions which can be drawn on Turkey’s position in ‘new EU’. First, considerations on the impact of Turkey’s EU membership is driven by exclusive considerations of Turkey’s impact on energy security and political independence from Russia. In some instances, Turkish membership is also considered in terms of its impact on the geopolitical balances. In the Western Balkans, Turkey’s role is interpreted through the geopolitical competition in this region by the peripheral EU states.

Second, the attitudes of new member states towards Turkey is likely to be driven by conditionality. There is hardly a domestic political constituency in ‘new Europe’ to hold strong views on Turkey, or Islam for that matter. This raises the likelihood that the positions of new EU on the Turkey question will be conditioned primarily by an ‘objective’ interpretation of conditionality. Given this reality of the debate in ‘new Europe’ Turkey should present its membership bid by stressing its impact and relying on its strict adherence to EU conditions.

New Europe’s public attitude towards Turkey

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Source: Euro Stat
1. Introduction

Turkey’s possible accession to the European Union has been one of the most controversial issues on the Union’s agenda. The question of Turkey’s full membership involves all possible geopolitical aspects, from demography to cultural identity, from geostrategy to economics, and from the internal European political balance to the EU’s relations with the US and the Middle East.1 There is a heated debate revolving around the question whether Turkey would contribute to strengthening Europe as a global player or lead to the EU’s dissolution. Critics portray Turkey as the Trojan horse which will split the Union. The defenders of such an approach regard Turkey as being simply too different, too large and too poor to be integrated into the Union. Opponents often refer to a European identity and regard Turkey’s alleged non-European identity as a hindrance to its full membership. While opponents see Turkey’s closeness to the Middle East as a threat and fear that Europe might become involved in the troubles in this area, proponents of Turkey’s membership take exactly the opposite view. Defenders of Turkey’s entry have highlighted Turkey’s role as a bridge between East and West. They have also emphasized Turkey’s impor-
tance as a model for other countries in its neighbourhood. In contrast to those who fear that closeness to troubled areas in the East might destabilize the EU, supporters of Turkey’s full membership have often defended the view that Turkey’s democratic dynamics could spill over and contribute to peace and stability in the region.\(^2\)

Turkey’s misfortune is that its candidacy for membership has been discussed at a time, characterized by internal crisis in the European Union and a highly polarized cultural environment. Deep divisions over the future of the European project prevail. Instead of a common European spirit, national considerations seem to have regained prevalence. While a group of countries led by Britain see Europe’s future in a strong transatlantic alliance and a loose economic rather than deep political union, others pursue the idea of the EU as an anti-pole to the US. The deep rift between the two camps widened in the run-up to the War in Iraq and was later cemented by the disagreement over the ‘Turkish Question’.

The structural and economic crises in some ‘old’ member countries have fuelled euroscepticism amongst their populations. This has supported a trend towards political polarization, the re-emergence of nationalism and related phenomena such as xenophobia.

European societies have entered a difficult process of social, political and economic transformation. Economic turmoil, the deconstruction of the welfare state, and the perceived shift of (low- and medium-paid) jobs in the manufacturing sector towards ‘cheaper’ regions have caused fears and uncertainties. This has supported a growing sentiment of isolationism in Europe. The so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ is one of the consequences of Europe’s new isolationism, suspicion against migrants and Muslim migrants in particular, is another.

The questions of Islam and the integration of Muslim communities have become matters of great concern. The London bombings, carried out by people recruited from seemingly integrated Muslim migrant communities, and the riots in the French suburbs were events which exposed the reality that Europe needs to tackle new and difficult challenges, which have been neglected for many years. Unfortunately, since September 11 and the ‘War on Terror’, the debates revolving around Islam and Muslims have often been characterized by prejudices, anxiety and suspicion.

\(^2\) It is rather interesting that members in an exposed geographic position, situated at the borders of the EU, such as Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Britain or Sweden have been much more positive in regard to Turkey’s Europeanness than countries situated at the geographical core of Europe.
The Turkish question has often been dealt with in the shadow of these unsolved challenges, charging it with the related fears and preconceptions. As a matter of fact, the Turkish question and how it is being dealt with offers an insight into Europe’s present condition, its problems and its painful soul and identity search.

2. Fears and Prejudices: The example of Austria

Austria has been a particularly interesting case with regard to culturalist approaches. As is generally known, Austria is considered – together with France, Greece and the Greek Cypriots – a hardliner on the ‘Turkish Question’. At first, Austria tried to hinder, delay and stop the opening of accession talks with Turkey. Since the negotiations have been opened, Austria, together with the other three, has taken a tough stance against Turkey on several occasions. The latest example was in December 2006, when Turkey refused to implement the protocol of the customs union to the Republic of Cyprus.

However, although these four countries may have acted together on several occasions, their strategic interests differ radically. While Greece and the Greek Cypriots have an interest in the continuation of Turkey’s EU process, Austria is keen to see negotiations break down.

The ‘Turkish Question’ has been given considerable coverage in the media and has played an important role in political debates and the campaigns of political parties. This is rather astonishing, given that Turkey plays a rather minor role in Austria’s foreign affairs. Austria’s strategic, economic and political interests lie in the Western Balkans, its historical sphere of influence. Austrian elites see the European integration of the Balkans as a precondition for peace and stability in the region. Given Austria’s geographic proximity to the region, Vienna perceives itself as the historical centre of the area covering the old Habsburg Empire. Austrian business and insurance companies and banking institutes have been highly active in the region. For all these reasons, stability in the Western Balkans is a vital interest and constitutes a priority in Austrian foreign affairs. By contrast, Turkey’s integration into the EU is seen as difficult and as conflicting with Austrian strategic, political and economic interests. Therefore, Austrian

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3 Austria has been very keen not to link Turkey’s accession with that of Croatia. Croatia, which has been strongly supported by the Austrian government, started negotiations with the EU at the same time as Turkey.
politicians and opinion makers have often favoured a privileged partnership instead of full membership for Turkey, without elaborating however on what exactly such a partnership would entail. While the elites have pursued the stabilization and integration of the bordering Balkans region, the Austrian public, in general, has been highly critical of any further enlargement.

Austria’s post World War II national identity has been strongly built on social stability. The welfare state with its institutions such as the so called ‘social partnership’ has been seen as one of the country’s greatest achievements, and has been a source of pride for Austrian citizens. Globalization and neo-liberal economic policies in the recent years have accelerated the country’s economic transformation. An increasingly competitive atmosphere in the labour markets has caused uncertainties. Due to the country’s geographic proximity there is a general fear of labour migration from the cheaper ‘East’. While the country’s leading companies have economically benefited from Eastern enlargement, employees and small scale producers fear the negative influences of economic integration with the cheaper labour markets in the neighbouring regions.

Economic globalization, the destabilization of the welfare system and the fears connected therewith have supported the return of historically rooted patterns and narratives. In consequence of the opening towards the East, the self-perception of being an outpost of Western civilization has regained a momentum. This deeply rooted historical narrative has upheld the myth of Austria as a bastion of Western (Catholic) civilization in the struggle against the East, represented in history by the Turks. Many castles, stories and tales support these historical images.

Given this historical pattern, the debates on Turkey have mainly revolved around the country’s lack of ‘Europeanness’. Turkey has been perceived as fundamentally different, in moral, cultural and political terms. It has served as the convenient ‘other’, telling us what Europe is not. In this context, Turkey has been ‘Orientalized’, helping to define Europe by contrast; a contrasting image, idea, personality and experience. This discourse has constructed fixed, static, incompatible and mutually exclusive identities. The shortcomings of Turkey’s democracy, such as human rights abuses, the situation of women or discrimination against minorities, have often been explained by essentialist arguments, such as Turkey’s culture.

or religion. Arguments against Turkey’s membership often contain pre-conceived images of a static and closed society. These ‘culturalist’ arguments are on the one hand the result of historical narratives which have conveyed images and preconceptions of the threatening ‘other’, and are on the other hand, built on the current experiences with Turkish migrant communities, which seem to confirm these images.

The Turks represent the largest and most visible migrant community in Austria. The Turkish Gastarbeiter turned immigrant, who wants to stay in Austria and who claims cultural particularity, is a rather new phenomenon in the Austrian context. Increasing numbers of migrants, their ghetto-ization, and the seemingly low degree of (visible) integration of Turkish migrants have further enhanced the fears connected with migration. Many of these Turkish migrants are considered to be culturally and visually different and are not perceived as a part of Austrian (European) society. Likewise, there is the fear that Turkey might not be able to integrate into the European Union either.

As there seems to be no cultural, political or economic interest in Turkey’s membership, the issue of Turkey has been easily politicized by all major political movements in Austria, and all parties with the exception of the Green Party have clearly dismissed Turkey’s membership. But most strikingly, the political campaigns of the far right parties FPÖ (Freedom Party) and BZÖ (Union for the Future of Austria) have played up anti-Turkish prejudices and stereotypes. Turkey and the Turks have been used as representatives and symbols of Islam as such, and they have been portrayed as a major threat to Austrian, Christian and European culture. These recent campaigns have fanned fears of Islam and Überfremdung (‘over-foreignization’) and the rhetoric has

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6 From 2004 onwards, the Social Democrats (SPÖ) gradually swung towards an anti-Turkish rhetoric. Today’s Prime Minister Gusenbauer stated in 2005 that ‘Turkey in the EU would mean the end of the EU, if it does not happen before anyway’ (Alfred Gusenbauer in a European Stability Initiative interview, 23 May 2005) The conservative People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democrats (SPÖ) agreed in their coalition pact to hold a referendum over the question of Turkey’s membership, once the negotiations are concluded. Both parties have also confirmed their view that a privileged partnership would be more appropriate for Turkey-EU relations. While social democrat movements in other countries have usually been counted amongst the supporters of Turkey’s membership, the Austrian Social Democrats have chosen a rather populist stance, which is closer to the conservative rhetoric of a ‘European cultural identity’.

7 The latter emerged from the former of the two parties, when the parliamentary club and the then members of the coalition government split from the more nationalist and rightist groupings within the former party (FPÖ).
inspired xenophobic feelings and Austrian Catholic, folksy, populist nationalism. While images of Afghan Talibans and fully-veiled women were shown on party bills, the Freedom Party’s blue-eyed leader H.C Strache was presented in a historical context as Prince Eugen, the historical figure who saved Vienna from Turkish conquest in 1683. Probably the most xenophobic slogan of the electoral campaign for the general elections held in October 2006 was the Freedom Party’s ‘Daham statt Islam’ telling in Viennese dialectic ‘Home instead of Islam’, and ‘Keine TürkEU’, which can be translated as: ‘No Turkish EU’. Given that Turkey’s membership is not seriously supported by any significant political, cultural, intellectual or business lobby in Austria⁸ and that the ‘Turkish Question’ has not been discussed in a balanced and neutral fashion, but has been charged with rightwing and xenophobic overtones, it is not surprising that public support for Turkey’s accession has further diminished. Whereas disapproval for Turkish membership was around 50-60% over the 1990s, it reached 80% in 2005 and over 90% in 2006.⁹

In an internet poll conducted by the Turkish Embassy in Vienna, 74% of the participants declared that Turkey was not a European country. 40% claimed they would disapprove of Turkish membership even if the country fulfilled all the necessary conditions and no labour migration would take place. 20% stated that Turkey must never be allowed into the Union.¹⁰

Poll figures about previous rounds of enlargement show that support can fluctuate. Yet, although support for countries such as Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania remained rather low, this was neither made into a topic of public debate nor cited as an impediment to the accession of these countries.¹¹ In order to avoid polarization and further frustration, responsibility thus falls on elites, but also on Turkey, to engage the public in an open and rational debate weighing pros and cons beyond mere culturalist arguments.

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⁸ Even the Green Party, which was the only political movement welcoming the opening of negotiations, is divided over this question.
¹⁰ http://wien.orf.at/stories/169524/
3. Conditions

Whereas Turkey experienced an unprecedented reform boost over the last years, which opened the way for membership talks with the European Union, Turkish democracy still struggles with many deficits. Many of the democratic reforms have remained on paper and are insufficiently converted into everyday life. Key institutions such as the judiciary, the security forces and the army seem to be particularly resistant to democratization and civilian control, especially when the government is not to their taste.

The 1982 Constitution created a multi-party democracy contained by a legal framework that was undemocratic in spirit. It strengthened the state instead of society or the individual. Turkey has been suffering from a historically rooted tradition of the sacredness of the state, which remains rather aloof from society. While the state establishment represents the centre, common people represent the periphery. Activities independent of the state have traditionally been regarded with suspicion.

The Turkish nation was designed as a unitary community, with an identity formed around the paradigms of a common morality, tradition and religion. The aim was to unite Turkey’s heterogeneous society into one body politic. The founding fathers of the Republic were not concerned with local, social or ethnic differences within society, but wanted to create a nation as an organic social concept, without social or religious divisions. United under the guidance of the state, different social groups would work together for the welfare of the national community. Members of the higher bureaucracy and the army see themselves as the guardians of this Kemalist legacy and often perceive any class, regional or specific religious demands as a danger to national unity and security. Kemalists regard the secular order as the guarantee of a free choice of lifestyle; they have put the principle of secularism in an iconic position, over and above democracy. While the Turkish system has enabled its citizens to lead a life free from religious constraints, it has equally provided a limited choice in the realms of religion and ethnicity. Since the Kemalist elites have always been wary of an Islamist reaction, they have tried to control the direction of Turkish society through authoritarian state institutions, such as the army the judiciary and the educational system.  

understanding of the state which has caused most of the problems in Turkey’s democratic transformation.
The founding myth of modern Turkey has been strongly connected to anti-imperialism and the struggle for national sovereignty. The memories of the Peace Treaty of Sèvres, which stipulated the partition of the country after World War I, and the subsequent national War of Independence pounded attentiveness to foreign foes and their internal collaborators into the public mind. School education and textbooks have conveyed a statist narrative, which has been passed on from one generation to the next, and has remained rather unchallenged and unquestioned over the years. Turkish history is taught in the light of the founding myth of the modern nation state. It narrates the phoenix-like rise of the Turkish nation which bravely shook off the yoke of foreign occupants and their internal collaborators. Maps of a partitioned Turkey and conspiracy theories have supported the Occidentalist images of the imperialist, Western ‘other’. As the Turkish public education has left rather little room for individual critical thinking, very few members of society have dared to question the dark spots ignored by this statist narrative. Critical episodes of Turkey’s history have been left out or denied. Any thinking which lies beyond the lines drawn by the state’s narrative is viewed as a threat to the unity of the nation. Today, all issues suspected of affecting national unity and state sovereignty are viewed with extreme circumspection and intransigence.13

Linked to this, a recent opinion poll revealed that 50.3% of the Turkish population thinks that the European Union aims to partition the country.14 Nationalist rhetoric about the flag, unity and national sovereignty, a common feature of Turkish politics, can easily reawaken dormant nationalist sentiment. While the prospect of future membership in the EU generated enthusiasm and led to new political and social alliances, the statements against Turkish membership emanating from European leaders, the law recently passed by the French parliament concerning the question of the Armenian Genocide, as well as the European Union’s stance on the Cyprus issue have caused distrust amongst Turks. Voices that ‘Europeans’ only aim at extracting concessions from Turkey without giving anything in return have become more frequent.15

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In the process leading to EU membership, Turkish society will have to overcome the feeling of being under permanent threat from both inside and out. It will have to openly deal with unpleasant and unpopular issues from Turkey’s past. Problems such as the Armenian question and human rights abuses in the war against Kurdish separatists or leftist groups will have to be discussed in an open and free atmosphere. Today, many people in Turkey still accuse those who tackle these questions of being traitors and collaborators of foreign powers.\(^\text{16}\)

Article 301 of the penal code, criminalizing ‘insulting Turkishness’ is seen as one of the major obstacles to freedom of speech and thought. Many prominent intellectuals and writers, including Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk as well as the recently assassinated writer and journalist Hrant Dink, have been accused on grounds of Article 301. While the government signalled its willingness to amend the law, the drafts for the new law revealed that the text might be amended, but that the spirit of the law, protecting the state from critical individuals, would remain in place. As the tragic murder of the Turkish-Armenian Hrant Dink revealed, ultra-nationalist, anti-democratic and authoritarian power circles are still strongly represented in the state apparatus.\(^\text{17}\) The so called ‘derin devlet’ (deep state) has always gained particular strength at times of weak political leadership, political turmoil and struggle with terrorism and separatism.

In order to tackle problems such as human rights abuses, the Kurdish question and civil-military relations, Turkey will first have to strengthen its liberal democratic culture and then decentralize its state apparatus. The centralized Turkish bureaucracy brings extensive powers together in its hands. Any significant decision has to gain the approval of the ponderous Ankara bureaucracy. Whereas there has been a lot of reform talk in previous years, the fear that decentralization might lead to power falling into the hands of


\(^\text{16}\) Cemil Çicek, the Minister of Justice accused the academics who planned to hold a conference on the Armenian Question of stabbing in the nation’s back.

\(^\text{17}\) Dink, the publisher of the Turkish-Armenian bilingual weekly AGOS, a liberal thinker who was often the guest of round tables and TV discussions, was murdered by a 17 year old nationalist. After his detention, pictures appeared which portrayed the perpetrator surrounded by policemen holding up the Turkish flag and celebrating the murderer as a national hero. Later, the media revealed that there had been several warnings before Dink’s assassination, concerning his security, which were all ignored by the authorities.
Islamist or Kurdish movements, has hindered the adoption and implementation of these reforms. There is the constant fear that liberalization and democratization might weaken the unitarian and secular character of the Turkish state and open a backdoor for Islamist or separatist movements. Reforms are painful, as they shake long-held traditions, disturb established power circles within the state apparatus and destabilize internal balances. Turkey today seems more than ever to be undergoing a process of deep socio-economic and political transformation. However, democratization is not complete and, while this process would require much support from the EU, the tenuous commitment of some EU members to Turkey’s accession and the contradictory and inconsistent statements emanating from European leaders on Turkey have supported nationalist voices calling for isolationism in Turkey.

Although the suspension of eight negotiation chapters in response to Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and air-carriers caused indignation in Turkey, this measure does not seem to be regarded as seriously punitive. In general, as long as the European Union cannot pursue its institutional reform and reactivate the constitutional process, the accession negotiations with Turkey are likely to drag on for years, moving from one crisis to another. Turkey’s full membership cannot be expected to take place as long as the EU has not resolved its internal problems. However, there also seem to be other barriers to Turkey’s membership, such as the Union’s absorption capacity and the approval of the European public. Opponents such as France and Austria have announced that they will hold referenda over Turkey’s accession once the negotiations are concluded. While the involvement of the broader public in European matters is an important step towards the Union’s democratization – which will hopefully reconcile common people with the European idea – it becomes problematic when referenda are only applied as a means to exclude Turkey from membership. It is to be expected that the opponents of a Turkish membership will try to keep the conditions for accession high, and that further conditions might be created.

18 The Kurdish DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) failed to pass the 10% threshold, but is rather well represented at the local level.
20 After all, the idea of a referendum has been raised only in regard to Turkey, while it is not planned in the case of Croatia, for example.
Nevertheless, since the predominant view amongst even the opponents of Turkey’s membership is that Turkey should not be alienated, one cannot expect a definitive halt to the negotiation process. The continuation of the negotiations is the only guarantee to keep the reform process in Turkey going.\footnote{See; Heinz Kramer (2007) \textit{EU-Turkey Negotiations, Still in the Cyprus Impasse}, SWP Research Paper, January.} But the fact that the EU simply cannot decide what it wants as far as Turkey is concerned is leading to a decline in Turkey’s willingness to comply with the EU’s demands.

4. Impact

Taking a global perspective, Turkey is situated at the cultural, political and geostrategic crossroads between the East and the West. Turkey’s distinctiveness lies in its hybridity, which combines Western features with Islamic culture. While some voices in Europe as well as in Turkey have argued that it is precisely Turkey’s Islamic nature which excludes it from being European, from a historical perspective, Turkey is undeniably part of the common European culture and history. The Ottoman Empire fought wars, forged alliances and had vivid cultural and economic exchanges with most of the European nations. Particularly in the Balkans, Turkish rule has left deep and lasting cultural traces. In 1856, Turkey was integrated into the Concert of Europe, including the dominant powers, which aimed at stabilizing the region and ousting the emerging Russia from the scene.\footnote{In March 1856, after the end of the Crimean War.} Although this was rather a formality, it confirmed that Turkey was considered a European power. Furthermore, Turkey has been integrated into most European institutions for many years.

The European project has been highly successful in creating a ‘security community’ in an ever expanding ‘democratic peace’ zone in Europe. This project has helped to reconcile the French and the Germans, the Poles and the Germans, the Hungarians and the Romanians and many other nations, which have a long history of war and political rivalries. From this perspective, Turkey’s accession is imperative for the success of the European project. Turkey’s integration into the ‘European peace’ zone would not only contribute to enlarging the zone of peace and stability, but it would also have important implications for the regions sur-
rounding Turkey, even if these countries do not have membership prospects. Instead of a security consumer, Turkey is on the way to becoming a key security exporter. Turkey could act as a soft power, irradiating peace, stability and prosperity. Particularly the US and Britain have seen Turkey as a model for other Muslim societies in the region. Even if Turkey’s ability to serve as a model for the compatibility of Islam and democracy is highly doubtful, it cannot be denied that the adjacent Arab world watches Turkey’s democratic and economic transformation carefully. Today, Turkey is on the way to becoming a vibrant economic centre in a greater Eurasian region and a bridge for oil and gas pipelines connecting the Middle East and Central Asia to Europe. Turkey’s GDP has doubled in the last ten years and growth rates point to the continuation of this trend. An economically strong and politically stable Turkey, as a member of the European Union, would certainly open new fields and markets, and enhance the Union’s role as a global player.

