



Lessons from Turkey's Urbanization Experience

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PREFACE

As The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), we have been organizing “Merih Celasun Memorial Days” each year since 2010 to commemorate our dear professor, Dr. Merih Celasun, who passed away in 2004.

In his scientific studies in economic policy throughout a stellar career, which he embarked upon at the State Planning Organization and continued at METU and Bilkent University, Merih Celasun not only offered very important solutions to the structural problems faced by Turkey, but also provided unique lessons regarding the way to approach the economic science to those lucky enough to get to know him. His knowledge, experience, and approach to economic problems made him a well-known scholar in international academic circles. His work became one of the first sources to resort to for those seeking in-depth information, particularly on the Turkish economy.

TEPAV, which has focused on identifying the problems of the Turkish economy and suggesting short and long-term policies, also included a “Merih Celasun Memorial Lecture” in the Merih Celasun Memorial Day organized in order to commemorate our dear professor, whose work and personality we take as a model for our own endeavors.

In 2012, the first Memorial lecture was given by Harvard University professor Dr. Dani Rodrik. Rodrik’s lecture, “Structural Transformation and Economic Development” was published by TEPAV in Turkish and English.

The second lecture was given by Dr. Daron Acemođlu in 2012. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) professor Acemođlu, who has twice been nominated for the Nobel Prize, made a presentation that shared its name with his book co-authored by James Robinson, “Why Do Some Nations Fail?”

Internationally-known academic Prof. Dr Timur Kuran, of Duke University’s Department of Economy and Political Science, gave the third lecture in 2013. Professor Kuran’s presentation was entitled “Institutional Origins of Authoritarian Administrations in the Middle East: The Legacy of Islamic Waqfs”.

METU scholar Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli gave the 4th memorial lecture in 2014. Tekeli’s speech, “How to Understand and Discuss Turkey’s Urbanization?,” led to a vivid discussion.

This text is İlhan Tekeli’s speech that was delivered in Ankara at TEPAV on December 29th, 2014 at the Merih Celasun memorial lecture. The book also includes the comments voiced following Tekeli’s speech, as well as the content of the Q&A session.

Once again, we thank our distinguished scholar, Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli, for his lecture on this year’s Merih Celasun Memorial Day.

Güven Sak /TEPAV

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli:

Introduction

Hello... It is an honor for me to speak at the Merih Celasun Memorial Event. I was delighted to accept my friends' invitation for me to speak here.

I got to know Merih Celasun in the 1970's. We were close when we were both faculty members at METU. To summarize in three words, Merih Celasun always represented common sense. He always trusted scientific study. He always studied a significant problem for Turkey. These qualities made him a respected scholar in Turkish academic circles, in my opinion.

When my friends asked me to talk about urbanization today, I felt like a fish swimming in water. I have been swimming in this topic for some 60 years and I had to ponder what to talk about.

Here is how I will try to start: We live in cities now. The rural population has decreased significantly. Inevitably, we complain about the cities we live in. We complain about the traffic, we complain about the uncollected garbage. This is in fact normal. You live there, you experience it and you will complain. But our complaint doesn't stop there. When we get together and begin to speak, we develop value judgments about what is going on and we classify parties as in guilty and not guilty. Hence we face a challenge to be fair when we develop these general judgments. Recently, I began to pay particular attention to this point. If you talk about a society, you inevitably face a problem of judgment and therefore bear the responsibility to be fair. I don't think that is very efficient to talk about these issues without being fair anyway. Generally when we discuss these issues, we try to identify the responsible parties. In such discussions, the responsible party is usually an urban planner. We derive the conclusion that urban planners have failed. Or if it is a politician, we say "Nah, this one has failed it". Or we blame immigrants, or the people who created that urbanization pattern. "These people have failed to urbanize" we say. I wonder if such an attitude helps us understand the issue. Or do they just make us pass unfair judgments?