Finally, the fact that the EU will have to deal with Turkey somehow might have a positive effect on the EU’s search for a common future. Recently, the question of Turkey’s accession has fuelled the idea of a two-speed Europe. This entails the concept of a core union, with deeper political and military integration, which might include countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, and a number of other countries, which are sceptical of political integration, such as Britain, the Czech Republic, Denmark and many new member states, which do not seek a ‘United States of Europe’. The idea of a two-speed Europe has strong supporters, as it would also allow for Turkey’s integration into the Union, without jeopardizing the concept of a political union.

1. Introduction

Following the collapse of the Cold War order and after a rather painful period of transition, especially in security terms, a key defining feature of the geopolitical environment as viewed by Greece is the progressive enlargement of the country’s ‘strategic space’. The relevant geopolitical landscape is now much wider than in the past, as a result of Greece’s continued Europeanization and more widely of globalization. Today, Greece’s strategic outlook is more European in nature than at any time in the post-World War II period. Moreover, as Europe’s geopolitical horizons have expanded, so have those of Greece.

The trend toward a more European strategic outlook has been reinforced over the past few years, partly as a result of the stabilization of relations with states in Greece’s immediate neighborhood, in the Balkans and, above all, in the Aegean. Greece’s geopolitical environment is now a mix of regional and global elements, with many prominent functional issues cutting across regional boundaries.\(^1\)

The progressive ‘Europeanization’ of Greece and Greek policy has evolved over time. Almost all of Greece’s foreign policy issues, including the strategic relationship with Turkey, have gradually but firmly

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been placed in a multilateral, European context. Indeed, the decision to move towards a policy of détente and rapprochement with Turkey has been emblematic of this ‘new look’ in Greek foreign policy. This departure from the ‘Aegean Cold War’ of the years between 1970 and 2000 is strategic in nature, and not simply tactical.2 Greece has sincerely supported Turkey’s accession to the EU as a matter of strategy. A stable, democratic and prosperous Turkey would be a reliable neighbour and partner to Greece and a stabilizing factor in the area. Greek support for Turkey’s EU aspirations though, is not unconditional. It is dependent upon the fulfillment of all the conditions and requirements set by the EU in the Negotiating Framework and the Accession Partnership, the cornerstones of Turkey’s accession process. In this regard, for Greek elites and public opinion the December’s 2006 European Council conclusions, suspending negotiations with Turkey on eight chapters of the *aqcuis* are a strong but appropriate message to Ankara. Negotiations cannot go on in a ‘business as usual’ mode. There are consequences for not conforming to the conditions and requirements set by the Union. At the same time, the negotiation process may continue.

2. Supporting Turkey’s EU vocation

The issue of Turkish accession to the EU has been the most important foreign policy challenge for Greece. The management of Greek-Turkish relations has acquired a near existential dimension for Greek security planning for almost half a century. The context of Greece’s approach to Turkish efforts to pursue European integration is almost exclusively defined in security terms. Any attempt to understand the post-1999 shift towards strong support for Turkey’s EU membership must be placed in this context. This explains why there is no real debate about the impact of Turkish accession on both the EU and on Greece in other policy domains beyond security, be it the economy or the institutional fabric of the EU. Since the early 1960s, Turkey has been the main concern of Greece’s security policy and the driving force behind most of its foreign policy

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2 The relationship between Greeks and Turks is influenced by the fact that the two peoples have for many centuries lived together and apart, in peace and war, in trust and suspicion. Some elements bring them together; others drive them apart. Geography, history, culture, psychology, religion, business and economic activity, education, social and many other factors are the factors in the equation.
designs. Actually, Turkey has dominated Greek security thinking and the identification of its strategic needs and priorities. The 1974 Cyprus crisis was regarded as the major turning point in post-WWII Greek security considerations. For the vast majority of Greek elites and public opinion the Cyprus crisis was a traumatic experience, but also the basis for ‘new thinking’ in security policy.

The crisis resulted in, among other things, the dual realization of, first, the limited value of NATO and US dependency as a security asset against the perceived Turkish ‘revisionism’, and second, the limits of Greece’s ‘internal balancing’ efforts, even with the dramatic increase in defence spending. Therefore the quest for the adoption of a more sophisticated ‘external balancing’ strategy became, in the minds of Greek policymakers, the only way to enhance Greek deterrence. To this end, full participation in the European integration project appeared as the most appropriate forum for the country’s external balancing initiatives vis-à-vis Turkey.

Greece’s primary goal was to use the EU’s assets as a system of political solidarity and security capable of activating diplomatic and political levers of pressure to deter Ankara from potential revisionist adventures in the Aegean. For over 25 years, this policy was expressed through a series of Greek vetoes to any European policy designed to institutionalize further the EU-Turkish relationship.

Following a number of bilateral crises in the 1990s over the Aegean and Cyprus, Athens became conscious of the fact that this policy could not work with recurring turbulence and that tension could not be easily kept at manageable levels. The potential for unwanted escalation was high as the 1996 crisis over the islets of Imia demonstrated. Moreover, as Greek convergence with the EU’s economic prerequisites climbed the national agenda, Athens started to question the basic feature of Greek-Turkish competition, namely the existing and intensifying arms race. Greek defence expenditure – the highest among EU member-states – constituted a heavy fiscal burden for the Greek economy, especially at a time when Greece was completing the implementation of an economic austerity programme in order to fulfill the criteria for membership into the European Monetary Union.

Thus, Greece was facing the difficult ‘guns or butter’ dilemma. The dilemma came down to Greece’s ability to sustain an adequate deterrence capability while concomitantly advancing into the inner cycle of European integration. Both goals were considered as essential for the country’s future. To achieve them both, Greece had to undertake
a series of initiatives that would persuade Turkish strategists that cooperation with Greece would be far more beneficial for Turkey than competition.

Efforts to effectively balance the Turkish threat without undermining credible military deterrence would be coupled with engaging Turkey in a context where Greece enjoyed a comparative advantage, namely the EU. In the minds of Greek foreign and security policy elites, the EU was the best available forum for setting priorities and placing demands in accordance with European principles on those countries wishing to become members. The conviction was that the strengthening of Turkey’s European orientation would engage Ankara in a medium- and long-term process of reform that would eventually lead to the adoption of a more cooperative attitude towards Greece. This was clearly reflected in the Helsinki European Council’s decision in 1999 to grant Turkey an EU candidate status. At Helsinki in fact two major conditions were attached to Turkey’s candidacy: first, Turkish claims concerning the ‘gray zones’ in the Aegean and the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf had to be submitted to the International Court of Justice, if all other efforts failed; and second, the accession of Cyprus to the EU would not be conditional on the resolution of the Cyprus problem.3

At Helsinki, the EU acknowledged a linkage between Turkey’s European orientation, the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict over the Aegean, and the solution of the Cyprus problem. Thus, Greece managed to confine both the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes within an EU context, and to closely link them with Turkey’s accession path. In addition, Greek policymakers believed that Turkey’s integration into the EU would eventually entail certain costs for Turkey, especially at the domestic level. By strengthening the democratization drive, it was expected that the civil-military establishment would be put under pressure to redistribute the country’s assets. Moreover, the military would be put under civilian control and new state elites would eventually redefine the ‘national interest’ in a manner compatible with European norms and contexts.4

This has been the rationale behind Greece’s sincere support of not a


virtual or *sui generis* but a real candidacy for Turkey. For Greece, supporting Turkey's adoption of European norms and values has been a grand strategic decision. Real progress by Ankara in this context will ‘anchor’ Turkey ever more closely to Europe and lend greater stability to Greek-Turkish relations, leading eventually to full normalization between the two countries and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Cyprus.

However, the challenge for Turkey is enormous and this is something that at least Greek elites are conscious of. So far, Turkish elites have not had to confront the dilemma posed on the one hand by a strong nationalist tradition and attachment to state sovereignty, and on the other hand by the prospect of sharing sovereignty in the EU. This is the first time Turkish elites have had to think differently about the nature of the state in a modern democracy. Even short of full membership, candidacy implies considerable institutional scrutiny, convergence and compromise. From the low politics (e.g. food regulations) to high politics issues, a closer relationship with formal EU structures will pose tremendous pressures on traditional Turkish concepts of sovereignty at many levels and will severely question (and has already been the case) the role of the military in Turkish politics. It is a process that has been difficult for all EU member states. Yet surrendering sovereignty has been one of the most fundamental elements of the EU’s success.5

For an EU member state, pursuing nationalist options outside the integration context has become extremely difficult and costly, if not impossible. For Turkey, the accession process, however long, will almost certainly reinforce democratic dynamics already unleashed in the 2000s, even if there may be occasional setbacks and slowdowns. The social contract between the state and the status quo-oriented middle classes seems to have weakened. Henceforth, the drive towards an accountable, transparent, and efficient government governed by the rule of law will go forward on a stronger social basis than ever before. Initial resistance and nationalist backlashes notwithstanding, the conviction in Greece is that membership will become all the more prized as an anchor for the cause of transforming Turkish state culture. The EU accession process will be instrumental to attracting much needed for-

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foreign direct investment, achieving better and more efficient government, securing the rule of law and realizing the prospects of widespread modernization.\textsuperscript{6}

The mainstream argument in Greece is that there is a need – for both countries – for a more ‘strategic’ approach towards each other. Both countries have a longer-term strategic interest in seeing Turkey’s EU vocation succeed. Turkey’s successful European adjustment has the potential of changing Greece’s threat perceptions, and fostering political and economic reform in a Turkey reassured about its place in Europe.

3. Perceptions and ‘technicalities’

But how do Greeks perceive Turkey’s European adjustment? Beyond issues related with the technical aspects of the \textit{acquis} or issues pertinent to the domestic reform of Turkish democracy, the paramount perception in Greece is that adjustment is a highly strategic imperative. With Greek and Greek-Cypriot insistence within EU decision-making circles, the ‘Helsinki context’ has been translated into a very demanding Negotiating Framework for Turkey, where the Copenhagen criteria have been complemented with a very specific set of requirements. These include Turkey’s unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations and to the peaceful settlement of its disputes; continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded; and the normalization of its bilateral relations with Cyprus.

For Greek public opinion, for example, it is inconceivable that the threat of use of force (\textit{casus belli}) against a member-state can be employed by a country that aspires to become a full member of the EU. The Greek goal is to reach full normalization of Greek-Turkish relations prior to Turkey’s accession. The belief is that the accession context is conducive to that end. It could lead to a dramatic transformation of the Turkish polity and policies.\textsuperscript{7}


The argument used by Athens is that Europe (and the US) will benefit from a more effective and predictable strategic partnership with Turkey. A key task for European and US policymakers is to make sure that Greek-Turkish brinkmanship no longer threatens broader interests in regional détente and integration efforts. The stakes of bringing to fruition this strategy of reciprocal accommodation are extremely high. Lasting rapprochement would yield enormous benefits for everybody involved.8

4. Qualifying the future

Greece has an overwhelming stake in a positive outcome of Turkey’s accession process. A collapse in Turkey-EU relations, unlikely but not inconceivable, would overthrow the strategy of engagement and ‘anchoring’ vis-à-vis Ankara, and could revive traditional sources of bilateral tension in the Aegean and Cyprus. This would put Turkish contingencies back at the top of the Greek defence agenda, with all that this would imply for national budgets, political energy and interests elsewhere. To most Greeks, future developments in Greek-Turkish and EU-Turkey relations will depend upon a set of factors.

First is the preservation of Turkey’s prospect of full membership. Other options short of full membership would undermine the strategic depth of the Greek engagement strategy with Turkey. A privileged partnership scheme would most probably result in removing from the EU-Turkish agenda all those issues that have made the Turkish accession process strategically attractive to Athens (human and minorities rights, normalization of relations with Cyprus, pressure on the Aegean issues, etc). It may satisfy some parts of the ‘old’ elites in Turkey, and the ‘Turko-sceptic’ coalition in Europe,9 but it would be a bargain that will not confer any real gain on Greece. On the contrary, it will result in a neutralization of Greece’s EU bargaining chips vis-à-vis Ankara. Such a development, without prior settlement of the Greek-Turkish disputes, would most probably be perceived as highly unattractive by Athens and would result in a return to the ‘age of vetoes’.

Second is Turkey’s ability to positively respond to Greek ‘openings’. So far, most of the changes in Greek-Turkish relations have come from the

Greek side. There has been no major shift in Turkish policy towards Greece. Without a Turkish gesture to match Greece’s lifting of its veto to Turkey’s EU candidacy and subsequent support for Turkey’s accession course, it may prove difficult for Athens to sustain domestic support for Turkey in the long run. Indeed, the Greek government operates with the benefit of the doubt even within its own party confines.

Third is Turkey’s willingness to fully adopt the *acquis* and structurally internalize the changes that it entails. The first step is to realize that accession negotiations are not a bargain. There is no choice but to proceed decisively with the full implementation of all the changes required.

Fourth is the Cyprus issue. Without progress based on the reality of Cyprus being a sovereign member of the UN and a full member of the EU, the current rapprochement will be hard to sustain over time.

Fifth are Turkish domestic developments. From Greece’s perspective three domestic issues and developments in Turkey are of particular relevance: the rise of Turkish nationalism; the polarization of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elements in Turkish society; and the emergence of a more dynamic private sector and a new constellation of interlocutors for continuing engagement with the EU and Greece.
5. CONDITIONALITY, IMPACT AND PREJUDICE IN EU-TURKEY RELATIONS: A ‘NORTHERN’ VIEW

Dietrich Jung

1. Introduction

Since the opening of membership negotiations between Ankara and Brussels in October 2005, Turkey seems not to have been able to come any closer to full membership in the European Union. On the contrary, three recent events show the critical atmosphere in which the accession negotiations are taking place. The first instance was the publication of the rather negative Progress Report on Turkey’s accession by the EU Commission in October 2006. The report concluded that reform efforts in Turkey had slowed down in 2006 and that there remain serious political deficits in areas such as freedom of speech and expression, minority rights, and the country’s civil-military relationship. In short, with regard to the reforms, stagnation seems to be the right word. Second, Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to traffic from southern Cyprus not only became an issue for European media debates, but also led to the suspension of negotiation talks between Brussels and Ankara in eight of the 35 chapters of the *acquis communautaire* in December 2006. In this way the unsolved political conflict in Cyprus is impacting quite negatively on the negotiation process. Finally, the assassination of the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007 put the democratic credentials of Turkish politics into question once again. Does this criminal case epitomize a more general problem of Turkey’s political culture regarding the full establishment of liberal democracy?
I will take the last issue, the murder of Hrant Dink, as my departure point for this paper on Turkey’s EU membership prospects. To a certain extent, the Danish media coverage of the Hrant Dink case highlighted a number of issues related to the three sets of argumentation – conditions, impact, and prejudice – which guide our project on Turkey and the European Union. In the Danish media, the assassination of Dink was discussed in close relation to Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which declares ‘insulting Turkishness’ a crime. Many observers made a direct linkage between this article and the motivation for Dink’s murder. As long as Turkey is not willing, so the argument goes, to fully reform its laws and institutions according to the Copenhagen criteria, the country has no future in the EU. While it might have been possible for the EU to deal with the democratic deficits of smaller countries after accession, Turkey is simply too big and too different for Brussels to be able to compromise with regard to the political, judicial as well as economic criteria.

It is in this manner that questions about the conditions and impact of Turkish membership have been raised in the Danish media debate in relation to the murder of Hrant Dink. Yet, the discursive context in which this debate has taken place is interesting. The conditions and impact are discussed against the backdrop of a rather stereotypical perception of Turkey. Accordingly, a number of media commentaries linked the murder of Hrant Dink directly to the question of whether Turkey will be able to meet ‘European standards of civilization’ at all. Are the Turks (read: Muslims) not part of an entirely different culture that is not compatible with ‘European values’? This example shows that the three dimensions of our investigation are only distinct from each other in analytical terms. In order to reduce the complexities of Turkey’s EU accession process, it makes sense to separate conditions, impact and discursive prejudices. In the reality of political every-day life however, the questions about conditions and impact are viewed through the lenses of deeply rooted historical stereotypes, and the three dimensions are often knitted together in a circular and mutually reinforcing argumentation. It is the central argument of my essay that Turkey’s prospects for EU membership are bleak if it proves impossible to break this discursive circle on Turkish-EU relations. In the following, I will try to give a brief analysis of the three dimensions from a ‘northern perspective’, including the discursive environments of Germany and Denmark.
2. Conditionality: Formal Reforms or Implementation?

There is no doubt that there are several fields in which Turkey still has to continue with the formal reforms of its legal and institutional apparatus. The last Progress Report on Turkey clearly indicated where these formal conditions have not yet been met. One of these fields is the area of individual and collective freedoms, highlighted by the debate on Article 301. The abolition of this article is certainly a necessity for adjusting Turkish criminal law to EU standards. More difficult, however, are the concomitant adjustments in the Turkish constitution. The results of the EU reform process are patently visible in the Turkish constitution, whose original version emerged in the aftermath of the military coup of September 1980. As in the 1960s, high-ranking Turkish officers supervised the drafting of the new constitution which was approved by referendum on November 7 1982. Although not formally abrogating basic democratic liberties, new provisions curtailed the right to enjoy them and enhanced the military’s role in the realms of politics and the judiciary. Therefore it comes as no surprise that hardly any article of the constitution has not seen amendments in recent years. Yet the ideological foundations for Article 301 also resonate in the stipulations of the preamble. There, we can find rather contradictory references to liberal democracy, individual rights, Turkish nationalism, Atatürkism, and the rigid and stifling notion of Turkish secularism. Unfortunately, it is stated in Articles 2 and 4 that these constitutional foundations of the Turkish republic are not amendable.

Article 301 is a direct expression of the spirit of Kemalist nationalism and the subordination of the people to the raison d’état. Another case in point concerns the problems relating to freedom of association. The legal restrictions on the formation of religious and cultural associations originate in the historically shaped political culture of the Turkish state. In order to meet EU standards, these restrictions will have to be lifted. Not only must religious and cultural groups have the free right of association, but the law also has to guarantee that these associations enjoy the character of juridical persons with full property rights. In this area, the whole set of legally guaranteed rights that builds the framework for civil society and a free public sphere is still awaiting a number of necessary reforms. The past years of reform have also seen the expropriation of the property of religious minorities by the state, based on the absence of a fully reformed law on associations. Given the speed and depth of the formal reform process in recent years, I am quite convinced that the
Turkish government is able and willing to meet – in formal terms – the conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria. The accession negotiations are therefore the appropriate straight-jacket within which to continue the reform process.

Regarding Turkey’s ability to fulfil the required conditions, the major problem is not formal reforms, but the transformation of new legal regulations into social practices. This becomes visible, for instance, in the EU’s critique of Turkey’s civil-military relationship. While acknowledging several radical legal reforms of state institutions, such as parliamentary control of the defence budget or reform of the National Security Council, the EU report indicates problems with regard to the public debate: Turkish generals still play a prominent role in Turkey’s political debate, presenting the military’s position in various fields of policy-making and criticizing the Turkish government. Indeed, looking at the discursive practices of Turkey’s public debate, the military still retains its political role. The Turkish officer corps’ well-established habit of meddling in political affairs will not disappear overnight merely as a result of a parliamentary decision. The necessary change in social conduct will take time and EU observers cannot expect a simultaneous transformation of both law and practice.

These examples point to the fact that the conditions for Turkey’s EU membership are less predicated on formal reforms than on their social implementation. However, while the first are visible in texts, the latter have to become practices that are regularly followed in Turkey’s social and political life. Their implementation is therefore a societal struggle, an arduous process of social change which can only be partly controlled by a government. What appears as a mere technical conditionality, in reality is prone to fierce political conflicts. In the course of the implementation process, individuals and institutions will gradually lose their privileged status in Turkish society.

The remaining problems with respect to the civil-military relationship and the frequent obstruction of government policies by the judiciary are two telling examples of the current battles about status, resources, and inherited privileges that have accompanied the reform of Turkey’s political and social institutions. The particular social and political context in which this political process in Turkey is taking place is expressed in the term of Turkey’s ‘deep state’, a mental and institutional structure that has developed over decades and which is rooted in parts of the military, the security apparatus and the judiciary. In combining a fierce form of Turkish nationalism with an authoritarian and state-centred notion of
politics, the deep state is, on the one hand, a legacy of the making of the republic. On the other hand, the arcane structures of the deep state have been strengthened and have taken on a new quality since the 1970s. In their struggle against Kurdish separatism, radical Socialism and Islamic fundamentalism, representatives of state institutions have even been willing to collaborate with right-wing political extremists and organized crime. In the course of the 1990s, the deep state has weakened the official state politically and economically. Black markets, criminal economic transactions and a huge shadow economy emasculated the tax authorities and directed economic resources into uncontrolled channels. The implementation of political and economic reforms is still struggling with these structures that have not yet vanished, impacting upon Turkish society.

This brings us back to the assassination of Hrant Dink. There is a tendency in the Danish public discourse to interpret all instances – even a despicable crime such as this – as proof of the lack of Turkey’s willingness to implement formal reforms. The ongoing reform of Turkey’s laws and institutions appears thus to be a smoke-screen behind which ‘non-European’ practices continue. Yet how is the implementation of reforms to be measured and when will Turkey be considered to have met the threshold after which no instance of torture, nationalist crime, legal fraud or abuse of state authority will no longer be considered proof of the insincerity of the whole Turkish reform process? To be frank, there is no objective measurement of the successful implementation of reforms. Conditionality is indeed not merely a technical affair. Rather, it is part and parcel of a political game which is conditioned by the changing political environments in both Turkey and the EU.

3. Impact: Size as Liability or Asset?

From another perspective, we must see conditionality as linked to ideas about the impact of Turkish membership on the EU in general. To be sure, in the successive waves of enlargement, no country entered the EU with completely transformed political and economic institutions. In comparison to Turkey’s experience with a multi-party system since 1946, the democratic political institutions of Spain, Portugal and Greece were in their infancy when these states entered the Union. The same applies for the Eastern European countries, which also went through a very quick and thorough transformation of their economies.
For all these countries, the reform process has continued within the framework of the EU, and it was their formal reforms rather than their complete implementation which eventually made them eligible for full membership. Ireland in particular is a case in point for the transformative power that EU membership in itself has exerted on a new member state. So why not give Turkey this chance to complete reforms in a first membership phase?

Looking at the political debate, three frequent arguments regarding Turkey’s impact on the EU are brought forward against this option: Turkey is too big, too expensive, and too different. The first argument, Turkey’s size, hardly holds against closer inspection – at least not in political terms. Given the institutional arrangement of the EU, it might be easier for Brussels to digest one big state than a number of small ones such as the new states in the Balkans. At the moment, the mere size of a country does not translate into political power in a linear way. On the contrary, small countries are politically much more influential than big countries as long as the EU does not agree on a scheme of institutional reforms, in particular the strengthening of its parliamentary institutions. Looking at its impact on the EU in general, Turkey’s accession has become hostage to the internal debate of the EU and the ‘too big’ argument has to be qualified within the context of this internal struggle for political reform and the future of the Union. The looming possibility of Turkey’s EU-membership has accentuated the EU’s internal reform debate, tied Turkish membership to the issue of institutional reform and thereby influences Turkey’s prospects of becoming part of the Union. If not so much in political terms, Turkey’s size certainly matters economically. However, it is a matter of pure interpretation whether size is perceived as a liability or an asset. There are a number of economic indicators which point in the direction of Turkey becoming a dynamic economic force within the EU rather than being a drain on resources. Growth rates, productivity, demography and trade relations are just some of these dynamic elements in the Turkish economy. From a macro-statistical point of view, Turkey is still a poor European state; however, with full membership not possible before 2014, this picture might change dramatically in the coming years. Nevertheless, in order to maintain Turkey’s economic development, a number of negative points have to be addressed.

Both Ankara and Brussels have to develop a strategy to tackle the huge geographical and social disparities in the distribution of wealth. So far, this problem has been tackled through shadow economies and internal
migration, rather than sound economic policies. With respect to the latter, Turkish politics will have to overcome its historically rooted structural weakness in formulating sound economic policies. Looking at party programmes, we are confronted almost with a vacuum regarding the economy. Another problem is the size and role of informal economic transactions. A large part of Turkey’s economic dynamism is still linked to black market activities. These not only entail tax evasion and thereby limit the developmental capacities of the Turkish state, but they also establish an economic foundation for some segments of Turkey’s middle class, which will necessarily erode under further reforms. From this perspective, the transformation of the informal economy requires a careful strategy so as not to undermine the political support of this middle class that might otherwise not benefit from EU membership.

Most visible however, is the impact of Turkish-EU relations on Turkey itself. Many European observers have expressed serious doubts about the intention behind Turkey’s EU membership bid. They often interpret the various obstacles in the country’s reform path within the theoretical framework that Samuel Huntington provided in his ‘Clash of Civilizations’. There, Huntington described Turkey as a ‘torn country’ in which the authoritarian state elite tries to anchor the country in the West against the will of the absolute majority of its population. However, the view from inside Turkey shows that Huntington’s picture is a mere caricature of Turkey’s political realities. Certainly, there is – as in all EU member-states – a broad coalition of EU sceptics. Currently, in this camp of Turkish EU sceptics we find strange bedfellows: authoritarian-minded secularists and Islamists alongside left- and right-wing nationalists. In particular, since the AKP government began with significant democratic reforms, this heterogeneous coalition of authoritarian-minded political forces has raised its voice.

Yet these representatives of authoritarian politics are increasingly outnumbered by a rising class of well-educated Turks who have embraced democratic values. Only a democratic Turkey, based on a functioning market economy and on the rule of law, will be able to provide this new democratically minded generation with the future it desires. They hold a genuine interest in the reform process and in the long run they will determine Turkey’s political future. It is therefore reasonable to predict that this generation will try to follow the road of comprehensive reform, regardless of the obstacles which domestic and European opposition to Turkey’s EU membership might create. To be sure, this internal struggle between democratic and authoritarian political forces has not yet been
decided and in the current situation the EU negotiation process provides a crucial straight-jacket for the country’s state elite to maintain the path of political and economic reform. Yet there is reason to be confident that the democratic and pluralistic forces in Turkey will prevail.

4. Prejudice: Islam and ‘European Values’

The above paragraphs indicate the difficulties in evaluating the impact of Turkey’s membership on the EU. The full integration of Turkey might be a risk, but given the country’s economic and political potential, it seems to be a risk well worth taking. Yet this decision is predicated on prejudices and very stereotypical perceptions, in particular with regard to the political constituencies within the EU. Contrary to all other EU members or candidates for membership, Turkey suffers from a specific historical narrative that excludes the country from the mental map of most Europeans. This became clear in the German media debate that followed the Helsinki decision to give Turkey candidate status. Paradigmatic in this context was a newspaper article by the well-known German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler in Die Zeit. Under the title ‘The Turkish Problem’ (Das Türkenproblem, 2002), Wehler presented the liberal readers of this weekly with all the standard prejudices about Turkey’s otherness. In Wehler’s analysis, Turkey remains distant from Europe because of a huge cultural gap, and the fact that it does not share any of the intellectual traditions of Western civilization. As a Muslim country, Turkey is clearly separated from Europe by cultural boundaries. Wehler’s simplistic cultural essentialism is not specifically German, but finds resonance among large parts of Europe’s national constituencies. Yet more problematic than these prejudices alone is the way in which these stereotypical perceptions are discursively intertwined with two important contemporary security debates. Since 11 September 2001, Turkey’s EU membership has been discussed within the coordinates of two central European threat perceptions: the menace of Islamist terrorism and the alleged failure of integration policies. In both threat perceptions, Islam is the cultural reference point through which Turkey’s EU membership also becomes part of security politics of another nature. In Denmark and in the Netherlands, and possibly to a lesser degree in Germany, the internal debate about the failure to integrate Muslim immigrants becomes equated with the integration of Turkey as a Muslim country into the EU. Those opposed to Turkey’s membership point to their difficulties with migrant communities as proof of the cul-
tural differences that would harm the EU in the case of Turkey gaining membership. They contend that as a result of these differences, Turkey, like the Muslim migrants in Copenhagen, The Hague or Berlin, will never integrate, despite all formal reforms. Supporters of Turkish membership counter this argument by relating it to the question of Islamist terrorism and propose Turkey as a litmus test for the compatibility of Islam and Western-style democracy. Unfortunately, both the supporters and the opponents of Turkish membership build their argumentation on the prejudiced assumption that there is an inherent problem between Islam and the values and norms of the European project.

To conclude, there is no doubt that Turkey still has a lot to do to meet the Copenhagen criteria in the coming years. In this sense, conditional-ity in both technical and political senses is a necessity. However, this finding makes the country no different from other candidates. Deciding when the conditions for full membership have been sufficiently met will be a matter of interpretation and therefore of acceptance of the country as being akin to the EU. The assessment of the impact of Turkish membership on the Union is equally subject to different interpretations of the country’s economic and political data. According to the respective political visions, there are arguments both for and against membership. Central for the coming years is the way in which this assessment of conditions and impact is made by the European public. Contrary to previous practice, the EU’s negotiations with Ankara have to be accompanied by open and frank debate between politicians and the public. If the public debate about Turkey’s EU full membership remains fettered with the security discourses about migration and terrorism, it is my suspicion that Ankara’s reform efforts will never be enough. Every deviation from the normative blue-prints of the ‘European mind’ will be interpreted as a failure of the whole process. There are also clear indicators that this discursive climate is having a strong impact on Turks, who are losing their faith in the project of European integration. Politicians, bureaucrats and journalists who want to support Turkey’s prospects should work hard on getting the accession debate disentangled from the general theme of Islam and modernity and the particular security debates about Islamist terrorism and immigration. Therefore, they should stop making Turkey a litmus test for the Muslim world and start taking stock of the problems and advantages that Turkey’s membership could bring to the project of European integration.
1. Introduction

It seems imperative to try and disentangle arguments for or against Turkey’s membership in the European Union from the prejudices which have been marring the discussion from the very beginning. It is however extremely difficult for a number of reasons. First, a lack of ingenuity – or courage – has characterized some of the proponents of Turkey’s membership, who advocated Turkey’s entry while hoping that it might be derailed by ‘known unknowns’, such as referenda, knowing in any case that referenda would take place in a somewhat distant future, i.e. far beyond their political responsibility. Second, serious arguments which are worth considering have sometimes been interpreted as pretences, i.e. as reasons to exclude Turkey from the European Union instead of being taken at face value – though serious arguments may of course hide hideous prejudices. Yet it might also be somewhat easy to talk about prejudices only. Beyond or before prejudices, three factors conjure up to make the case of Turkey’s membership in the EU quite difficult: one is that ‘enlargement fatigue’, as it is being called, has caught up not only in France but also in Europe at large. The last round of enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria, which took place in the wake of the fourth round, would have been hampered by public opinion in most EU countries, had these been consulted. The second reason why Turkey’s membership in the EU does not resonate well in France and in other countries is that it
Anne-Marie Le Gloannec touches upon raw nerves while revealing problems and posing questions as to our own model(s) of society, national and European, and as to our role(s) in Europe and in the world. The elites distrust an enlarged Europe which is less and less amenable to French influence compared to the smaller Europe of the past. The public dread a larger Europe which will not protect them against what they perceive as the nefarious consequences of globalization. In other words, a lack of self-confidence, an atmosphere of crisis and decline which prevailed in the last years of the last French President do not create a favorable context for Turkey’s accession to the EU.

Last but not least, even if we manage to leave prejudices on both sides aside, which is desirable – the case of Turkey is far from overwhelming. There are good reasons to oppose its membership in the EU just as there are good reasons to advocate it. In other words, the case is not clear-cut – a marked contrast to the very heated debate and entrenched positions on both sides. As far as I am concerned, I would advocate Turkey joining the European Union mainly in order to anchor democracy in this country. At the same time, one has to consider that Turkey’s membership raises a number of problems. It is, I think, necessary not to hide the difficulties, otherwise the advocates of Turkey’s membership will have little chance to be heard by the opponents.

2. Conditionality and the French political context

While in France the main political leaders, conservatives, liberals or socialists, and public opinion have largely opposed Turkey’s membership, President Jacques Chirac decided early on to favor Turkey’s membership in the EU – in spite of the opposition of his party, the UMP, and of its leader, Alain Juppé, an opposition that the liberal Jean-Louis Bourlanges, characterized as “un non de principe, définitif et sans appel”\(^1\). The French Parliament was not consulted. The decision taken later on by Chirac to organize a referendum – or rather for his successors to organize a referendum – can be interpreted as a makeshift attempt to make up for ignoring public opinion and political opposition. Nor was there a European debate. The comment made by Olli

Rehn dismissing any talk of privileged partnership is certainly respectable, coming from a Commissioner (not being an elected politician, he has the right to say this). Yet, it looks like an attempt to stifle any political debate at the European level, which is disastrous.

2.1 The suppression of the political debate

This leads me to underline an element which has not been put forward by any French politician though it frames the whole debate. There is an inescapable contradiction between the two faces of the European political union: it is, on the one hand, a union of states and, on the other hand, a union of peoples. As a union of states, negotiations take place between governments, commitments are made, treaties will be signed and *pacta sunt servanda*, treaties are to be respected. As a union of peoples, solidarity should develop – as it gradually grew between the French and the Germans, fostered by private initiatives and governmental support – and only on this basis will the Turks be accepted in the European Union: debates should take place and solidarity should be cultivated. For the time being, both are missing and Olli Rehn’s comments smack of censorship.

No politician in France has publicly addressed the question of whether conditionality should be viewed primarily as a technical process or as a political one. However if one listens to the current debate in France, and if one takes into consideration the fears that the European Union inspires, one should be wary of considering conditionality as a merely technical process to be left in the hands of the Commission. Certainly leaving politics aside, depoliticizing conditionality has its merits: after the wars of religion which devastated Europe, religion was taken out of the public sphere, it was depoliticized. However with globalization and Europeanization, there is a general feeling, right or wrong, that a number of questions escape the public sphere and can no longer be decided by the public’s political will. Hence the deep unease towards the European Union. In other words, the Commission may be extremely efficient in its handling of a number of questions, enlargement in particular, but this may appear as a way to by-pass a necessary political course. In a way, Jacques Chirac’s proposal to introduce a referendum may be seen as an attempt to recapture the political process – though it is, I think, deeply wrong to do this through a referendum.
2.2. The Copenhagen criteria: elusive or evolving?

This has also led actors in France to focus on questions such as the question of Cyprus – discussed in other papers – or again the Armenian genocide as a way to re-introduce a political discourse and, certainly for a number of opponents to Turkey’s membership, as a means to introduce new hurdles. It has allowed an important and vocal minority, the French of Armenian origin, who are often well educated and well represented, to kidnap the Turkish question for their own political purposes – following the path set by the Loi Gayssot. A law was adopted by the French National Assembly on October 12, 2006, foreseeing penalties for those who deny the existence of the Armenian genocide. This law however has not been approved yet by the Senate and it is been criticized in France by a number of enlightened historians who, while condemning the genocide, deem it improper to resort to law. The question of the Armenian genocide should be addressed at two levels, I think. On the one hand, it would be (or would have been) desirable to ask Turkey to settle its pending questions with Armenia (i.e., borders), and generally speaking, with its neighbors in the way the question of Hungarian minorities were dealt with in the framework of the Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe – a suggestion that Suleiman Demirel had once made. On the other hand, confronting the past should be left to the Turks themselves, something they have started to do.

One should underline however that the Copenhagen criteria were never set in stone (even though the expression ‘Copenhagen criteria’ gives the impression that they were), thus implying that they are technicalities. The archeology of the criteria leads us from the Rome Treaty to the Birkelbach Report and the Copenhagen criteria, which later evolved to include the \textit{acquis communautaire}. The extension of the EU to the Eastern Balkans (and, at some point in time, to the Western Balkans) has given birth to new criteria (such as collaboration with the Hague Tribunal) and to increased vigilance as far as respect of the criteria is concerned. To that extent, it must be underlined – and proven – that there is no \textit{lex Turcia} and that the criteria have always evolved. However the fact that at a point in time it seemed that Serbia might be exempted from collaborating with the Tribunal could have given the wrong signals to a number of states: not only would it have torn down our own principles but it might also have given Turkey the impression that anything goes. To that extent, the presentation of the Cyprus question in the French press – as well as in the press of other countries – and
in particular the question of the freezing of eight negotiation chapters, was disastrously biased: Turkey was made the sole responsible of a situation which the EU itself badly mismanaged. In other words, the so-called Copenhagen criteria can and should evolve, according to the situation, yet they should not be held as a pretext for blocking the road towards accession – yet there is no objective way to distinguish pretext from legitimate requirements.

3. Impact

3.1 The Impact on the functioning of the EU

A number of politicians underline the danger of enlarging without deepening. As Giscard d’Estaing put it: “Jusqu’où se poursivra cette fuite en avant d’une Europe non encore organisée, peu efficace de ses résultats et qui voit se réduire le soutien démocratique de sa population ?” This is a very real and very serious problem. The most federalist of the French, members of the UDF such as former President, François Bayrou, who was one of the most serious contenders for the Presidency, or Jean-Louis Bourlanges, a member of the European Parliament and supporter of Bayrou, oppose Turkey’s entry on the grounds that the EU should join forces and further its political union. Conversely, some of those who advocate Turkey’s membership, such as Michel Rocard, the former socialist Prime Minister and a member of the Ahtisaari Commission, have given up on Europe as a political union, and cynically wonder ‘why not ?’, meaning by this : why not enlarge to the East… Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Jean-Louis Bourlanges have underlined that the European Union is not ready to have Turkey join it. This is for two reasons. First, the EU is not functioning well as it stands and this will get worse as the number of its members increases. Second, Turkey is a huge country, and since with the Nice Treaty the institutions have tilted towards a greater degree of intergovernmentalism, the Union will become less federal as demography plays a more important role in determining decision-making power. In other words, the existing institutional system would grant Turkey – the youngest member – a primary role within the Council and the Parliament, were it to join the EU.² The

Constitution would only reinforce this situation. In this respect, it is remarkable that Convention President Giscard d’Estaing did not undertake any reform proposals to address this problem. This probably goes to show how opposed he is to Turkey’s entry.

3.2 The question of Europe’s borders

There are also those in France who underline the uneasiness of Europeans/French people about having Syria, Iraq and Iran as potential neighbors. The question of borders raises a twofold problem. The question was raised early on, by intellectuals such as François Perroux, a political economist who wrote “L’Europe sans rivages”, in the 1950s, or again by Raymond Aron. Europe does not have any natural borders. Intellectually, it could embrace the whole world – actually it did embrace the world for almost two centuries…. Yet as a political project it needs borders – and these are, by definition, arbitrary. Theoretically, they are to be defined through a political debate inside the EU and together with Europe’s neighbors. As such, they are necessarily borders of inclusion and exclusion – i.e. there will not be any perfect consensus, there will only be an agreement.

The Eastern borders of Europe have a particularity which verges on a dilemma. For the past years, the European Union has been extending its area in order to create stability and prosperity in its East – this was not the only motive, but it was a potent one that the Germans in particular put forth and that the Poles are now making their own. Yet the further the European Union reaches to the East, the greater the instability of the territories and states it encounters, be it economic, political or social. Even if this may not apply to Turkey – though economically, the country is the poorest candidate ever – it may apply to territories East of Turkey which will become Europe’s neighbors. Without a clear vision articulated by responsible politicians, the expansion of the European Union may look like an increasingly risky business.

This combines with another dimension of enlargement, which few politicians have articulated in France though it is present in the debate in Germany, for instance. Enlargement has so far become the best tool the EU has for promoting democracy abroad. It has anchored Portugal, Spain and Greece as well as the former Soviet satellites by redistribut-

ing the benefits of prosperity to increasingly larger constituencies and by offering a permanent framework guaranteeing the durability of the democratization process. Yet it has done so very late on in the process, with the Western Balkans being an exception. The question I want to raise and for which I have no answer is the following: is the EU now intervening earlier on in the democratization process, running the risk of becoming embroiled in turmoil and perhaps even failure? Is this a relevant question as far as Turkey is concerned, or could a parallel be drawn between Portugal and Turkey? Whatever the answer, the public might be scared by the turmoil in Turkey, by the assassinations of prominent liberals, the rise of nationalism, the rise of Islamist fundamentalism, etc. – and the particular distrust that liberal secular Turks display vis-à-vis the current evolution in their own country.

3.3 Does religion matter?

At face value, this argument should not be taken seriously. France harbors the biggest Muslim community – just as it harbors the largest Jewish community – and most French politicians have gone out of their way to underline that indeed it is not an argument. In the whole of Europe there are millions of Muslims in Europe, and both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania, potential members of the EU, have Muslim populations. Two arguments however are being brought into the debate. One is an indirect one: though France has a small Turkish community, and though its important Muslim community is on the whole well integrated\(^4\), any debate on Turkey’s membership resonates with the debate which is shaking our society over the place of Muslims, especially the alienated and more radical ones.\(^5\) In other words, the debate over the integration of Turkey in the EU mirrors – to some extent – the debate over integration in France.

Closely linked to this argument, a second one pertains to the particular brand of laïcité that characterizes Turkey.\(^6\) Today, it entails the state’s tight control over religion. This might remain as it is, evolve towards a full-fledged separation of Mosque and State in a Europeanized Turkey,

\(^5\) though one should underline here that religion did not play a part in the suburban riots of the winter 2005.
\(^6\) François Bayrou op. cit. p. 1089
or tilt towards the development of fundamentalism. In other words, one may very well accept Islam as a religion and still fear the current re-Islamization of the country, worrying about the outcome of the battle between traditionalists, secularists and Muslims, radicals or moderates who attempt to apply hermeneutics to the reading of the Qur’an. The very flux which characterizes these days the Turkish political scene and the Turkish society do not necessarily soothe French fears over the change in the complexion of French and European societies that Turkey’s membership in the EU might entail. In the French case too, it also touches a raw nerve, that of laïcité, a brand very different from the Turkish one but which nonetheless is to some extent as profoundly ideological as Kemalism is: to dub the opponents of Turkey’s membership in the EU as members of a Christian club misunderstands the fears of those French Republicans who dread a strengthening of the role of religion – be it Christian, be it Muslim – in a country which has rolled back religion from the political sphere and, to some extent, from the public one as well.

Last but not least, another kind of argument is being brought forth, in particular by historians and by those who oppose Turkey’s membership in the EU: they underline the ‘otherness’ of Turkey, its different history which casts it apart from the European history of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. This is, I think, the weakest of all arguments as it reifies the past.

Conclusion

To sum up, there is currently in France not one major politician supporting Turkey’s entry – as the electoral campaign clearly underlined: both Nicolas Sarkozy and François Bayrou oppose it, while Ségolène Royal – who eventually came out in favor of Turkey’s membership – stressed the need to call upon public opinion. The newly elected President, Nicolas Sarkozy, cleverly rejected any opposition to the opening of new negotiation chapters because he contends that the revamping of the Constitution, or rather an agreement over a light treaty, constitutes a priority. Yet he has also clearly not backed down and goes on opposing Turkey’s membership in the European Union. Both this opposition and the fact that the French Constitution has been altered to include a new provision which makes it necessary to consult the French citizens over any new enlargement forecast a bleak future.
Certainly all the arguments I have detailed above are serious, be it the question of political borders, the question of the political future of the Union, or the question of a democratic debate. Yet it might be disastrously wrong to close Europe’s door on Turkey. The main reason why I favor Turkey’s entry, is to anchor its future to the EU as the EU anchored those of Spain and Portugal, Greece and the Eastern European countries. It is a bet, a bet on the future of Turkey, on a ‘Christian-democratized’ Islam in a European society or in any case on the completion of the democratization process which began some decades – or centuries – ago. The European Union would be the best framework to permanently entrench a democratization process: just as in the case of other countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, democracy will have to be achieved by the Turks themselves, supported however by the perspective of joining the Union.
1. Conditions

Since Turkey began its path toward EU accession in 1999, it has undergone unprecedented transformations. Reforms have strengthened democracy, rule of law and respect of human and cultural rights. They have stabilized the economy and permitted its continuing modernization, which in turn has resulted in a period of sustained economic growth. Some features of the Turkish state and civil society have begun to change and many long-standing taboos have been broken. In assessing this process, some analysts have gone as far as to compare Turkey’s reform process to a silent revolution.