In the last couple of years, I developed a way of thinking: A city is generated by the society. If you live in a society, there is no one to blame. You too are a member of the same society. In fact our main problem probably is understanding how the society generates the city. If the society generates the city, how does it do that? If you want to intervene as a planner, how can you make that intervention? A serious analysis is necessary to make that call. Today, I will deliver my speech in the light of the question: "How can we understand the city that this society has been generating in the Turkish experience?" When we talk about urbanization in Turkey, everyone starts off with a sentence that has become a cliché: "The growth of our cities has accelerated following World War 2". But did urbanization really begin at that time in Turkey? When we look into recent history, we see that urbanization began just after the 1850's, that this was the onset. The urbanization process began once the modernization period that I name "shy modernization" in the Ottoman society started. Public health measures began to be taken, quarantines set up and state bacteriology laboratories began to be established etc. The cities grew by 1.5%. Typically, the urban population constitutes around 10% of the population in pre-industrialized societies. At a growth rate of 1.5%, by the end of the 19th century, this figure had reached 20% in Turkey. Turkey first went through urban transformation in this period and the main transformative factors were fires. Cities constructed out of wood caught fire in large proportions, and you had to make plans to renew them etc. So urban

planning in fact existed before the Republic. The first plans made in the 1850's were in the form of local plans for fire areas. Our experience starts back then.

But when Turkey embarked on a radical modernization process after the establishment of the Republic, its urbanization slowed down to an extent. The urban population remained around 20%, with very mild increases. The main development, the rapid growth began after World War 2. This development in turn underwent a qualitative change in the 1980s.

Urbanization Experience of Turkey Between 1950-1980 in the Period Of Populistic Modernization

My presentation will consist of two parts; I will try to explain the urbanization process in two parts: The first one is our urbanization dynamics between the 1950's and 1980's, in the period of populistic modernization and the building processes or housing supply processes that led to it, and the second one is the process after 1980 as we transitioned into post-modernity, in an environment where economic policies began to change drastically, etc., leading to the formation of a city entirely different from the former. Basically, I will try to present these two periods to you in comparative terms.

Turkey went through rapid urbanization after World War 2. If you try to explain urbanization in Turkey making reference to the mechanization of rural areas, as is usually the case, the machines came in 1948. I was a fifth grade student when that happened. And urbanization will be complete before I die. A model of urbanization that fits into one person's lifetime is unprecedented on a global scale. Our urban population soared from 20% to 80%. In countries that resemble ours, for instance in Latin America, it increased from 40% to 80%. Such an enormous transformation as in our case is unprecedented and it accomplished this without sparking major social crises. I will try to tell this story and in doing so, I will emphasize the following: The architect of this accomplishment isn't the intelligentsia. We have arrived at this point with solutions devised by people who directly faced the relevant challenges, whose capacities in fact was limited. I obviously think that fact is very important for an assessment of the experience in Turkey.

When the Turkish urbanization experience started after World War 2, this was the situation: Turkey was not unaware of urbanization, urban architecture etc. The country had accumulated a certain body of know-how. Turkey owed this know-how to the construction and development legislation of the second half of the 19th century and the local administration that emerged around this legislation, as well as military skills in especially topography. Such knowledge enabled Turkey to implement certain practices. However, such know-how was upgraded when Ankara became the capital in 1923, and the Republic attempted to develop a new and modern city here. After the initial years of Ankara experience, 1930 is the most critical year in terms of setting the urbanization ideology and standards of the Republic. Three laws were enacted consecutively this year. These are Municipal Law No. 1580, Public Health Law No. 1593, and the Law No. 2290 on Buildings and Roads. These are all well-studied texts. They also offer clues about the urban vision that the Republic wanted to convey. Interestingly, the Republic anticipated a health-centered urbanization. The planning was shaped around it. Urban planning started to be taught in universities during World War 2. As Hasan (Ersel) discussed, Ernst Reuter, later to become the mayor of Berlin, was employed as a professor at Ankara University. In a way, Turkey had reached a modernist urban perspective after World War 2. It had the sufficient capacity to make development plans for her cities. It had the modern legislation. It entered the post-war era with considerable intellectual background. However, when extremely rapid urbanization began, this background made it harder to solve problems instead of solving them. I will try to explain this point later.