How much of this change can be attributed to the EU’s pre-accession process? It is hard to establish precisely. Most certainly, the conditions for opening the negotiations – and particularly the need to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria – have played a significant role in setting in motion the reform process in Turkey.

The 1993 Copenhagen political criteria and their subsequent refinements during the fifth enlargement have become a solid frame of reference for countries aspiring to EU membership. The EU its member states adhere to fundamental principles which by and large refer to a

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1 The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect or represent the opinions of the European Commission.
body of international and European conventions to which member states are signatories. The Copenhagen political criteria are clearly identified and can be broken down into a set of sub-criteria and minimum standards which form the common ground regarding understandings of democracy, rule of law and human rights in EU countries. In practical terms, however, these principles are implemented in different ways in the EU member states and this makes it difficult to establish clear guidelines on how reforms should be carried out in a candidate country. As a consequence, the way in which EU demands established by the EU Accession Partnership are translated into concrete reforms depends mostly on the candidate country, although the EU follows the process closely by monitoring the way the various benchmarks and conditions are met, through regular dialogue and by providing pre-accession assistance to facilitate reforms. In the case of Turkey, as has been the case in other accession processes, the EU highlighted the political criteria areas which required the attention of Turkish reformers, but the timing and specific substance of the actual reforms were left in the hands of Turkey itself. It is not by chance in fact that the reform process began to move forcefully in the period 2002-2004, when favourable internal dynamics combined with the pressure of the upcoming 2004 deadline combined. Although shortcomings remained – particularly in the implementation of legislative reforms – progress was recognized by the European Commission, which in its 2004 Progress Report stated that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria. As a result, the EU Council gave the green light for the opening of negotiations on the basis of a rather strict Negotiating Framework. Among other things, the Framework envisaged an open-ended negotiation process and continuous monitoring of progress made in the fulfilment of the political criteria. What has happened since then? Do the accession conditions continue to induce progress in Turkey? On the technical side, the opening of negotiations in October 2005 has given way to the screening of EU legislation. Screening proceeded smoothly throughout 2006 and screening reports for more than one third of the negotiating chapters have been presented to the Council to date. In addition, negotiations in one chapter, science and research, were opened and provisionally closed in June 2006. Parallel to these positive results, several clouds have cast shadows over the accession process. The first reason for tension has been the growing dispute over the implementation by Turkey of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement, and particularly over Turkey’s decision not to open its ports and airports to vessels and planes from the Republic of
Cyprus. Lack of solution on this issue has lingered throughout 2006 as a major threat to the accession process. The stalemate resulted in the EU Council decision, on 11 December 2006, to suspend the opening of negotiations on eight relevant chapters (free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to provide service, financial services, agriculture and rural development fisheries, transport policy customs union and external relations) and not to provisionally close any negotiating chapter. Meanwhile however, the Council has left the door open for continuing negotiations. This decision allows for the finalization of the screening process, the presentation of the remaining screening reports and the opening of negotiations on other new chapters.

The December decision, while sending an important political message to Ankara, avoided the risk of a complete suspension of the negotiations, at least for the time being. This has allowed the EU and Turkey to barely extricate themselves from the impasse, which characterized the last months of 2006. Things are on the move again, with high expectations about the possibility of opening negotiations on four new chapters shortly. Turkey has also signalled its willingness to review the state of reform across the board and possibly issue a new National Programme for the Adoption of the *acquis*.

The second major area of uncertainty has been the slowing down of political reforms in Turkey. The 2006 Progress Report clearly stated that the pace of political reforms in Turkey slowed down. The report highlighted numerous areas still in need of further effort. Particular attention was devoted to the issue of restrictive practices in the freedom of expression. This is epitomized by Article 301 of the Penal Code, which has been used to begin several court cases against journalists and writers – including the recent Nobel Peace Prize winner Orhan Pamuk – for expressing non-violent political opinions. In addition, other issues continue to require the attention of the reformers: further improvement in the rights of non-Muslim religious communities, enabling them to function without undue limitations; improvement of women’s rights, through encouragement of women’s education, increased action against domestic violence and honour crimes; trade union rights, including the right to strike and bargain collectively in line with EU standards and ILO conventions; improved civilian control over the military; and a sustained effort to improve the economic, social and cultural rights of the Kurdish population in the southeastern provinces.²

The case of the recent debate over Article 301 quite interestingly illustrates EU-Turkey interactions in the area of political reforms. The Commission has expressly indicated that the restrictive aspects of Article 301 are in clear contradiction with freedom of expression. It has also underlined that Turkey needs to bring freedom of expression fully in line with European standards because freedom of expression is a ‘fundamental part of our common democratic values’. As was the case already in the past, some Turkish nationalist quarters consider this demand an additional example of ‘interference from Brussels’ in Turkey’s internal matters, thus politicizing the domestic debate on the issue and making actual change more difficult. The debate on freedom of expression has become, particularly after the recent killing of Hrant Dink and the massive popular participation in his funeral, the single most important area of confrontation between pro-reform and conservative groups in Turkey.

The scope of political criteria issues to be tackled in Turkey thus remains quite wide. The government has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to addressing these issues in the overall context of pre-accession reforms. The accession process envisages specific mechanisms to follow developments in this area. Constant monitoring of political reform progress is ensured through periodic political dialogue carried out by the Commission, which then reports to the Council. The dialogue has recently been intensified. This mechanism has already proven useful in maintaining a detailed scoreboard, encouraging and sustaining reform efforts. Moreover, ‘the results of the dialogue with the countries in their progress in meeting the political criteria for membership will be fed directly into the negotiation process’. The Negotiating Framework in fact establishes that negotiations might be suspended in case of serious breaches in the area of political criteria.

As mentioned above however, the pace and speed of progress depends on the presence of proper political conditions in Turkey. Turkey’s political attention is currently monopolized by the upcoming presidential and political elections. With nationalism on the rise, an atmosphere of acute confrontation among political actors and a political agenda dominated by issues for the most part not directly linked to EU accession – foreign policy and the relationship with the US, the resurgence of

Kurdish separatist violence, the continuing high unemployment rates – 2007 is unlikely to be a time for major breakthroughs.

2. Prejudice

A second major factor which has recently impacted upon Turkey’s accession process has been the EU-wide debate over the future of Europe. Following the French and Dutch ‘nos’ in their national referenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty, much of this debate at national levels has been centred on the so-called enlargement fatigue. Public opinion’s worries about the impact on employment of the fifth enlargement have come to the forefront. This has led to a questioning of the future of enlargement and the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ – or ‘integration capacity’ as it has recently been renamed – as well as the borders of Europe. Unsurprisingly, Turkey’s case has become entangled in these debates. In the face of popular disenchantment with European integration and uncertainties over the future of the EU project, scepticism over Turkey’s role in the EU has found new space. Persisting low levels of public opinion support for Turkey membership have fed a revival of the discussions on whether Turkey really belongs to Europe. Some EU leaders have embraced these positions and vague proposals have been made about the need to envisage alternative options for Turkey-EU relations. Some EU countries have planned popular referenda as a pre-condition for ratification of future enlargements.

In Turkey, the EU debate has renewed doubts about the end result of the accession process and provided ammunition for Eurosceptics. One should not forget that Turkey’s mistrust of Europe runs deep in Turkish society. It finds its origins in the memories of the role that Europeans played in the decline of the Ottoman Empire and in the trauma of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. The questioning, time and again, of Turkey’s EU vocation in Europe provokes chain reactions in Turkey. Conservative and nationalist forces have an easy hand in reawakening dormant Turkish fears that Europe will ultimately turn Turkey a cold shoulder. The idea that ‘whatever we do they will never accept us’ is still strongly rooted by a large part of the Turkish population. Obviously, this atmosphere is not conducive to enthusiastically pushing ahead with reforms.

By and large, an internal EU debate over future enlargement and Turkey, often linked to the different domestic political situations in member states, is inevitable. A panoply of different opinions is also to be expect-
ed in such a diverse Union. However, the problems that it creates in Turkey have also been openly acknowledged. In a recent speech at the University of Helsinki, Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that the continuous questioning of the agreed objective of accession for Turkey ‘calls into question the credibility of our own commitments. That in turn undermines the conditions and criteria for accession, which the very same European Union defined unanimously and thus damages the motivation for reforms in Turkey. It creates a vicious circle of reversed commitment, weakened conditionality and stalled reforms’.

It is unlikely that the EU debate on Turkey will subside soon. The only effective response that Turkey can provide is to show continuous and unabated commitment to reforms. Turkey should do this for two reasons. First, because ‘reforms are good for the country’. They have already brought about positive returns in terms of macro-economic stabilization, sustained economic growth and foreign direct investments. This is well understood in Turkey, where, in spite of the inevitable hiccups, the feeling of ownership of the reform process remains quite high. Second, Turkish progress in the political and economic realms improves the image of the country, thus helping to reduce misconceptions and prejudice in EU public opinion (as has already happened in the period of ‘high-intensity’ reform in Turkey). At the very least, real progress on the ground can provide solid arguments in the communication effort that Turkey will need to make in the next few years to help reduce EU public opinion’s current misgivings against Turkey.

Finally, some of the prejudice in both Turkey and the EU is grounded on a lack of knowledge of each other. The accession process, by multiplying the occasions for exchange between institutions and people from Turkey and the EU – particularly at the level of civil society – will be useful in reducing mutual misconceptions and mistrust on both sides.

3. Impact

The analysis of the impact of accession of a new member state on the EU has become one of the criteria on which the pace of enlargement is based. While the issue was already referred to amongst one of the crite-

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4 Commissioner Olli Rehn Lecture on Turkey and the EU, Helsinki University, 27 November 2006.
ria for accession, in addition to the Copenhagen criteria, the experience with the recent enlargement has produced increased attention to the question of absorption capacity. The special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new member states stated that: ‘the EU must ensure that it can maintain its capacity to act and decide according to a fair balance in the institutions, respect budgetary limits and implement ambitious common policies that functions well and achieve their objectives’.5

A preliminary analysis of the impact of Turkey’s accession – based on the existing institutional, policy and budgetary frameworks – was conducted in parallel with the 2004 Progress Report. Since then however, it has become apparent that assessing in detail the repercussions on the Union of Turkey’s membership several years ahead is a very difficult exercise indeed. First, in all three areas (institutions, budget and policies) the EU is likely to undergo important changes which make an impact analysis based on today’s parameters less meaningful. Second, if it continues with political reforms and economic modernization, Turkey itself will change profoundly in the years to come. It is for this reason that in the future, for some limited key areas of the acquis, the impact assessment will be carried out on individual chapters and policies as accession negotiations continue. This will also make it possible to establish common EU positions on negotiations (e.g. on transitions periods). More broadly, the importance of Turkey for the Union is also a key part of this current debate. In geostrategic terms, Turkey is increasingly viewed as a vital partner. Turkey is at the crossroads of three crucial regions, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus; its successful reforms can be a showcase for democracy and moderation and can play a stabilizing role in its neighbouring countries; given its overwhelming majority of Muslim population, it can also facilitate the so-called ‘dialogue between civilizations’. In addition, Turkey has also been a major player in recent crises. It has participated in the peace-keeping missions in Afghanistan, Lebanon, in the various ESDP civilian operations, such as the EU-led police missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FYROM, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in the first EU-led military mission EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These missions have strengthened Turkey’s credentials as a strong partner in crisis response. Moreover, with the completion of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, Turkey has become a key actor in the crucial areas of energy supply and ener-

5 Enlargement Strategy, op.cit. p. 22.
gy security. For a Union which has the ambition to foster its role as a global player, Turkey’s partnership has much to contribute.

Finally in economic terms, integration has been proceeding at high speed. The EU has for some time now been Turkey’s largest trading partner, representing about 50% of Turkey’s trade volume. Since 2001, EU exports to Turkey have been growing by almost 20% per year, and its imports by around 13%. Furthermore, Turkey is increasingly integrated in EU production cycles and has recently witnessed an important increase in FDI coming from the EU. As far as impact on Turkey is concerned, accession prospects are bound to have positive effects on Turkey’s international credibility, thus easing Turkey’s ability to continue stabilization policies and to tackle structural economic reforms. The accession process will provide a strong anchor for maintaining a stable macroeconomic framework, by continuing to reduce inflation and fiscal deficits. The EU could therefore be instrumental in ensuring that the country remains on track in managing its economic fundamentals.

Moreover, the experience from the recent EU enlargement shows that the accession process can indeed be a powerful driver for change. It can speed up and deepen economic transformations by increasing integration into the internal market, progressive improvement in policies and higher investment. In the case of Turkey, some degree of harmonization has already taken place thanks to the customs union and this might actually shorten the negotiating process and the preparation for accession in certain areas. Further gradual integration in the internal market will also be realized through the progressive opening up of trade in services, agricultural products and public procurement.

These processes will lead to increasing demand and opportunities for trade and investment, which should translate into higher growth opportunities, falling service prices and overall productivity rises. They should also facilitate further structural transition processes such as, for instance, the reduction of the labour force still employed in low productivity agriculture and its move into higher productivity service sectors, or the reform and modernization of key elements of the economy such as backbone services (e.g. financial sector, transport, and telecommunications).

On the policy side, the accession process will deepen the customs union through the elimination of the current exclusions such as agriculture, the elimination of technical barriers or anti-dumping, as well as regulatory convergence in other areas, such as consumer protection, the environment, social and taxation policies. This will contribute to upgrading Turkey’s standards to international levels, facilitate its integration in the
EU and global markets and have a positive impact in terms of a better quality of living. Turkey should sustain the reform momentum and proceed with acquis harmonization. Although costly and difficult, structural reforms and improvement of the regulatory framework brought about by progressive alignment with the acquis will improve the business environment. Turkey will have to continue to cut its public sector, improve the effectiveness of its public administration and harmonize its rules of establishment. This would increase investors’ confidence and invite sizeable inflows of FDI, which in turn should create more favorable conditions for improving the competitiveness of the economy and fostering the sustainable development of the country, with important positive effects on the social sphere as well.
1. Introduction: Is Turkey only just becoming an issue in Finnish political debate?

The prospect of Turkish membership in the EU has not caused much debate in Finland – but the issue seems to be simmering below the surface. Looking at the reasons for the absence of a debate may tell us something about the variety of national discourses and experiences within the EU. Vice versa, the reasons for the launch of such a debate tells us about how a European debate, a European public opinion and a European public space are taking shape. Turkish EU membership would not be the only example of how the debate in other EU countries influences the debate in Finland; also the debates on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands had an impact on Finnish public opinion. Overall, when analysing the Finnish debate on Turkish EU membership, it is important to be aware of its context and to account for the other questions to which it is linked. A peculiarity of the Finnish debate might be that security plays a more central role than movement of labour or immigration issues; another particularity might be the comparisons between Turkey and Russia that seem to be at hand. Overall, the Finnish stance towards Turkish EU membership would tend to be from slightly negative to neutral (public opinion) or neutral to neutral.

1 The author would like to thank Ms Pia Alilonttinen for her most helpful assistance.
positive (the official government view). Finland has been amongst the most positive EU countries towards Turkish membership. This is partly because of the Finnish government’s positive attitude towards further enlargement and partly because of the fact that Turkish EU membership has played a central role during both Finnish EU presidencies so far, in 1999 and 2006. The centrality of the issue during the presidency in 1999 – when Turkey was given candidate status – seems to have left several politicians with a continuing interest in Turkey, including then Prime Minister and later Speaker of the Parliament, Mr Paavo Lipponen. Other prominent politicians can also be counted as promoters of Turkey, notably former President of the Republic, Mr Martti Ahtisaari, and the Finnish member of the European Commission, Mr Olli Rehn, in charge of enlargement.

Turkey-EU relations was counted as one of the successes of the 1999 Finnish EU presidency. The topic was again central during the 2006 presidency. Given the 1999 precedent, there were some expectations in 2006, not least from the Finns themselves, that the Finnish presidency would be able to resolve the Cyprus impasse in Turkey’s negotiation process. In this respect, there was also a good dose of disappointment regarding the results. Considerable efforts were put into solving the problems on the table. In 2006 however, Turkey’s membership did not dominate the European Council meeting. Towards the end of the Finnish presidency, the idea gained ground that it would be good to avoid discussing Turkey in the December meeting in order not to make the discussion too prestige-laden and the positions taken too ‘weighty’. Instead, the General Affairs Council was used as the venue to find an agreement. Afterwards, the Finnish Prime Minister stressed that Turkey’s future lies in the EU, and that there would be no derailment of negotiations. The EU’s door would remain open, but the corollary of openness would be rigorous application of the conditions.

In the Finnish debate, voices clearly against Turkish EU membership are few. The Finnish MEP Ville Itälä has actively contributed to the discussion with such views, stemming from his party’s affiliation to the EPP-

2 He is together with George Papandreou the chairperson of the High Level Working Group on Turkey of the PES (Party of European Socialists).
3 He was the chairman of the Independent Commission on Turkey that in September 2004 published the report *Turkey in Europe. More than a promise?*, published by the British Council and the Open Society Institute.
ED (Group of the European People’s Party and European Democrats). There is one populist anti-EU party represented in the Finnish Parliament, the True Finns, that is against Turkish membership. It obtained 4.1% of the votes in the parliamentary elections this year (thus, considerably more than in 2003 when its share was 1.6%).

As usual, matters related to the EU did not figure on the list of items debated in the campaign of the 2007 parliamentary elections. Yet, interestingly, the only EU related question that was expected to become an issue in those elections or at least show a cleavage between the candidates and the political parties was the question of Turkish EU membership. This can be deduced from the fact that the increasingly popular ‘MP Engines’, i.e., websites that identify the ideal candidate based on the match between how the user and the candidates answer a set of questions, took up the Turkey question. The commercial TV channel MTV3 asked in its ‘MP Engine’ four questions about foreign and security policy: whether Russia is a threat, whether Finland should join NATO, whether Turkey should become a member of the EU, and whether Sweden’s NATO policy has implications on Finland. The ‘MP engine’ tailored for young people and students also asked the question on Turkish EU membership. However, in the parliamentary campaign debates, the question was not taken up.

2. Opinions on EU enlargement

The two main factors highlighted by Finnish public opinion regarding Turkey’s membership are cultural differences between a Muslim country and the predominantly Christian EU, and the predominantly negative view on enlargement as such. This can be linked to the feeling that Finland, as a small country, will further lose power and influence within the Union with an enlargement that makes large states have a mightier voice still. It is also linked to the perception that Romania and Bulgaria were taken in too soon, before they were ready for membership. The Eurobarometers would generally place Finland in the same group of Eurosceptic countries as Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom.

5 http://www.MTV3.fi/vaalikone [7 February 2007] The web test of the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE only asks about NATO, while that of the Sanoma Corporation (the company behind the daily Helsingin Sanomat) will open later.
6 http://www.nuortenvaalikone.fi/ [7 February 2007].
Looking at the development of opinion in recent years, a typical take on Finnish opinion in Autumn 2002 would be the poll made for the European Parliament Information Office in Helsinki, which showed that 69% thought that enlargement should halt once the (then) current applicants had joined. 24% would have liked to see enlargement continue, in which case the most welcome candidates would have been Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. 22% were in favour of Russian EU membership, and 29% in favour of Turkish EU membership. Two years later, a poll for *Aamulehti* in September 2004 showed that 42% were in favour of Turkish EU membership on certain conditions, and 37% against. More men than women were in favour of membership. As to party affiliation, those closest to the social democrats were the most positive. When looking at the parties themselves, the Left Alliance was most in favour and the Greens least so.

EVA, the Finnish Business and Policy Forum regularly measures Finnish public opinion on the EU and other international issues. In their report of 7 March 2006, they asked questions relating to EU enlargement. The prevailing view was clearly negative. Almost two thirds would have liked to halt enlargement for a long time because of the unsuitability of present candidates (the exact wording of the question refers to ‘Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey’). When asked whether Finland should promote enlargement during its EU presidency, only one out of ten saw it as an important goal.

The ‘negative’ stand on enlargement may be a matter of interpretation when in fact differences between positive and negative attitudes are not that great. According to the Standard Eurobarometer 66 (Autumn 2006), 53% of Finns are against further enlargement, but as many as 43% are in favour. 62% see that Turkey belongs geographically at least partially in Europe; 33% see that Turkish membership would strengthen security in the area; 69% think cultural differences are too strong for Turkey to be a member; 82% see that membership could increase immigration to other EU countries; 90% consider that Turkey should improve its economy in a considerable way before entering, and 96% see

7 *Kainuu Sanomat* 16 November 2002.
8 During the debate on legislation about adultery in Turkey.
9 *Aamulehti* 19 September 2004.
10 In their own characterization “a pro-market think-tank financed by the Finnish business community”.
the systematic respect of human rights as a condition for entry. The claim that Turkish EU membership would ease the problems of an aging European population was also presented and polled: 27% of Finns agree with the claim while 60% disagree.

In this survey, Sweden is the most positive towards Turkey amongst the EU-25, even though only 46% of Swedes would like Turkey to join the EU. In Sweden, overall support for EU enlargement has also increased from 2005 to 2006 by 5 percentage points. Sweden in particular sees Turkey as partly belonging to Europe (culturally 79%, historically 63%), while Greece, Cyprus and Austria are the countries where the smallest number of people see it as belonging to Europe. Swedes also believe in the security-strengthening influence of Turkish EU membership (59%), while those who least believe in this are the Austrians. Cultural differences are also highlighted most by the Austrians, and least by the Swedes and the Dutch.

The Special Eurobarometer 255 of July 2006 on attitudes towards EU enlargement summarises these views in the following way:

QD16.5. Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be in favour/opposed to the accession of Turkey to the European Union?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In favour</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU25</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Conditions and conditionality in Turkey’s accession process

In the Finnish context, the conditions or criteria for EU accession play a crucial role. Conditions are taken to mean objective criteria. They help to depoliticize enlargement. New members are taken into the Union as soon as, and only when, they fulfil the criteria for membership. Thus, the process becomes technical in nature. Eventual objections to the membership of a particular candidate can be politely hidden behind this veil of objectivity. This belief in objective criteria is
reflected in the Prime Minister’s standpoint mentioned above: the EU’s door is open for Turkey, but the corollary of openness is rigorous application of the conditions.\textsuperscript{12}

The problem with such a view is that it is not easy to evaluate the fulfilment of criteria in an objective way. It is also difficult to apply conditions in a rigorous way when they are ambiguous in nature. As to the ‘non-chapter issues’ in the political realm that Turkey will need to tackle in the context of the accession process, one can identify two problems. First, it is difficult to put the remaining challenges in any order of importance, or to disentangle them from each other (e.g., civil-military relations, the Kurdish question, the human rights record). Second, it might be difficult to find an unequivocal form and content for these criteria. For example, there would seem to be difficulties in the question concerning the position of the military. The EU in fact lacks a single European model that it could offer to Turkey, being able to express only in general terms the idea that more should be done in terms of making the role of the Turkish military resemble that of EU countries.

The sense of confusion this leads to is exemplified by the Accession Partnership documents (first published in 2001 and revised twice, in 2003 and 2006), where a distinction is made between short-term priorities, which are expected to be achieved within one to two years, and medium-term priorities, that is 3-4 years. Such a systematic approach might be commendable, but perhaps it is systematic only on the surface. The distinction between two years as ‘short’ and three years as ‘medium’ is artificial. Moreover, short-term priorities include many things: reinforced political dialogue, political and economic criteria, and the \textit{acquis}, namely:

- democracy and the rule of law, including strengthening public administration by means of reforms, civil and military relations, the judicial system and anti-corruption policy;

- human rights and the protection of minorities, involving the observance of international human rights legislation;

- civil and political rights, involving the prevention of torture and ill treatment, access to justice, freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, and freedom of religion;

- economic and social rights, involving women’s and children’s rights, trade union rights, minority rights, cultural rights and the protection of minorities, the situation in the east and the southeast;

- regional issues and international obligations, involving Cyprus, the peaceful settlement of border disputes, obligations under the Association Agreement and economic criteria;
- assuming the obligations of membership, namely the requirements stemming from the *acquis*, as constituted by European Union policies and legislation, both primary and secondary.

This leaves the medium-term priorities:
- economic criteria concerning privatization, reform of the agricultural sector, the pension and social security systems, and education and health;
- ability to assume the obligations of membership in areas of Community activity earmarked in the Accession Partnership.\(^{13}\)

Somehow, it would seem that a shorter list of short-term priorities would be more effective and credible.\(^{14}\)

The focus on political questions beyond the scope of the Copenhagen political criteria (e.g., Cyprus and the freezing of eight negotiation chapters) may also have consequences for the credibility of EU political conditionality. First, the freeze would seem to weaken the position of the pro-EU forces in Turkey. Second, leaving Turkey’s European fate, post accession negotiations, in the hands of national referenda, smacks of additional membership criteria, which are not up to Turkey itself to meet. In the end, the referenda allow the people of certain EU countries to decide on the question – irrespective of whether or not Turkey fulfils the conditions in any ‘objective’ way. Third, it might increase the overall politicization of all aspects of the accession negotiations.

Yet another view on the conditions or criteria emerges when one looks at opinion polls. What people in general see as important criteria depends on what alternatives are presented to them in the questions posed. The choice of options is revealing. The Special Eurobarometer 255 of July 2006 about the attitudes towards EU enlargement asks about the main challenges facing Turkey in the following way:

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\(^{14}\) The tools in the implementation would then be progress reports, political dialogue, twinning, pre-accession assistance, and programmes such as the EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue. [http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/default.asp?pld=7&lang=1&pnId=1&ord=0&fop=1](http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/default.asp?pld=7&lang=1&pnId=1&ord=0&fop=1)
QD13 “In your opinion, what are the main challenges facing the Western Balkan countries and Turkey on their road to the European Union?

For the Nordic EU countries, as well as for EU-25, the primary challenge was the respect for human and minority rights:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>EU-25</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adapting and implementing European norms and standards</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation/cooperation with neighbouring countries</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring economic development</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing political instability</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for human and minority rights</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating organised crime and corruption</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing European values and principles</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is particularly interesting in these answers is the relatively low scores obtained by ‘European values and principles’ as well as by ‘European norms and standards’ when compared to human rights and democracy – which, however, should be amongst the core European values. Such results suggest that people might not strongly believe that the implementation of European norms is a sufficient condition for entry into the European Union.

4. The impact of Turkey’s accession to the EU

One might think that Turkey’s accession would have a big impact on the EU and on Finland because Turkey is a big country. Yet this does not seem to be the case. On the contrary, the tiny southern neighbour, Estonia, caused much more debate and concern in Finland during its process of accession. Prior to the 2004 enlargement, there were rather strong campaigns warning against the threat of Estonians moving massively to Finland in search for work. Finnish farmers were worried about the earlier season in Estonia and the ensuing invasion of Estonian lettuce and cucumbers in Finnish vegetable markets. Overall, migration has not yet become an issue in Finland. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania was perceived as unproblematic in comparison
with the 2004 enlargement. In 2004, temporary restrictions on the movement of labour from new member countries were introduced, but there was no need for such restrictions with the enlargement of 2007. The fact that Turkey will most probably include permanent derogations makes this easier still. Another matter is, however, that the general public might not be aware of such derogations.

In the political and institutional realm, no major impact is expected in Finland. Finland’s role within EU institutions would be further weakened, but Finland is already thinking of how to use its position more effectively rather than concentrating and campaigning on the importance of size. For a small country like Finland, this question is easier than for a country like Germany, as the proportional change is less important. Whether big countries in the EU are three or four does not matter much. Yet, the Finnish point of view would continue to be that countries of all sizes need to have the right to a voice in the system. What is expected of Turkey as a member is a sense of responsibility about its actions within the EU institutions, including in the European Parliament.

How Turkey’s EU membership would impact on public opinion is a question that might be answered only tentatively by looking at how opinion has or has not changed after the past enlargements. The 2004 enlargement round brought with it neighbouring Estonia as an EU member, The 2006 EVA report asked about peoples’ views about the 2004 enlargement, but there is little evidence as of yet: 36% of the respondents were neutral, 32% negative, and 27% positive.

When thinking about international relations and the geostrategic realm in particular (including Cyprus, the Middle East, Armenia and the Caucasus), Turkey is viewed as acquiring a role in the core group of member states, allowing the Union to gain a point of view on the region. By the time of Turkey’s membership, the EU therefore will need to have a clearer idea about its neighbourhood, and most notably about the problems in the Middle East and Cyprus. As to the foreign and security policy of the Union, one of the most interesting aspects of Turkey’s entry could be its impact on the EU’s relations with Russia, which are crucial for Finland. Both countries, after all, are neighbours of Russia. Would their views be different? How big an impact would Turkey have on the EU’s policies towards Russia, and what kind of a role would it

15 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, background discussion, February 2007.
play? Other considerations that might in time become central would include Turkey’s role in the energy policy of the EU and its position on EU defence policy, ESDP missions and EU-NATO relations.

To Finland, the implications of Turkey’s sustained or stalled reform process are also critical for the development of the investment climate in Turkey. There are around 20 Finnish businesses for which Turkey is an important market, both in itself and as a stepping stone towards markets in the region. These include telecommunications; 38% of Turkey’s largest GSM operator Türkcell is owned by the Finnish company Sonera (TeliaSonera). For a long time already, trade between Finland and Turkey has grown by some 20% a year.\(^1\) For these actors, above all Turkey’s EU perspective increases investment and business predictability. They would emphasize the need to diminish regulations and other investment-hampering procedures in Turkey, and to simplify the judicial system, while also underlining the advantages of improving the level of education.

5. Perceptions and prejudice in EU-Turkey relations

Preconceived views in Finland of Turkey, its identity and culture, may influence the views on the impact of Turkey’s future accession. Yet prejudices tend to be much stronger about neighbouring countries than about countries as distant as Turkey is for Finland. Proximity is indeed an important factor in shaping perceptions and prejudice. There are not many links between Finland and Turkey besides the membership issue. Relatively few Turks live in Finland, and there are not many Turkish migrants in Finland;\(^2\) Turkey is a popular tourist resort for Finns, but relatively less so than for the Swedes. Even though economic interests of Finnish businesses in Turkey are growing, they are still small compared to those of other member states.

Where perceptions, misperceptions and prejudice stem from is also a key question. While opinion polls reflect such views, they might even partially fuel them, or at least structure the debate. Much depends on what is asked and how the questions are framed – the choice of which

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\(^1\) Embassy of Finland in Ankara, news at www.finland.org.tr [4 April 2007].

\(^2\) Overall, there are very little foreigners in Finland, 2% of the population, some 121,000. The number of Turks in Finland is around 2800. In 2006, 41 of the altogether 2324 asylum seekers came from Turkey.
countries Turkey is lumped together with, or the choice of presenting Turkey as a factor potentially decreasing or increasing security. In a country like Finland, situated rather far from Turkey, but with some potential affiliations to it (e.g., between the Finnish and Turkish languages), prejudices are few. What is important, however, is that perceptions and prejudice spread easily. European-wide prejudices may grow as part of the development of a European public space and as a European debate on the question evolves. The spread of negative perceptions is often easiest when there are no firm views existing on the issue, when prejudice is uninformed. This might be the case for Turkey: the polls often reflect a large degree of uncertainty. For instance, the EVA opinion poll\textsuperscript{18} gives three statements on Turkey for the respondents to ponder on, and their reactions are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Totally agree</th>
<th>Agree more or less</th>
<th>Difficult to say</th>
<th>Tend to disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Turkey does not qualify as a member of a EU based on Christian values</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish EU membership would be positive in that it would help the Muslim and the Western cultures understand each other</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim immigrants cannot be integrated in European society</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A large part of the respondents thus say they do not really know. Whether they are then more easily ‘directed’ in their views or simply eager to know more is difficult to say. What is interesting to observe in any case is that there seems to be a typically Finnish way of putting the question on Turkish EU membership into context, namely, linking it to security. This is particularly clear in the MTS opinion poll. The MTS (ABDI), the Advisory Board for Defence Information, is a permanent

parliamentary committee placed within the Ministry of Defence and it is one of the ‘institutions’ in the Finnish opinion poll world. In their latest poll in November 2006, Turkey appears in one question, related to security – and more specifically to Finnish security. When the respondents were asked to choose amongst a list of various factors they saw as increasing or decreasing Finnish security, the top four ‘strengthening’ choices were common defence in the EU, Finnish EU membership, EU’s action against terrorism, and Finnish military non-alignment; while the top four ‘decreasing security’ options were: the US war on terrorism, foreign ownership of Finnish enterprises, the Russian war against terrorism, and Turkey’s membership in the EU. But even if 41% see Turkey as a decreasing security factor (43% in 2005), 44% see that Turkey’s membership has no influence on security. Practically no one sees Turkey as having a strengthening effect. Here, the answers are, however, less interesting than the questions, which so clearly direct the respondents’ attention and choice.

Ultimately, polls are a powerful way of drawing people’s attention to some specific sides of a given question. One might even say that in addition to polling opinions, polls contribute to forming them. When the results are reported in the media, it might look as if the people themselves thought about a question in a specific light. Thus, Finns might be presented as spontaneously paying particular attention to the possible security-decreasing impact of Turkey’s EU membership, even though they might not even have thought of such an impact had they not been offered the argument/option in the poll. Finally, the role of the media as an opinion-builder may become particularly important when information is relatively scarce. The choice of showing trendy youngsters from Istanbul talking on their (presumably Finnish) mobile phones, or showing ladies with headscarves when reporting on events in Turkey does matter for the formation of public opinion in the country.

19 Its tasks include “national defence information for normal and exceptional conditions and observing the development of Finns’ opinions regarding matters closely related to national defence”. See http://www.defmin.fi/?l=en&s=179.
1. Introduction

In the debate on Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union, Germany is the key country. Our special relationship with Turkey – unequalled in intensity and duration by any other European country – goes back to the beginning of the modern age. Today, Germany is Turkey’s most important trading partner. It has been the preferred destination for Turkish migration to Europe for three generations. Increasingly, Turks living in Germany are becoming German citizens. Nevertheless – or perhaps precisely because of this closeness – the relationship remains burdened with misunderstandings, tensions and outright conflict. This is true as much between Germans and Turks in Germany, as between the two countries themselves.

Consequently, the German discourse on Turkey’s accession bid to the EU after the opening of negotiations in 2005 is both representative and unique within the larger debate on Turkey in Europe. As elsewhere in Europe, the two main subject headings of the accession debate – conditionality and impact – are politically and culturally contingent categories, which swirl and shape-shift in response to larger developments (e.g. changing views on the EU project or European geostrategy). Equally typically, these ostensibly ‘objective’ criteria often mask deeper prejudices and preconceptions: some of them conscious, many barely understood. Yet the German debate on Turkey’s accession is also truly unique in Europe, in that it is interconnected with Turkish migration to and set-
tlement in Germany, and therefore intimately linked with the ongoing debate about what it means to be a German. Germany’s stance alone, of course, cannot swing opinion and policy in Europe. But Germany could, for all the reasons just stated, be Turkey’s most powerful natural advocate within the EU. Without it, conversely, progress in the membership debate is likely to remain very limited.

2. Germany and Turkey: contours of a special relationship

The relationship between Germany and Turkey goes back several centuries. In 1701, the first Ottoman ambassador, Mektupçu Azmi Said Efendi, came to the court of the Holy Roman Empire, and the ‘Oriental’ fashions that swept Germany thereafter were fuelled mainly by artistic, literary and commercial contacts with the Ottoman Empire. German traders, bankers and craftsmen settled in Istanbul from the 18th century onwards. Beginning in the late 19th century, German Emperors sent Prussian officers to train and lead the Ottoman imperial army. The two countries were allies in World War I. In the 1930s and 40s, hundreds of refugees from Germany fled to Turkey, many of them famous scientists, lawyers and artists. Some – like Berlin’s later mayor Ernst Reuter – made important contributions to the reform of Turkey’s universities and administrative system.

Today, Germany is Turkey’s most important export market, before the US and Italy. Russia has just pushed Germany to second place on the list of Turkey’s main import partners, but this is chiefly because of its natural gas exports. ¹ Germany is the single biggest supplier of foreign direct investment to Turkey. There are over 2,300 subsidiaries of German firms and joint ventures in Turkey,² and more than 60,000 Turkish enterprises in Germany (with an annual volume of 28.9bn).³ More Turkish students go to Germany (currently approximately 22,400) than to any other country, and they make up the largest group of foreign students in Germany. Finally, with 4m Germans travelling to Turkey annu-

² Auswärtiges Amt, see above.
³ Karsten Polke-Majewski, DIE ZEIT, April 2006.
ally on holiday, Germany is by far Turkey’s most important source of tourism income.4

Turkish migration to Germany began in earnest in the 1960s5 and gathered steam in the 1970s, encouraged by a labour-hungry industry. After a hiatus following the 1973 oil crisis and a hiring stop, the flow resumed in the 1980s, with Turks based in Germany bringing wives or other family members from Turkey to live with them. Today, over 2m Turks – the Almanyalı Türkler or Almançılar – live in Germany, many of them in their second and third generation.6 At 26% (up from 15.8% in 1970, when Italians were still the largest immigrant group in Germany), they are the single largest immigrant group in the country.7 They also make up by far the largest subgroup in Germany’s 3.5m-strong Muslim community.8 More recently, a new wave of migration in the other direction has begun – mostly by pensioners seeking a warmer climate and more affordable living conditions on the balmy southwestern coasts of Turkey.9

In Germany, however, the integration record is mixed at best.10 On the positive side, there are nationally prominent German-Turkish politicians (Ekin Deligöz, Lale Akgün, Cem Özdemir, to name only a few), academics (Hakki Keskin, Faruk Şen) businessmen (the best-known being Vural Öger, founder of Öger Tours, and MEP), writers (Feridun Zaimoğlu, Zafer Senoçak), artists and actors (director Fatih Akın, actors Sibel Kekilli, Kaya Yanar, Renan Demirkan), as well as sports figures (the soccer-playing twins Halil and Hamid Altintop, for example). Türkisch für Anfänger (Turkish for Beginners), a prize-winning national prime time TV series that first aired in 2006 and managed to be both frank and funny about the clash of cultures in a mixed German-Turkish family proved so popular that it is now running in a

4 This amounts to nearly a quarter of Turkey’s total annual tourism; Auswärtiges Amt, see above.
5 Germany signed a labour recruitment treaty with Turkey in 1961.
6 BAMF, op.cit., p. 119. The next largest groups are the Italians and citizens of the former Yugoslavia, at about 600,000 each.
7 A total of 7.3m foreigners were living in Germany in 2002, 8.9% of the total population. See Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsforschung, Demographieindex 2004, p. 47, http://www.bib-demographie.de/index_info.html.
9 Up to 20,000, according to the Auswärtiges Amt, see above.
second season. A comedian who goes by the stage name of Django Asül made national headlines recently when he gave the keynote satirical speech at the Paulaner brewery’s *Starkbieranstich* ceremony at the beginning of Lent in Munich, a Bavarian tribal rite of the highest order.\(^{11}\) The second national TV channel, ZDF, has just decided to institute a special religious programme for Muslims on Fridays (modelled on the *Wort zum Sonntag* for Christians). The Turkish communities in Germany, for their part, were shocked out of their relative seclusion and passivity by the combined impact of Islamist terrorism in the US and Europe, as well as by the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and the Danish ‘cartoon crisis’.

The German grand coalition government, supported by a number of foundations and community organizations, is making a concerted push for improving the integration of Muslims in Germany. In particular, the Deutsche Islamkonferenz (German Islamic Conference), a series of meetings between the government and Germany’s Muslim communities initiated by Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble in 2006, is intended to culminate in a formal agreement along the lines of the Concordate with the Vatican or the treaty with the Association of Protestant Churches. Chancellor Merkel upgraded the position of the federal commissioner for migration, refugees and integration, now held by Maria Böhmer, to cabinet level. Municipalities are increasingly offering German language and culture courses for Turkish immigrants – and more often than not, making them mandatory (a practice previously frowned upon as discriminatory, and which contributed a great deal to the creation of parallel Turkish societies). Serious efforts are also now being made to integrate Turkish children (and, often, their mothers), into German kindergartens and schools. And the Turkish government, too, is contributing by – for example – funding German language classes for imams who are about to be sent to Germany. All this is a remarkable departure from the politics of (at best) benign indifference masquerading as ‘multiculturalism’ in the 1980s and 1990s – and was probably only possible under the aegis of a grand coalition.

Nevertheless, problems abound. There is a genuine need for more reliable sociological studies and quantitative data. Yet there is broad consensus on the issues to be tackled – if not always on their underlying causes – even amongst the German-Turkish community. These include

\(^{11}\) For details, see http://blog.gmfus.org/2007/02/07/cooler-germania/.
Turkish ghettos and parallel societies in many German cities; Turkish mothers who do not speak a word of German; Turkish girls who are not allowed to go to school or attend certain classes, school sports and trips; and high violence and crime rates among male Turkish adolescents. In addition, low rates of participation in secondary education and vocational training have proven to be an additional barrier to adaptation and integration. The joblessness rate among Turks in Germany is almost double the average German rate. Three times as many Turks live on welfare than Germans. Turks retire far earlier (often because of work-related disabilities). Mosque-building projects remain a pervasive subject of friction in German municipalities. The fact that Turkey has been among the top three countries of origin for asylum seekers in Germany for the last decade has imported a serious cause of domestic conflict in Turkey – mainly divisions between its ethnically Turkish and Sunni majority and its Kurdish and Alevite minorities – into Germany. Turkish bureaucracy maintains a strong grip on Turkish communities in Germany from afar – particularly over religious organizations. Finally; as in Turkey itself, Germany’s population is divided between a highly secular, urban, Western-oriented and cosmopolitan minority on the one hand, and a deeply religious and conservative majority, often coming from small-town or rural backgrounds in the eastern part of Turkey, on the other. The Turkish community in Germany – its official umbrella organization is the Türkische Gemeinde Deutschlands/TDG, which encompasses over 200 groupings and is headed by the Social-Democrat Kenan Kolat – is divided on many specific political issues.

It is thought that there are few Turks among the tiny percentage of Muslims living in Germany who are suspected by the federal domestic intelligence service (Verfassungsschutz) of supporting Islamist terrorist organizations. Yet domestic Turkish terrorism (Grey Wolves, PKK) and Islamic radicalism (Metin Kaplan, the ‘Caliph of Cologne’, extradited in 2004 to Turkey) have historically found its way to Germany. Nor has the secular nationalist culture of their homeland made second-generation immigrants immune to the temptations of Islamism, as cases like that of Bremen-born Murat Kurnaz show.

12 10% in 2005. 80% of the applicants are Kurds. Turkish applications were among the few to be granted at above-average rates, despite newly restrictive asylum regulations. See Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsforschung, op.cit., p. 53; and Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF), op. cit., p. 57-59 and 64.
The relatively low rate of Turks who have obtained German citizenship – just over 700,000\textsuperscript{13} – is due to a complex set of obstacles (some of them deliberately cultivated) on both the German and the Turkish sides. The fact that Germany waited until 1999 to liberalize its highly restrictive citizenship law of 1913 was an important (if not the only) factor in keeping the rate low. The Turkish state also added a strong disincentive by actively discouraging double nationality. But this in itself bears testimony to the troubled record of Turkish-German integration.

This situation, unique in Europe, is the backdrop against which the German debate about Turkey’s EU membership bid must be analysed. In principle, of course, it offers opportunities as well as challenges – which is why it is used as an argument both for and against Turkey’s European integration.\textsuperscript{14} But the essential point to make here is that only in Germany is the debate about Turkish EU membership inextricably intertwined with a debate about the very nature of German identity in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.\textsuperscript{15} For a German to take a stance for or against Turkey’s membership in the EU implies taking a stance on the integration or not of Turks in Germany itself. In other words, this is not just about Turks coming to Europe, or becoming Europeans. In Germany, they are already there. And it is about them becoming Germans too.

3. Germany and Turkey’s EU accession process

3.1 Policy: parties and politicians\textsuperscript{16}

During the sixteen years of his tenure, Germany’s Christian-Democrat Chancellor Helmut Kohl was notoriously and implacably opposed to Turkey’s EU membership bid. In an ironic twist of history, it was pre-

\textsuperscript{13} Auswärtiges Amt, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/Tuerkei/Bilateral.html.

\textsuperscript{14} Faruk Şen, director of the zentrum für Türkeistudien, argues that the EU membership process itself has been a motor of integration for Turks in Germany, see http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php?wc_c=297&wc_id=62&wc_p=1&printmode=1.

\textsuperscript{15} The Turkish Diaspora certainly picked one of the more fraught national identities in Europe to challenge. Germans’ national self-image (still burdened with the shame, guilt and pain of its 20\textsuperscript{th} century history) is today being battered even more by the forces of globalization, high immigration and low birth rates. However, there are signs of maturity as well, such as the relaxed patriotism on view during the 2006 Soccer World Cup – during which veiled Turkish women were seen wearing the German national colours!

\textsuperscript{16} For details and specific source references, see the European Stability initiative (ESI) ‘The German Turkey Debate Under the Grand Coalition’, October 2006, on www.esiweb.org. This
cisely his remark that the EU was and ought to remain a ‘Christian club’ at the 1997 Luxemburg European Council and the ensuing international uproar his comment unleashed, which tipped the balance of the debate in Europe and set in motion the sequence of events culminating in the formal opening of membership negotiations in October 2005. Kohl’s Social-Democrat/Green successor government, under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, emphatically reversed this position and endorsed Ankara’s EU candidacy – although unsupported by the large majority of public opinion and accompanied by distinct, if discreet, expressions of reserve within their own parties.

Today, Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) leads a grand coalition in Berlin which has proven to be an uneasy marriage of convenience on many issues – not least on the Turkey question, where the official positions of CDU and SPD remain diametrically opposed. Merkel, who was previously on record as endorsing her party’s alternative proposal, a ‘privileged partnership’ with Turkey, has tried to square this particular circle by reaffirming her party’s preference, and at the same time promising *pacta sunt servanda*, meaning that Germany would honour its formal commitment to pursue membership negotiations in good faith. 17 Since then, she has pursued a zig-zagging course: for example, a cordial visit to Istanbul and Ankara in late 2006 was followed by the recommendation that the decision on a reopening of the eight negotiating chapters closed in late 2006 should be subjected to another EU vote (‘a revision clause’) – giving in effect Cyprus a veto. While this practice is familiar to domestic Merkel-watchers as a cross-tacking technique designed to keep allies and foes equally on guard, her Turkish interlocutors have understandably found it unnerving.

The Chancellor’s personal views in all this remain resolutely hidden from view. But her generally strategic and rational take on most political questions would appear to make it unlikely that she believes in the essentialist line of Kohl et al. Some observers are even persuaded that,

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were she bolstered by a larger parliamentary majority and consistent economic growth, she could find sympathy for a more strategic take on Turkey herself.

Within Merkel’s party, views are also clearly more complex than the official line would seem to suggest. While the ‘Christian club’ rationale has come to be considered too provincial by the majority of the CDU, related essentialist arguments based on history and culture are still much en vogue. Economic and social tensions within Turkey as well as, more recently, within the EU (the ‘absorption capacity’ gambit), are marshalled as collateral defences. But prominent Christian Democrats like former Defence Minister Volker Rühe or the present chairman of the Bundestag’s Foreign Policy Committee Ruprecht Polenz have either made it clear that they support Turkey’s bid for strategic reasons (Rühe) or at least demonstrated sympathetic interest in it (Polenz). A reportedly fierce internal debate within the CDU at the time of the election campaign in 2005 over whether to tap into popular fears of Turkey was apparently won by the anti-populists.18

In the SPD matters are no simpler. Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier as well as party leader Kurt Beck have repeatedly endorsed the official party line of supporting Turkey’s candidacy.19 This line of argument is based on two principal factors. First, the argument goes, is Turkey’s geostrategic position as a ‘bridge’ between the West and the Middle East, and, more recently, as a bridge to areas of interest in terms of energy diversification, such as the Black Sea and Central Asia. Second, is the perception that a stable secular Turkish republic anchored in the West might serve as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism – or even as a model for modernizing Arab nations. The fact that about 60% of Germans of Turkish origin consistently vote for the SPD might also have helped.20

More or less prominent Social-Democrats like Karsten Voigt, Markus Meckel and Lale Akgün are all on record as being in favour of Turkey joining the EU. Yet the SPD as a whole has noticeably refrained from

18 Rumour has it that the Minister-Presidents of Hessen (Roland Koch) and Bavaria (Edmund Stoiber) were clamouring to instrumentalize the issue, but were beaten into retreat by a more cautious factions led by now-interior minister Wolfgang Schäuble.
19 See, for example, the SPD party leadership’s position paper of January 7, 2007 on the EU Presidency, http://www.spd.de/show/1700789/070107_pv_erklauering_eu_praesidentschaft.pdf.
making this a campaign issue. No doubt this restraint was partially opportunistic, given the two big parties’ neck-to-neck race in the 2005 election. Yet in all likelihood there are deeper, darker reasons too, such as the enormous internal tension between the party’s progressive tradition and the profound fear of globalization and welfare state reform that puts it squarely in the conservative camp on many current political issues. Here the Turkish question risks becoming a symbol for all those external forces ripping and tearing the cozy haven of Germany’s post-war social model, or the pre-enlargement/pre-constitutional debacle dream of a geographically limited and fully integrated EU.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the Greens’ electoral base harbours similar, but possibly more guilty misgivings, because of the party’s even more pronounced official pro-Turkey stance. Indeed similarly to the SPD, Germany’s eco-party is similarly torn between progressive and conservative instincts. Cem Özdemir, the Greens’ best-known and most eloquent advocate of Turkish membership, is currently somewhat sidelined in the European Parliament. Former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, whose fervent advocacy of Turkish membership reflected his late conversion to the geostrategic gains of European enlargement has sought exile even farther away, in Princeton.

The Liberal Party (FDP) has positioned itself firmly on the fence on the Turkey question, stating in a recent paper on the occasion of Germany’s assuming the EU Presidency, that ‘negotiations should remain open, and should end either in membership or close association’. The paper further adds that the ‘key for success lies in Turkey’s will for reforms’, yet immediately warns that a Turkey’s turning against Europe would be ‘highly damaging for our interests’.21

Neither does the Left Party, a highly volatile and fragmented parliamentary group held together – barely – by the slightly sulfurous charisma of its two leaders Oskar Lafontaine and Gregor Gysi, offer an unequivocal stance. In its parliamentarian Hakki Keskin, speaker on EU enlargement, the Party flags a stalwart (if not entirely uncontroversial) pillar of the German Turkish community. Yet on the evidence of the press statements on the Left Party parliamentary group’s website,22 the party takes considerable pleasure in trouncing Turkey for its treatment of minorities and women, the slow pace of reforms, and its reluctance to acknowledge the

22 See http://www.linksfraktion.de.
mass killings of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Indeed, the Left Party seems to be claiming the moral high ground on both sides of the debate. To the author’s knowledge, no survey has ever been conducted of German parliamentarian and policymakers’ views on Turkey and its EU membership bid – and if it were to be undertaken, honesty could probably only be had on the promise of strict anonymity. Yet if polls such as the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends and others are any reliable guide, the divisions of opinion are far more likely to run within parties than between them, and more often than not following generational lines.

3.2 Public opinion: polls and debates in academia and the media

As a paper by the European Stability Initiative points out, German public opinion ‘remains… amongst the most sceptical in Europe’ on the issue of Turkish EU accession. The special Eurobarometer # 255 of July 2006 saw 52% of respondents taking the view that Turkey’s membership was primarily in Turkey’s own interest. 69% of the Germans polled said they were against Turkish membership even once Turkey complies with all of the EU’s conditions. In Transatlantic Trends 2006, 42% of the Germans polled said Turkish membership would be a bad thing, up from 28% in 2004 – but with 40%, interestingly, remaining noncommittal. The previous year, in Transatlantic Trends 2005, which had asked some additional questions exploring the reasons for or against Turkey’s candidature, a clear majority of the Germans rejected the notion that Turkey’s Muslim population does not belong in the EU (60% against), or that Turkey is too populous (61% against) or too poor (71% against) to be integrated. What really worried the Germans was the potential negative economic effect of Turkey joining the EU (66%).

The ESI’s paper notes that there are few genuine Turkey experts in Germany, Heinz Kramer of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin or Udo Steinbach of the Orient-Institut in Hamburg being amongst the few exceptions. German historians (Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Heinrich-August Winkler) and at least one retired German Chancellor (Helmut Schmidt) have been all the more voluble in their disapproval, whereas,

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23 To be found in www.transatlantictrends.org.
25 Op. cit., p. 71 – only the Austrians were even more strongly against Turkey’s bid, at 81%.
26 Ibid.
political scientists Claus Leggewie and Herfried Münkler have championed Turkey’s bid.\(^{27}\) The discussion of Turkey’s EU accession in the German media has been a very mixed spectacle as well. Of the three largest newspapers – the weekly \textit{DIE ZEIT}, and the dailies \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung} and \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} – only \textit{FAZ} has followed a consistent course (against), while the other two are divided on the issue.\(^{28}\) Astutely, the ESI authors also remark that the debate which reached a peak in 2002 with a flaming, but often rather abstract discussion on the ‘nature’ of Europe and its ‘natural’ borders has since shifted ground and matured. Where the earlier debate centred on essentialist ethnocultural (and hence apolitical) arguments about the identity of Europe and the meaning of German \textit{Leitkultur}, today’s discourse focuses on the mechanics of European governance, and what it takes to be a stakeholder in a modern European society, as well as on issues relating to economics, demography, internal governance and geostrategy.\(^{29}\) Most interestingly, it examines both the positions of the immigrants and the host society, asking both sides what changes would have to be undertaken to move towards each other – and what the potential costs of not doing so would be. This has opened a new and potentially fruitful line of inquiry into the limitations of German and European traditions of secularism. Historically, these provided only for negative freedom of religion, or freedom from interference by the state – rather than positive freedom

\(^{27}\) See Leggewie(ed.) op.cit. for details. Additional references are to be found in the ESI paper.

\(^{28}\) Details, see Andreas Wimmel (2006) ‘Transnationale Diskurse in Europa: Der Streit um den Türkei-Beitritt in Deutschland, Frankreich und Grossbritannien’, Frankfurt, pp. 123 et seq., as well as Martin Große Hüttmann (2005) ‘Die Türkei ist anders als Europa: Die öffentliche Debatte um einen EU-Beitritt der Türkei in Deutschland, in Angelos Giannakopoulos, Konstadinos Maras (eds.), \textit{Die Türkei-Debatte in Europa: Ein Vergleich,} Wiesbaden, pp. 35 et seq. At \textit{SZ}, for example, Heribert Prantl and Christiane Schlötzer (for) write against Christian Wernicke or Martin Winter; at \textit{ZEIT}, Michael Thumann (for) argues with Helmut Schmidt (against), whereas Susanne Gaschke, Jochen Bittner and Frank Drieschner have all written extensive and more or less sympathetic portraits of Turks in Germany and their communities. Finally, the \textit{FAZ}‘s Istanbul correspondent Rainer Herrmann has established himself as the lone pro-Turkish voice of his paper.

\(^{29}\) Münkler and Leggewie are typical of this line of discourse. Unsurprisingly, proponents of the supranational EU model tend to be unsympathetic towards Turkey’s candidature, whereas advocates of enlargement are more sanguine. The state of the transatlantic relationship also played into many analyses: America’s insistent advocacy of Turkey in the early 2000s, when the relationship was particularly brittle, was put down as yet another point against Ankara. Now that the US-European relationship has become more pragmatic and relaxed, it seems easier to judge the Turkish case on its merits.
of religion, as understood above all in the US constitutional tradition, where it is held that the state must provide and protect the space for the free expression and exercise of minority religions. Whereas the US has allowed officers to wear turbans or yarmulkes, or permitted citizens to sue shopping centres for not displaying a menorah next to a Christmas crèche, the German state and courts have chosen the opposite direction. They have forbidden teachers and other civil servants from wearing headscarves, and ordered Catholic schools to remove crucifixes from classrooms. The German state is indeed resolutely conservative in other ways too; for example, it deducts church taxes from employees’ salaries for both the Catholic and Protestant churches, but not for any other community. Such a re-examination of the relationship between religion and the state, or faith and politics, ought to be of considerable interest to Germany’s other religious minority groups, not least its more than 100,000 Jews. Nevertheless, this debate is as yet in its infancy, and the notion that secularism as it is presently practiced might limit the expression of religious freedom rather than enabling it, is held at most by a minority. Mainstream discourse about religion tends to focus on a bleak perception of the incompatibility of Islam and Western culture.30

Despite all these recent developments and shifts in the German discourse, the notion of Turkish political and/or cultural ‘otherness’ remains a potent focal point, capable of re-igniting a broad and heated popular debate at almost any moment. Solidarity with the Kurds – a popular left-wing vehicle for criticizing Turkey and a feature of most political demonstrations in the 1970s and 1980s – has dimmed noticeably since the Balkan wars and the post-September 11 radicalization of the Muslim world, which generated a new appreciation of the achievements of the secular Republic of Atatürk among Germans. The Armenian issue is also less virulent in Germany than, say, in France or the US. Turkey is widely regarded as being in a deplorable state of denial about the genocide of 1915. But any inclination to make a political issue of the Armenian question is swiftly tempered by the consciousness of a far greater historical guilt in the shape of the Holocaust, the knowledge that the pre World War I Ottoman Army was schooled and led by Prussian officers, and possibly also the fact that the Armenian Diaspora in Germany is far smaller and less influential than elsewhere.

30 See Udo Steinbach, on www.bpb.de/themen/Die Türkei in der EU, quoting research by the well-known German sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer.
But the issue of human rights – particularly the freedom of expression and the rights of women – is and will remain a highly inflammatory one. The defamation suits against Orhan Pamuk, Elif Şafak and other writers all received extensive coverage in the German media, as did the murder of the Armenian-Turkish journalist and writer Hrant Dink in January 2007, or the honour killing in Berlin of Hatun Sürücü in 2005. Women authors like Necla Kelek and Serap Cileli, as well as lawyers like Seyran Ates (all of them Turkish Germans), became nationally known figures in Germany because of their outspoken advocacy of Turkish women’s rights.

4. A Role for Turks?

A discussion of German attitudes to Turkey’s EU bid would be incomplete without some reference to the Turkish role – both within Germany and Turkey. German Turks (both the integrated minority and the silent, less integrated majority) as well as the Turkish government and public have ignored substantial opportunities for constructive contributions to a healthier debate. Integrated Turks in Germany could do worse than to reach out to the less privileged – say along the model of American mentoring programmes for young people, like ‘Big Brother/Big Sister’. This would be a visible expression of solidarity as well as of their own success. A stronger push for integration on the part of the majority would make it considerably less easy for reluctant bureaucrats or prejudiced public opinion to excuse their own inaction hiding behind Turkish disinterest. A more relaxed attitude by the Turkish state towards its Diaspora might also work wonders. Last but not least, it would help immeasurably if domestic Turkish public opinion ceased to sneer at both integrated (alienated from their roots) and non-integrated Turks in Germany (too attached to their roots) – and began to regard its Diaspora as an asset and potential ally, rather than an embarrassment.

Such suggestions require, of course, an almost superhuman degree of rationality and enlightenment from all interested parties. Yet consider the gains. Turkey might consolidate its reform process and gain a powerful ally for its EU bid. Germany might lay to rest its noxious tradition of essentialist politics, and reconcile multi-identity modernity with the respect for different forms of faith within a constitutionalist framework. In truth, Turkey and Germany both stand to gain – and to lose – most from each other.
Yet such an arrangement might prove an attractive model even for other European countries which battle with the legacy of their colonial past and immigrant Muslim communities of a far less secular mindset than the Turks. And finally, it would help refute the suspicion that Europe regards its future as a gated community, rather than an export model.
10. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND TURKISH ACCESION: THE ENLARGEMENT INSTINCT PREVAILS

Richard G. Whitman

1. Introduction

The question of Turkish accession to the EU has a very low level of political and public saliency within the UK. The positive or negative effects of Turkey’s membership of the EU are not widely debated by UK politicians and debate that does take place is largely confined to a relatively small constituency of foreign policy-makers, analysts and academics. There are a number of important factors that provide the explanatory conditions for Turkish accession being a low-level political issue in the UK. This set of conditioning factors assists in comprehending the current British position on Turkish accession and will be considered first. The paper then concludes by assessing whether this situation is likely to continue by identifying some factors which might generate a change in the UK stance.

2. Attitudes to Turkish Accession: Conditioning Factors

The conditioning factors which are significant in comprehending the UK’s current stance on Turkey’s EU accession are: governmental, public opinion, parliamentary and party political, and political economic. These factors are significant for comprehending the degree and form of commitment that the British government gives to Turkish accession and provide an understanding of the depth of understanding (and support) for European Union enlargement in general.
2.1 Government policy objectives

Since coming to power in 1997, the New Labour government has pursued the long-standing UK government policy of enthusiasm for EU enlargement. However, the enlargement policy pursued by Prime Minister Tony Blair has been conditioned by different factors than his predecessors. Blair set himself the early goal of putting the UK at ‘the heart of Europe’ and directing a more enthusiastic European policy for the UK.\(^1\) The question of whether this general European policy aspiration has been realised is beyond the scope of this paper. However, what is of importance is that the UK has had a much more sympathetic European policy than that pursued by the Thatcher and Major governments. It can be argued that Blair has ‘normalized’ the UK’s position towards the EU and that that has shifted the British government away from the automatic opposition to the deepening of European integration that was the hallmark of British policy since the middle of the 1970s.\(^2\)

In a limited number of areas the British government has even sought to stimulate new directions for EU policy that might be viewed as integrationist in spirit (particularly noteworthy is its contribution to the development of the ESDP since the St. Malo Anglo-French summit of 1998). However, this should not distract from the fact that the Blair government has kept the UK outside the core of European integration by not seeking UK membership of the single currency.

If the Blair government could be said to have departed from some aspects of its predecessors’ European policy there has been a strong element of consistency in support for EU enlargement. The issue of enlargement of the EU has not been an issue of dispute within the Cabinet of the British government nor between any ministers or government departments within the United Kingdom. This was the case for the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the Union and remains the case for the accession of Turkey.

The current government’s official stance on Turkey’s prospects for EU membership is encapsulated by a recent statement of Foreign Secretary Margaret Becket to Parliament: ‘No-one is in any doubt that Turkey must meet all the requirements and obligations of membership before


joining the European Union. But as this House has consistently agreed, a European Union with Turkey as a member will be stronger, richer and more secure’. 3

Of particular note is that Turkey’s accession to the EU receives favourable assessments within the governmental defence community in the UK. Turkey’s membership of the EU is viewed positively as a possible strong contribution to strengthening the capabilities of the ESDP, which has been a key UK policy objective. However, there does not appear to have been wide-ranging and deeper analysis conducted on the impact of Turkish accession on the ESDP or its impact upon UK defence and security priorities.

The Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the British consulate and a branch of the HSBC in Istanbul on 20 November 2003, and the subsequent investigation, have created an enhanced Anglo-Turkish collaboration on intelligence and security issues. It is however difficult to discern the extent to which the UK intelligence community has translated this collaboration into an enthusiasm for Turkey’s EU accession.

2.1.1 Policy in action through the UK EU Presidency

The UK had a good opportunity to operationalize its policy with respect to Turkey during its Presidency of the EU. The UK Presidency in the second half of 2005 made the opening of negotiations with Turkey a key priority.

The formal opening of Turkey’s membership negotiations after a tense ‘end-game’ was a notable achievement of the UK Presidency, especially against the backdrop of the unfavourable political circumstances of the aftermath of the Dutch and French votes on the Constitutional Treaty. 4 Additionally, the Austrian government threatened to veto any attempt to open accession negotiations in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). The position of the Presidency was helped by two events. The first was the absence of Angela Merkel who had previously advanced the notion of a ‘privileged partnership’ for Turkey as an alternative to full membership of the EU. As the German elections did not present Angela Merkel with as a clear a mandate as expected and, distracted by the need to build

a grand coalition, her CDU party was not represented at the GAERC in Luxembourg. It was also precipitate that Carla Del Ponte, chief prosecutor at the UN War Crimes Tribunal, had reported on 3 October that Croatia had fully cooperated with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) over General Ante Gotovina, who had been indicted (and subsequently detained on 7 December 2005). This enabled the UK simultaneously to open accession negotiations with Croatia (to which the UK had previously been opposed until Croatia was in full compliance with ICTY) and thereby be in the position to use this as leverage against the Austrian government’s opposition to Turkish membership.

The manner in which the UK Presidency handled negotiations on Turkish accession generated negative reactions from a number of member state foreign ministries. And it has been suggested that a crisis could have been avoided had the UK laid the groundwork of consultation more thoroughly in the lead-up to the GAERC on 3 October. The representatives of the Central and East European countries were particularly incensed by the fact that they were consulted only after a deal had been agreed with Ankara. This does not appear to have been the result of incompetence on the part of the British government, but rather a choice to focus political energy and effort on dealing with Austria as the recalcitrant member state obstructing the formal decision.

To summarise, there is a consensual view across government on the UK’s position on Turkey’s accession to the EU, which has not been the cause of ‘bureaucratic politics’. Intra-departmental tensions are minimal with wide agreement between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) on the UK’s position with respect to Turkey and the EU. The predominant view is that Turkey should be seen as complementary to the EU as long as it can achieve the necessary thresholds required for EU accession.

2.2 Public opinion

Outside Whitehall, Turkey’s EU membership has a low level of salience in British political life. Other EU issues such as the Constitutional Treaty, membership of the single currency and the consequences of labour migration from the 2004 enlargement of the EU attract greater interest and attention. The indication of the low-level of salience of Turkey’s EU accession in UK political life can be indicated by Turkey being a non-concern in public opinion in the most recent general elections and in parliamentary politics. There appears to have been no
polling on this matter by UK public opinion organizations (as opposed to Eurobarometer) since 2003. Turkish membership of the EU has not been an issue that has attracted considerable interest and/or concern. There is no active organized public hostility to Turkey as an EU member primarily due to public ignorance. And there has been no exercise to actively inform the public or lead public opinion. More pressing issues of public concern on enlargement have been the scale of migration from Central Europe as a consequence of the opening of the UK labour market to citizens of the 2004 accession states. Indeed immigration rates are the areas of highest public concern (rated most important by 40% of respondents with the next most important concern being terrorism at 35%). The key vehicle for organized UK opposition to membership of the EU comes from the UK Independence Party (UKIP) which favours UK withdrawal from the Union and has identified negative impacts of EU enlargement on the UK. Opinion polling conducted through Eurobarometer (Special Eurobarometer 255 of July 2006 for the most recent polling) gives an indication of the underlying public sentiment. Eurobarometer places the UK not much above the EU average in favour of Turkish accession at 42% in favour (with an EU average of 39%) and 39% opposed of those polled (as against a 48% EU average). This suggests that the UK public has a slight predisposition towards supporting membership but only by a relatively small margin and in a context in which the issue has not been widely publicly debated.

2.3 Party Politics and Parliament

Turkey’s EU membership is also a relatively insignificant parliamentary political issue measured in terms of the parliamentary time devoted to the issue. The deepening of European integration (as opposed to widening EU membership) is a much greater issue of division across the three main political parties. The primary disagreements are on the desirability of strengthening the formal integration process through strengthening European institutions or broadening the scope of EU policy competence.

5 Standard Eurobarometer 66, UK National Report, p. 26. And this has risen 12% in six months.
6 Attitudes Towards European Union Enlargement, Special Eurobarometer 255, July 2006. Q.16. Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be… to the accession of Turkey to the European Union?
2.3.1 Conservative Party position

Although European policy in general acts as a key dividing issue between New Labour and the Conservative Party, this is not the case on enlargement. The Conservatives’ position on enlargement has been consistently supportive, whilst objecting to the idea that EU institutions need to be strengthened to facilitate future enlargements. Even under its new leader David Cameron, the Conservative Party remains strongly opposed to the Constitutional Treaty, while being strongly in support of Turkey’s EU membership. The Conservative Party has argued that Turkey’s accession is needed for geopolitical and military reasons and because Turkey represents a ‘bridge to the Islamic world’.7

These rationales (and beyond the notion that widening the EU has a diluting or restricting effect on the deepening of European integration) are also attractive for the Conservative Party as it is an objective sought by the United States. The Conservatives remain strongly committed to the ‘special relationship’ with the US and reject the direction that the ESDP has taken since St. Malo. Turkey’s EU accession is viewed as a basis upon which to strengthen Atlanticism and NATO. The Conservative Party has consistently viewed NATO as the appropriate venue for European defence. It views the EU’s defence aspirations as duplicating NATO and sees Turkey as an ally on this issue.

European policy did not feature as a significant issue in the most recent British General Election in 2005. Each of the main parties did, however, set out their respective positions on the EU and its enlargement in their 2005 general election manifestos. The New Labour manifesto provides a clear indication as to the government’s current line, stating that under its forthcoming EU Presidency it would ‘...bring closer EU membership for Turkey’. The Conservative Party manifesto was strongly supportive of enlargement, stating that, if elected, ‘(w)e will also build on the success of enlargement, making Europe more diverse by working to bring in more nations, including Turkey’.

The new Conservative Party leader David Cameron, appointed after the General Election, has held out the prospect of a rethink of for-

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7 Dr Liam Fox, Shadow Defence Secretary (2006) ‘Turkey could be a beacon to the Islamic world: that’s why it must be admitted to the EU’, *Daily Telegraph*, 3 September.
eign and security policy through the creation of a ‘Policy Group on National and International Security’ announced on 12 January 2006. The intention is for the group to ‘examine all aspects of the UK’s national security, from both a domestic and an international perspective’. The group ‘will examine the UK’s geo-political positioning vis-à-vis the EU, NATO, relations with the USA and with Commonwealth Countries, as well as with less-developed countries and the emerging giants; and will also examine UK defence policy in the light of the current and emerging security challenges which the country faces’. When, or indeed whether, a Conservative Party re-orientates away from hostility to European integration will be a key determinant as to whether the UK becomes an overwhelmingly committed, and consistently reliable partner, in the EU irrespective of which political partner is in power in the UK.

2.3.2 Members’ of Parliament expertise

More extensive parliamentary expertise on Turkey is concentrated in the House of Lords rather than the House of Commons. Members of the House of Commons who declare an interest in Turkey are minimal. The members of the House of Commons that take the keenest interest in Turkey are primarily those members of parliament with Turkish (or Cypriot) communities based in their constituencies. The UK has a population of Turkish origin of approximately 58,000 (1.2% of the total Turkish migrant population in Europe) and with 64% of this population living in Greater London. Additionally, there are members of parliament who have a special interest in Turkey as a consequence of industries in their constituency that have Turkey as a major market destination. There are also a number of former foreign and defence ministers sitting in Parliament who take a continuing informed interest in European issues and follow Turkey’s enlargement prospects. There is, however, a small organized cross-party lobbying and interest in Turkey in parliament. The normal method for organizing interests in parliament is through the creation of an ‘All

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party group’, which exists for Turkey as the ‘All-Party British-Turkey Parliamentary Group’. There is also an additional group on ‘European Union Enlargement’ whose purpose is to liaise with countries requesting EU membership status.

The most detailed parliamentary attention and scrutiny of EU enlargement and Turkish accession comes through the committees of both houses of parliament. In the House of Commons, the relevant Commons Committees are the Foreign Affairs Committee, the European Scrutiny Committee and to a lesser extent the Defence Committee. Each of these select committees has a majority of Labour members of parliament and none has been a source of hostile opinion on Turkey’s EU membership in Parliament.

The House of Lords has kept a close eye on EU enlargement developments. The House of Lords’ European Union Select Committee has considerable European expertise and its sub-committee on ‘Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Policy’ has taken a particular interest in EU enlargement. The EU Committee of the House of Lords has been supportive of Turkey as an EU candidate but has raised particular concerns about the pace of Turkey’s transition processes.11

The House of Lords provides a key resource in the oversight of the EU enlargement process and a source of creative and original thinking on EU developments. The Lords’ European Union Select Committee demonstrates the added-value that engagement of informed parliamentarians can have on the EU if time is taken to examine the issue-area in depth. The generally positive assessments of Turkey’s EU accession reached by the Lords illustrates that an informed understanding of European issues does not automatically generate hostility among UK parliamentarians.

2.4 The political economy of Britain’s Turkey policy

The political economy aspects of Turkey’s accession to the EU are an important potential dimension for comprehending the UK’s perspective. Turkey is one of the UK’s fastest growing trading partners and investment destinations. Trade between the two countries hit an all

time high in 2005 at $10.6 billion (the rate of growth in trade has been extremely high with, for example, an increase in trade of 24% from 2002 to 2003). UK companies are the fifth largest investors in Turkey. The UK is also an important market for Turkey, being Turkey’s second largest export market and the seventh most important source for imports. The implications of this political economy aspect of the UK-Turkey relationship and the impact of the UK business lobby is yet unfelt in the domestic political context, but is expected to increase if Turkish accession to the EU becomes a realistic proposition.

3. Change factors

At present the UK suffers from neither an over- nor an underwhelming enthusiasm for Turkey’s EU accession. And as noted above, the informed constituency is small. However, there are a number of factors which might bring about a change in the UK attitude.

3.1 Politicization of immigration and the spill-over effect

The next UK General Election is not expected to be scheduled in advance of 2009/2010. This does mean that a change of governing party is not to be expected before that date. And as indicated above, the Conservative Party’s position on enlargement does not currently differ much from New Labour’s. However as European policy in general is an issue that distinguishes the two main parties, the prospect of future enlargements becoming an issue of contestation cannot be entirely ruled out. Furthermore, as the issue of immigration is currently a political issue that has considerable resonance with the public, and as Turkey represents a possible additional source of labour migration to the UK, rising public opposition to accession cannot be ruled out either.

Public opinion polling indicates that immigration represents the most pressing political issue that the British public wishes to see the British government address. There also appears to have been a spill-over effect on public enthusiasm for enlargement, with a drop-off of public support for the principle of enlargement.
3.2 Change of Prime Minister

Prime Minister Tony Blair’s impending departure from 10 Downing Street has generated intense interest in the policies and style of his most likely successor, the current Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown. Pundits have been speculating about how a Brown-led government would differ from the Blair administration, with particular attention being paid to foreign policy, and about whether and to what extent Brown might depart from Blair’s approach. Brown has stated on various occasions that he admired the EU for its enlargement policy to date and for its success in promoting peace in Europe. His desire to rebalance the cohesion funds to focus on the EU’s poorest countries – mainly the newest member states – is another indication that he supports the new member states and supported enlargement. His key ally, Ed Balls, has stated in various speeches that the UK would gain from legal immigration resulting from enlargement, which suggests Brown’s team sees further enlargement in a positive light.

4. Conclusion

Turkey’s accession to the EU is currently an issue of low-level political concern within the UK. As indicated above there is, as yet, no core constituency of active opposition to Turkey’s EU membership. Rather, there is a level of general support across the UK political elite for EU enlargement. Public opinion polling suggests that the wider public is less engaged on the prospects of Turkish EU accession. A key conditioning factor for the maintenance of the benign attitude towards Turkish accession would be whether it would be facilitated by a ‘package deal’ that included the enhancement of the power of EU institutions. In such a context it might be anticipated that UK scepticism would trump enthusiasm for enlargement.

12 It is generally expected that Tony Blair’s resignation as leader of the Labour Party will take place before the parliamentary summer recess in 2007, and that in the subsequent leadership election Gordon Brown will be elected leader of the Labour party and accede to the position of prime minister.
11. CONDITIONALITY, IMPACT AND PREJUDICE:
A CONCLUDING VIEW FROM TURKEY

Mustafa Aydin and Asli Toksabay Esen

1. Introduction

This exercise is aimed at providing a snapshot of views on Turkey’s candidacy and its prospects for accession to the European Union with specific reference to the conditionalities imposed on the country, the impact that its eventual membership would have, and the prejudices that hinder or promote its accession path. The discourse on conditionality, impact and prejudice has traditionally concentrated on a number of key issues. Apart from the Copenhagen criteria, which constitute the core of the EU’s conditions, several other, often controversial issues have been raised and sometimes recognized as conditions to be imposed on Turkey during the accession negotiations. In terms of the impact of Turkish accession on the EU and its member states, some of the main issues are the influence of Turkey on the institutional setup, on the composition and distribution of the EU budget, on the EU’s role in the global economy and political system, as well as on employment and labour markets, the Common Agricultural Policy and energy. Public opinion is vocal on all these issues. This concluding chapter will try and present the key points raised by the participants in their chapters and during the discussions, and then analyse conditionality, impact and prejudice from a Turkish perspective.
2. Perspectives from member countries

The participants’ portrayal of these issues in this exercise suggests significant differences between the elite and the masses within the EU. These, in turn, underline the importance of a sound multi-level communication strategy for the viability of Turkish accession. While the majority of the policy elite in each country (with the exceptions of France and Austria) tend to have more favourable attitudes towards Turkey and its prospective membership because of a number of considerations and deeper interests, the majority of the public opinion across Europe and in individual countries remains lukewarm to the issue. Germany is one of the primary driving forces of the European project and its favourable opinion on and support for Turkish accession carries a significant weight for Turkish policymakers and politicians, as well as for the Turkish Gastarbeiter living in that country. As pointed out during the workshop, the debate on Turkey’s integration into the EU is viewed by both Turks and Germans as indicative of the possibility of integrating these guest workers into the German/EU system. In France (as well as Denmark), however, the connection seems to be constructed in the opposite direction. The failure to effectively integrate the Muslims (more Moroccans and Algerians than Turks) is taken by many French people as solid evidence that Turkey as a Muslim country is incapable of being integrated into the EU. In Germany by contrast, these essentialist arguments are viewed by many as lying in the past. The United Kingdom seems to be the most enthusiastic supporter of Turkish accession to the EU despite the indifference and a sense of aversion towards possible further waves of immigrants among the people. The salient point though is that the UK seems to be running against the tide in terms of the debates within the EU on Turkey. While other major partners endorse institutional and financial reforms in order to strengthen the network that would need to bear the burden of Turkey’s accession, the UK’s scepticism about a strengthened Union could convert the positive outlook on enlargement and Turkish accession into a more negative mood. Austria instead is the epitome of Turco-scepticism within the Union. For historical, geographical and cultural reasons, Austria tends to endorse the incorporation of the Western Balkans, while feeling very strongly anti-Turkish on identity grounds. The Nordic attitude towards enlargement and Turkish accession tends to be more positive than that of the EU-25. The Finnish elite in gener-
al is more sympathetic to Turkey gaining a place in the EU, though identity concerns prevail among the Finnish public, with specific reference to religion. Finns also voice concerns about the power distribution between large and small states in EU decision-making if enlargement continues. The Finns share a strong emphasis on human rights issues with other constituencies in the EU-25. Swedes instead are less concerned about differences concerning identity and belonging, and more welcoming in terms of the security assets that Turkish accession promises to bring. The Danish emphasis on implementation rather than formal reforms is well taken, as is – to an extent – the perspective that sets out the reform process as a struggle between authoritarian and progressive forces. Nevertheless, to frame the issue in this manner tends to oversimplify the process and harden certain mental categories. It also creates an aura of particularism and misses the point that these tendencies are almost global.

A recurrent theme in many chapters is Turkey’s perception as a security and energy asset. Indeed, for many member countries, Turkish military capabilities and strategic centrality appear to have significant resonance for an EU aspiring to be a global player. For neighbours like Greece, Turkey’s European venture has immediate security implications, which is the reason why Greece and to a lesser extent Greek Cypriots endorse Turkey’s eventual membership, provided that strict conditionality in line with their strategic interests is applied. Again, for many countries, the prospect of Turkey becoming the hub of new and existing pipelines and a central player in the provision of energy is extremely positive. It appears to be seen as a way of stemming their energy dependence on Russia, which they perceive as an unreliable and precarious partner.

3. Conditionality

Conditionality seems to rest at the heart of the debate concerning Turkish accession. The definition of conditionality and the significance attached to several criteria differ from one context to another. As has been the case with the participants in this exercise, the various member states show a tendency to prioritize and emphasize different conditions for Turkish accession at different points in time. Nevertheless, some themes seem to recur in the opinions raised by both the participants in this exercise and the member states themselves.
One of them is whether conditionality should be confined to the Copenhagen criteria or whether there are other issues that are not encapsulated in them that can legitimately be advanced as conditions for Turkish accession. Confusion seems to prevail over these quite substantial problems. Contrasting and at times contradictory opinions have been voiced, including in Turkey itself. Linked to these awkward questions is a further question about whether conditionality should be framed as a technical or a political issue. It is one that has received considerable attention in several reports. In the debates both inside member states and among them, and so also in the discussions within the framework of this group, there seems to be no clear consensus on the definitions of and the boundaries between political criteria and technical ones. Whether objectivity or measurability is the main requisite of being technical is also unclear. Turkey argues that the EU is dealing a blow to its credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkish public opinion by framing political conditionality in a political (and therefore by definition constantly changing) framework, rather than in one which is technical and objective (i.e. a list of requirements to be followed through to the end). While the discourses within the EU on the objectivity and technicality of the conditionalities have some resonance in Turkey, it is precisely the politicization of conditionality, together with an overemphasis on open-endedness, that disturbs the Turkish audience and arouses suspicions of a ‘hidden agenda’ behind them. The way to handle this problem should probably not be too explicit or political, but rather it should be to attempt to translate these political problems into steadfast rules, conditions and benchmarks. This would enable both parties to obtain a common understanding of the actual content of the criteria. This would entail bringing into light the ‘de facto conditions’, i.e. conditions that are not inherent in the body of conditionalities but ones which are nevertheless indispensable priorities for member countries. That will permit a clear understanding of and, if possible, a consensus about the rules of the game. Doing all this would admittedly be a very difficult and time-consuming task, but, as we are getting closer to a make or break point in Turkey-EU relations, it would contribute both to the transparency and the feasibility of the entire scheme. Conversely, politicizing certain issues might actually weaken the prospects for a solution in cases where the problem is already highly political or even explosive.

Several authors stress the fact that the Turkish candidacy has gained a peculiar character whereby issues beyond Turkey’s control, such as the
integration capacity of the Union and national referenda, have come to the fore, with specific reference to Turkish membership. These additional conditions have a disruptive impact on the role and the effectiveness of conditionality. Similarly Europe’s long-delayed debate on its own identity and institutional reforms is closely bound up with both the EU’s absorption capacity and Turkey’s membership prospects. These, combined with the unfavourable public opinion across Europe on Turkish accession, tend to hamper the credibility of the Union and the enlargement project, and strengthen Turkish suspicions that the Union will slam the door on Turkey.

4. Impact

While the exercise has been impressively successful in pointing out the issues clustered around conditionality and prejudice in particular, somewhat unsurprisingly, less can be said on the kind and magnitude of the impact that Turkish accession will have on the EU and on individual member states. This parallels the relative scarcity of studies conducted on the substantive impact of Turkish accession, which is unlikely to happen in the short to medium term, on various aspects of the European Union. This is in large part due to the difficulty in foreseeing many of the facets of the question, a concern also pointed out in the Union’s 2004 report.

The correlation between the perspectives of individual countries on Turkish accession in general and the emphasis they place on various aspects of impact is also significant. Countries that take a positive view of Turkish accession tend to stress Turkey’s geopolitical and strategic assets, as well as contributions towards, among other things, common energy, security, and defence policies of the Union. Turco-sceptics within the Union (notably France) see Turkey as a security liability rather than a security asset with the argument that a Union bordering and neighbouring the Middle East is a challenge that the Union would not wish to live with. They also emphasize instead Turkey’s size and the institutional complications and budgetary burdens that its accession is likely to bring in tow. Some countries, including the engines of the European project, Germany and France, are particularly concerned about these challenges. The outflow of Turkish migrant labours once mobility is permitted also troubles member countries, and especially those already possessing a considerable Turkish or Muslim population.
An interesting point is the fact that Turkey’s geopolitical stance is regarded as a blessing or a curse depending on the eye of the beholder. Another point to be raised that receives relatively little attention in the literature is the extent to which Turkey’s impact across different areas will be conjectural or systematic. When analysing this issue, the temporal, and at times, temporary nature of the impact must be taken into consideration.

However, on a broader level and considering the current lack of information, a possible way forward would perhaps be to undertake an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s impact on the Union, its institutions, its budget and its individual member states responding to the concerns raised above. This would help clarify the validity of some of the concerns raised about the EU’s absorption capacity and pave the way for concrete steps to be taken to remedy likely difficulties. It could be a constructive way to proceed and overcome counterproductive and uninformed debates. It would also be helpful if efforts were then made to shape the debates in Europe along the lines of the findings.

5. Prejudice

Prejudices have been prevalent across the continent due to deep-rooted culturally narrow prisms. As put succinctly by Jung during the workshop held in Rome in March 2007, ‘Turkey suffers from a specific historical narrative that excludes the country from the mental map of most Europeans.’ The assumption that there is an inherent problem between Islam and the values and norms of the European project stands as an obstacle in the way of meaningful and substantive contact between the two parties. Yet, equating the Turkish case with Islam and closing the doors on it on these grounds will not prove to be a viable strategy for the EU in the long run, since Bosnia and Albania, with their predominantly Muslim populations, have made it into the prospective rounds of the enlargement agenda. The same tensions will inevitably re-emerge as new rounds in the search for Europe’s identity are launched.

On a more self-critical note, the shift in Turkish discourse from the assertion, since the foundation of the Republic, that Turkey belongs to Europe in civilizational terms towards an emphasis on an ‘alliance of civilizations’ is unfortunate. This approach of the current Turkish government reinforces the essentialist attitudes that constitute the basis
for anti-Turkish sentiment on religious and cultural grounds as it underlines differences rather than convergence, as Dr. Tocci forcefully argues in her report.

Another interesting point in this context is the similarity of the discourses adopted on both sides – namely Turkey and the EU – towards the issue of Turkish accession. While supporters tend to emphasize plurality and openness, critics on both sides view the prospective accession as a divisive and disruptive occurrence. Isolationism appears to be gaining ground on both sides, which is bad news for people who favour a working relationship.

There are a few other issues that should be emphasized. One is the startled and dismayed view taken within the EU of the rising tide of nationalism in Turkey. The attitudes and discourses of leading European political figures as well as the consistently negative public opinion towards Turkish membership must be recognized as an important cause. A vicious cycle is thereby being created by both sides. The controversy about Turkey’s European credentials after the political decision recognizing them has already been taken, and the mixed signals coming from almost all quarters, are contributing to the ‘they will not open the gate anyway’ argument in Turkey. This is generating a backlash on the part of the Turkish constituency, who in turn, are adopting an increasingly sceptical and obstructive attitude towards the domestic reform process. The slowdown in the reform processes under pressure from an increasingly Eurosceptic, isolationist and nationalist public, is in turn paving the way for unfavourable comments and possibly a sense within the EU that Turkey won’t be able to ‘make it to the civilized world’ after all. European criticism then further fans alienation in Turkey.

The second issue, that is by no means novel but is still worth stressing here, relates to the ways in which the debate concerning Turkish identity and its European belonging masks, or reveals, profound questions of the identity of Europe itself, i.e. the EU as a project and a prospect, and of the individual countries themselves. In each country examined, the debate on Turkey reveals the aspirations of ‘being’ or ‘becoming’ a nation with clear borders and a uniform identity or one that adapts to globalization in a cosmopolitan fashion. The same goes for Europe as an entity, with countervailing tendencies towards being either an inclusionist, pluralistic and progressive project or a bordered, gated and isolationist community.
6. A way forward

Although the road ahead should be the topic of another, more comprehensive study, some preliminary points arise from the progress achieved in this project. One of the most central questions is about the starting point of the communication strategy and the ways to overcome the difficulties that have been identified by the participants. It appears that Turkey will need to devise different strategies for each member state in line with their central concerns and strive to shape their interests. Therefore, rather than taking the European Union as a coherent whole, individual contexts should be taken into consideration and both the discourse and the communication strategies tailored to the specific requirements of each case.

The communication strategy in each country should also be devised on two levels, one for the elite and one for the masses. For the elite, high-level meetings with the participation of academics, policymakers and/or the media would be useful. Thematically speaking, these may either focus on Turkey and its path to accession or, alternatively, they may not necessarily concentrate simply on Turkey but rather on a set of issues that are of interest to member states and indeed involve Turkey as a significant part of the equation (e.g. energy security, defence or demographics). The second is a viable option in that it prevents emotional barriers from being erected in advance, and makes clear, albeit in an indirect way, Turkey’s significance as a player and its cooperation on such vital issues. Partnerships among grassroots organizations and information-producing and opinion-shaping establishments, such as the one created under this project, are also indispensable for this communication strategy. These should ideally go beyond an exchange of ideas and information and proceed to the implementation level, through project clusters to be devised and operationalized between the host country and Turkish institutions.

As for the peoples of Europe and their opinions on Turkish accession, the media is of the utmost significance in shaping the perspectives of individuals. As Ojanen observed during the discussions, broadcast images, independently of what is said, can leave longer-lasting and deeper images than any effort to explain the assets or liabilities of a given candidate country.

There seems to be scarcely any effective effort to prevent (and indeed overcome) the drastic impact of scare-mongering on the part of political figures on both sides. The latter may be intended to instrumentalize the
concerns of the public to translate them into votes. To this end, perhaps the best strategy should be to address leaders directly, particularly those with a negative outlook, in an effort to try and make an, if only miniscule, positive change in their perspectives. On a broader scale, the change of attitudes at the leadership level could be achieved in the longer run only if the general public’s views on Turkey change substantially.

As was highlighted more than once during the discussions, opinion polls, like the media, tend to shape public opinion and draw attention to certain issues, particularly in cases where respondents tend to be ambivalent about or unaware of a certain issue that is brought to their attention in a context when contacts and information are scarce. The way the question is framed also influences their responses and tends to shape their perspective in an issue area brought under the spotlight. One of the points to consider in devising a communication strategy for the road ahead is the way in which Eurobarometer surveys (or others) and their results are framed and interpreted, as well as the discourse adopted and the images conveyed to the public in the media.

A note of caution is warranted here. Although the discussion above seems to imply that a communication strategy is the way forward, certainly much more than that is needed to keep Turkey’s accession process going. One issue that has to be clarified is the linkages between conditionality, impact and prejudice. Both Turkish and EU elites will have to understand this and act on this basis to prevent a further rise in isolationist and nationalist sentiments on both sides. Turkey will need to maintain its motivation to keep up its reform momentum and would certainly benefit from Europe’s endorsement along the way. While having a communication strategy does matter, more and better efforts relating to the substance of the negotiations and the convergence process are required. Turkey-EU relations have never been uncomplicated or untroubled, but it appeared as if they had acquired a momentum and favourable character a while ago. Instead, words like ‘derailment’ and ‘train crash’ abound in the discourse on their relationship today. While this has partly been in response to thorny issues like the Cyprus question, it is also an indicator of the declining political support for Turkey’s accession on both the EU and the Turkish fronts.

Indeed, there was a strong ‘coalition of the willing’ on both sides in the early 2000s in favour of Turkey’s accession. Popular rejoicing over the enthusiasm of the Justice and Development Party for Turkey’s European venture when it came to power in 2002 was a sign of the Turkish public’s support for the EU membership at the time. The decision to open
negotiations in 2005, on the other hand, despite opposition from some member states, was indicative that a coalition of forces among the ‘engines countries’ of the Union did indeed exist. Only a couple of years later, the picture seem to have changed dramatically. The changes of government in Germany and France with more Turco-sceptic forces replacing relatively sympathetic predecessors, as well as the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in France and Holland through referendums, has shifted the balance in the European context.

On the Turkish side, the recent course of events has also been less than rosy. The failure to manage the presidential election process on the part of the AKP government, the non-transparency surrounding the process and the polarization that followed brought to the surface the fragility of accomplishments of the reform process. The military’s interjection in the process through so-called ‘e-memorandum’ has sparked a reaction from pro-democracy domestic groups as well as from European institutions. Mass demonstrations in major cities by pro-secular groups and the Constitutional Court decision to overrule the first phase of the election process have deepened and further complicated the predicament.

This pro-secular sentiment seems to coincide at times with nationalist tendencies and anti-reform attitudes. This has been evident in the slogans and the banners during the rallies that also expressed an aversion towards the EU and the US. In the meantime, the reform process has been shelved and the popular support for EU membership is at an all-time low since the beginning of the accession negotiations. Forthcoming elections do not promise stability for the political scene either. To the contrary, the most probable sharing of parliament seats will imply further protracted and complicated crises in the political arena. This political volatility and the ascent of anti-reform forces in Turkey forces us to pose the question whether the European vocation of the country and the achievements of conditionality so far have been temporary rather than systematic.

The overall impression is that the coalitions in support of Turkey’s membership on both sides are undergoing a process of fragmentation. It is difficult to assess whether these will face a complete dissolution or whether the lost ground could be recovered and revived. Although there are grounds for optimism (as Turkey’s European aspiration have been a long-standing and deep-rooted vocation and also in return a necessary evil for the Union), the reasons behind the waning support on both sides as well as the possible directions in which things will proceed in future are complex and manifold, passing beyond the scope of this
paper. We may conclude by asking some questions that will reveal the real colours of the present picture: Do the anti-EU and anti-Turkey forces and sentiments mirror and feed on one another and if so, what are the mechanisms behind this vicious cycle? Were the reforms and achievements in Turkey an outcome of conditionality, or due to domestic balances of power of the time? Have these achievements been consolidated, or are they simply a house of cards that can be blown away with a change in wind? Can the ‘European train’, as Turks like to call it, be stopped or forced to change track by a change in governments on either side? What will the impact of the Merkel-Sarkozy combination be on Turkey’s accession path? How will the course and the outcome of the presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey influence both Turkey’s attitude and the EU’s perspective on Turkey? Might the relationship indeed come to a complete halt in the short to medium term? And finally, what can a communications strategy achieve under the current circumstances?

Capturing the Turkey-EU relationship is a challenging task, as both sides are undergoing rapid and profound transformations. Equally, if not more, challenging are the efforts to make projections on the future course of the relationship, and to intervene to make positive changes. Finding answers to the questions above will only temporarily solve the puzzle, as dynamics, dispositions, and directions are bound to change in the years to come before Turkish accession becomes a reality. We will then need to ask and answer similar questions, find new answers and devise new strategies. This may not be an ideal way forward, but it appears to be the only viable option.
CHRONOLOGY

by Marcello Vitale

1997

12-13 December The Luxembourg European Council confirms Turkey’s eligibility for membership, while denying Turkey candidate status.

30 June The Yılmaz government comes to office with the support of ANAP (Motherland Party), the DSP (Democratic Left Party) and the CHP (Republican People’s Party).

1998

28 September The German social democrat party (SDP) wins the general elections under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder. The success follows the victory of Tony Blair’s Labour Party in the UK the previous year, and the centre-left coalition in Italy in 1996. The so-called ‘social democratic wave’ adds new impetus to EU-Turkey relations.

12 November Landing in Rome from Moscow, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan is arrested. He leaves Italy on 16 January 1999, after months of haggling between Rome and Ankara.

1999

11 January The Ecevit government comes to office backed by a coalition between the DSP (Democratic Left Party), the MHP (National Action Party) and ANAP (Motherland Party).

15 February Öcalan is captured in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, by the Turkish secret services.

8 June In Turkey, the constitutional court calls for Öcalan’s execution. The Council of Europe warns Ankara to respect human rights, which were violated during Öcalan’s trial.
17 August A violent earthquake hits Turkey. The event triggers a wave of solidarity in Greece ushering a new climate of cooperation in bilateral relations. A new phase in Greek-Turkey relations is launched, known as ‘earthquake diplomacy’.

17 September Romano Prodi is nominated president of the European Commission.

10-11 December The Helsinki European Council accords Turkey candidate status, destined to join the Union according to the same criteria applied to other candidates. The result made possible also in view of the lifting of the Greek veto within the EU.

2000

January In Germany, an amendment to the citizenship law reduces from fifteen to eight years the period of residency before an adult immigrant can obtain German citizenship. Many Turkish gastarbeiter obtain the necessary requisites for obtaining citizenship.

2001

February A political dispute between prime minister Ecevit and president Sezer triggers a financial crisis in Turkey, which had already begun in November 2000. The crisis will trigger the rise of unemployment, a surge in inflation to 70% and a reduction of 7.5% of GDP. In March, the government signs an agreement with the IMF, underwriting a reform programme based on the reduction of public expenditure, the reform of the banking system and wide-scale privatizations to re-energize the economic structures of the country.

2002

August Following the proposals of the Ecevit government, the parliament marks a U-turn in Turkey’s reform process by approving a legislative package including, amongst other reforms, the abolition of the death penalty during peace time.
3 November  Turkish elections see the victory of AKP led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a controversial politician formerly condemned for having fomented religious hatred and banned from institutional political life. This brings to the leadership of the country the AKP’s number two Abdullah Gül. Many talk about a political earthquake in the country: of the three parties in the former coalition government, none passes the ten percent electoral threshold. With 34.4% of the vote, the AKP wins 65% of the seats in parliament, a majority that allows it to form a stable one party government.

9 November  In an interview to Le Monde, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing declares that: “Turkey is not a European country, its membership would mark the end of the European Union”.

12-13 December  The Copenhagen European Council rejects the opening of negotiations with Turkey but underlines the progress made by Turkey, The decision on the opening of negotiations is postponed for two years.

2003

March  The Turkish parliament refuses the passage of US troops on its territory in view of the looming attack on Iraq.

14 March  Following a parliamentary decree, Erdoğan becomes prime minister.

15 November  Several car bombs explode near two synagogues in Istanbul causing 25 deaths and over 300 injuries. Six days later, three further explosions hit the British consulate and the British bank HSBC in Istanbul. The attacks are claimed by the terrorist network al Qaeda.

2004

24 April  In a simultaneous referenda the Greek Cypriots reject and the Turkish Cypriots accept the ‘Annan Plan’, foreseeing the birth of a federal state on the island.
29 April Following a Commission proposal, the Council, in view of looming accession of the Republic of Cyprus, approves the green line regulation freeing the movement of goods and people within the island. The General Affairs Council a few days earlier had proposed aid and trade measures to lift the isolation of northern Cyprus.

1 May The EU welcomes ten new members into its fold, including the Republic of Cyprus.

17 May The General Affairs Council of the EU updates its list of groups and individuals threatening the security of the EU. The PKK is included in the terrorist list.

1 June The terrorist organization PKK declares the end of its unilateral ceasefire begun in 1999.

22 July José Manuel Barroso becomes president of the European Commission.

5 October The president of the Commission Barroso declares his support for the proposal put forth by French President Jacques Chirac, whereby the peoples of EU member states should approve the entry of Turkey through national referenda.

12 October Metin Kaplan, Islamist leader resident in Germany known as the “Caliph of Cologne” is extradited to Turkey a few hours after his arrest in Cologne. A long and troubled question between Turkey and Germany comes to an end.

21 October The German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer declares that Turkey’s EU membership would represent a great victory in the fight against terrorism. In a television interview he states that Turkey’s entry could be paralleled to the 1944 landing of allied forces in Normandy; a ‘D-Day against terror’.

17 December Following a Commission proposal, the European Council in Brussels decides to launch accession negotiations with Turkey.
2005

29 May French citizens reject the EU Constitutional Treaty in referendum. A few days later the Dutch people do likewise.

3 October Turkey’s accession negotiations are opened.

2006

6 February Don Andrea Santoro, an Italian Catholic priest is murdered in Trabzon.

7 February The trial against novelist Orhan Pamuk resumes following the first session on December 16, 2005. Pamuk is accused of denigrating “Turkishness” in view of his writings and speeches regarding the “Armenian genocide”. Pamuk is acquitted of charges.

12 October France approves a law criminalizing the denial of the Armenian genocide. The Turkish foreign ministry states this constitutes grave damage in bilateral relations.

28 November Pope Benedict XVI travels to Turkey.

11 December The member states suspend negotiations on eight of the 35 chapters of the acquis in view of Turkey’s non-implementation of the customs union protocol to Cyprus.

2007

19 January Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink is murdered in Istanbul. Erdoğan defines this crime as a threat to peace and stability in the country.

March Accession negotiations with Turkey are re-launched on the non-blocked chapters.

1 May Turkey’s constitutional court nullifies the first round of voting for the election of the president of the Republic, due to the non-fulfilment of the necessary quorum of votes.
The decision is taken following the e-memorandum by the Turkish Armed Forces with emphasis on the secularist nature of the republic and public criticism of government policies. Mass anti-government protests by Turkish public have followed in support of secularism.
Absorption Capacity: determines the speed of EU enlargement. For an accession process to be successfully completed, not only must the candidate country fulfil all necessary criteria, but also the Union must be able to ‘absorb’ the new member by retaining appropriate internal balances within its institutions, by respecting budgetary constraints and by implementing effective Community policies.

Accession negotiations: is the process through which the Union analyzes the adoption and implementation of the chapters of the *acquis* by the candidate countries. This process allows the Union to follow and support the candidates in their preparations for membership and evaluate their fulfilment of the criteria. The negotiations take place within bilateral inter-governmental conferences including the candidate country and all member states, in which common positions are sought regarding each chapter. In the case of Turkey, there are 35 negotiation chapters.

Accession Partnership: is a document that identifies the specific needs of the candidate country to be targeted by pre-accession assistance so as to direct and support the accession process. Short term (1-2 years) and medium term (3-4 years) priorities are identified by the Union to be fulfilled by the candidate country. The Accession Partnership is part of the broader strategy launched at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council aimed at providing through structured dialogue the necessary instruments for accession.

AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*): is borne from the ashes of the Refah Partisi and the Fazilet Partisi, both dissolved by the Turkish Constitutional Court in so far as deemed to have threatened the secular nature of the state. The leader of the AKP is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, previously mayor of Istanbul and prosecuted for having allegedly fomented religious hatred. The AKP is a conservative party, reminiscent, as the party leadership claims, of the European Christian-demo-
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Democratic tradition in the post-war period. At the 2002 elections, the AKP won a 34.4% majority corresponding to 65% of the seats in parliament, with which it has ruled Turkey in the years that followed, ushering important reforms in the country, in particular related to the country’s march towards the EU.

Armenian Genocide Armenian Genocide is the disputed term referring to the mass killings of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during the World War I. Contrary to Armenia and many other states, Turkey refuses to accept such a terminology arguing that, inter alia, deaths during the forced migration of the Armenians in 1915-16 do not constitute the crime of genocide according to the UN Resolution 96(I) of 11 December 1946 and UN Resolution 260(III) of 9 December 1948.

Article 301: is a controversial article in the Turkish Penal Code foreseeing imprisonment from six months to three years for those who publicly denigrate ‘Turkishness’, the Republic, the Grand National Assembly, the government and the army. Notable prosecutions under Article 301 include Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk and the assassinated Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. In 2006, Elif Şafak also faced charges of “insulting Turkishness” because of her novel, The Bastard of Istanbul. The case was dropped at the prosecutor’s request.

There are similar articles in the penal codes of many other countries such as Article 248 of the Austrian Penal Code; The German Criminal Code Section 90 concerns Disparagement of the State and its Symbol; or the Identification of “Crimes Against the State” in Italy. However, the interpretation of the article is subject to controversial applications in Turkey.

Derin Devlet (deep state): is a term that came in to usage in Turkey in late 1990s with various meanings. When referred to 1970s, it denotes Gladio-type secret organizations buried ‘deep’ within the state. In early 1990s, it came to refer to unholy coalition of corrupt politicians, security officials and former nationalists turned into organized crime bosses struggling to contain separatist terrorism – by whatever means. In recent years, the term refers to an informal coalition of pro-status quo forces within the state apparatus (the military and the intelligence community) as well as business and political figures.
**Enlargement Fatigue:** is an expression that indicates the costs borne by the Union following each round of enlargement. These real and perceived costs lead conservative political groupings and segments of civil society in Europe to call for a freeze on enlargement. The negative responses in the referenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands and the ensuing political crisis in the EU have been often portrayed as a corollary of ‘enlargement fatigue’.

**Eurobarometer:** is the service of the European Commission, founded in 1973, to measure and analyze opinion trends in all member states and candidate countries. Knowledge of public opinion influences the work of the Commission both in the drafting of legislative proposals, in the evaluation of its own workings and in taking new decisions. Eurobarometer conducts both opinion polls and focus group discussions.

**European Constitutional Crisis:** is the situation ignited within the EU by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch citizens in referenda in May and June 2005. The response to the failed referenda triggered a political stalemate in Europe which has slowed down the momentum of European integration.

**EU Candidacy:** is accorded by the European Council on the basis of an Opinion by the Commission, undertaken following the formal application for membership by the aspiring candidate. This status does not automatically entitle the candidate to membership. Entry can be secured only after the successful conclusion of accession negotiations, whose launch is decided by the European Council.

**Fortress Europe:** is the tendency in the EU which, on the one hand allows for the liberalization of the movement of persons within its territory under the Schengen agreement, while on the other hand, encourages a halt of migratory flows from neighbouring regions into the Union. These dynamics link the idea of ‘fortress Europe’ closely to attitudes refuting the rising influence within Europe of external cultural influences.

**Kemalism/Kemalist Establishment:** Kemalism entails the institutional, ideological and political set up of the state established by Atatürk, as well as the broader process of change from which the Turkish Republic was established in 1923. The founding pillars of Kemalism were: nationalism, statism, populism, secularism, republicanism and reformism, upon which the
Turkish Constitution and the norms governing political and social life in Turkey are based. The Kemalist establishment indicates those members of the elite, comprising mainstream political parties, the high-ranking judges, and the military, whose actions aim at preserving the values inspired by the Kemalist revolution, first and foremost the secular nature of the state.

**Kurdish question:** an expression that indicates the problematic relations between the Turkish state and its population of Kurdish origin, which has called either for the establishment of an independent state or for the recognition of its individual and minority rights within Turkey. The struggle this has led to has seen widespread violence especially in Turkey’s south-eastern provinces through PKK terrorist activities as well as violence and the violation of individual rights by the Turkish state.

**Lisbon Agenda:** is the EU policy for innovation, growth and employment, launched in Lisbon at the European Council meeting in March 2000. The aim of the Agenda is to set in motion the necessary reforms in the economic, social and environmental realms allowing the EU to become the most competitive and dynamic global economy by 2010. Several measures are foreseen in the Agenda to promote “knowledge infrastructure” (scientific research, education and professional training), innovation and economic reforms, as well as to modernize the European welfare system. In 2005 the member states decide to re-launch the Agenda by prioritizing two of its cardinal objectives: economic growth and employment.

**PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan):** Kurdistan Workers Party, engine of the revolt and terrorist activities by segments of the Kurdish population against the Turkish state. Its leader, Abdullah Öcalan is captured while leaving the Greek embassy in Kenya in 1999, prosecuted and sentenced to death. This sentence is later transformed into life imprisonment, following Turkey’s abolition of the death penalty in 2002. The PKK has been included in the EU’s list of terrorist organizations, deemed to pose a grave threat to security. Following the capture of its leader, the PKK has renamed itself KADEK. It has resumed terrorist operations, mainly from Northern Iraq since the summer of 2004.

**Screening Process:** is the first phase of the negotiation process and takes place on both multilateral and bilateral tracks. The candidate country is introduced to the main headings of each chapter of the *acquis* and its harmonization and implementation plans are evaluated. Following the
screening of a chapter, the member states decide, on the basis of a Commission recommendation, whether the chapter in question can be opened and they determine the parameters for its provisional closure.

Sèvres syndrome: a term that indicates the symbolic description in Turkish political culture of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres that redesigned and drastically scaled down the size of the prospective Turkish state after the end of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The attempted mutilation of the country has influenced deeply the ensuing development of the Turkish Republic, which erected territorial integrity as a principal value underpinning constitutional provisions and wider political and popular culture. This factor has often led to the interpretation in Turkey of international recommendations and pressures as undue external interference aimed at disintegrating the Turkish state.

Turkish Armed Forces: is an institution which has the recognized constitutional duty to guard the founding values of the Republic, including its integrity and secular nature. Legitimized by the direct link to the founder of the state, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the role of the Turkish armed forces is bolstered also by the support of the public. The Turkish people often disaffected from their political leaders who have frequently proven their ineffectiveness and corruption, has traditionally expressed its trust in the military. Hence, the tight link between political and military power in Turkey.

Widening and Deepening: The deepening of the EU indicates the dynamic of integration that has characterized the formation of the Union, engendering ever closer ties between its member states, institutions and peoples. Deepening is often presented as a parallel development to the widening of the Union, that is the accession of new member states. It is often seen as a necessary precondition for further widening. Alternatively, widening is often portrayed as a hindrance to an effective deepening of the Union.
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1 All contributors write in personal capacity. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect or represent those of their institutions.

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