The first problem is that the history of rapid urbanization coincides with Turkey's history of transition to a multi-party system. 1946 is a year when Turkey held its first multi-party elections and vote seeking or populist concerns started to shape legislative decisions. We are faced with a period where the radical modernity of the Republic's early years that lasted until the 1945s, 1950s was abandoned but rather than giving up modernity completely, a populist modernity started to precipitate instead. This period – i.e. leaving the modernity motto behind – had its consequences. The most important characteristic of modernity, of the modernist legitimacy concerning the city, is that it excludes *fait accompli*. This is a modernist planning tradition where everything needs to be planned in advance, permits to be taken and buildings to be carried out accordingly. Of course the Turkish experience has a third determinant: capital accumulation is very slow. Local administrations have low incomes and lack the flexibility to increase this income. Turkey suddenly enters the demographic transition curve in the presence of these three determinants. While the population of only one city, namely Ankara rose by 6% per year before World War 2, populations of all cities in Turkey increased by 6% afterwards. I will not go into the details of this issue because it is an issue in itself but rural dissolution takes place. This dissolution results in major urban migration. So as the population increases by 3%, the remaining 3% is due to immigration. This adds up to a 6% increase.

Capital accumulation in Turkey cannot suffice to solve urban problem created by this situation because Turkey has to do two things to solve this problem in the framework of the modernist legitimacy it built: 1) Create jobs for the newcomers. 2) Build infrastructure, construct housing and provide services in cities. This all necessitates capital. Turkey doesn't have capital. The amount of capital is limited. It can either save it for its industry, or even if it spares some for urbanization, it won't be enough and it won't be able to create employment. The solution is clear, the cost of urbanization should be cut down. It isn't possible to lower the cost of urbanization following the standards or the planning notions established before World War 2. So what happens? A solution is needed to achieve this cost cut. Secondly, the skill sets of rural-to-urban migrants don't match the ones necessary in accordance with the aforementioned modernist framework. When this is the only solution, there is one solution to this among the middle classes and within their mentality: Migrants should go back to rural areas. The most important promoter of this line of understanding is the late Burhan Felek. Burhan Felek's columns always said "These people should leave. What are they doing here?" Yet bureaucrats and urban middle classes cannot find the solution.

The unequipped newcomers find the solution by managing to live in cities. Here comes the squatters. In fact newcomers have a natural ally but it isn't vocal enough yet. This ally is the newly forming industrialist, the industrialist that begins to emerge from the 1950s onwards. But the development of industrialists and the industry was very different back then. There weren't any industrial zones as there are today. There were roads. Highways were constructed after the 1950s. Industrialists construct a plant on the side of roads in the land they acquire and attract squatters around the industrial plants. squatters and the industry begin to develop hand in hand. Of course when these phenomenon began to develop, Turkey transitioned to multi-party regime. Then votes were at stake for bargaining and squatter amnesty laws began to be enacted one after another. The first amnesty came into effect in 1948 and amnesties continued in the following years as well. Interestingly, the word "squatter" doesn't appear in any Turkish legislation from those days. The first time the word "squatter (*gecekondü*)" is used in Turkish law is in 1966, via *Gecekondü Law No 775*. It took 18 years to digest the term. The terminology used until 1966 was "unpermitted construction". The legitimacy molds of the modernity set in the 1930's were so oppressive that these pardons were enacted but did not

say on what. They didn't say: "This is the capacity of the newcomers and these should be the rules for them to live legitimately in cities accordingly". What did they say? "The construction law does not apply within the area indicated by the blue borders on the map for the next 2 years". In a way, it bores a hole in time and space on the entire area of modernity. On the remaining parts, modernity is fully in force. Interestingly, there is a resemblance with the rest of the world here. The world didn't do well on this issue either. Mental molds of modernity turn out to be as binding in other parts of the world just as they are in our country.

The strategy to lower the costs of urbanization doesn't only apply to housing. It is a comprehensive strategy. A rising population inevitably causes problems. There isn't enough money to solve them, so solutions are cheap. For instance whereas public transportation was the only transportation method in Turkey before World War 2, the "dolmuş (shared taxi)" emerged. Local administrations couldn't invest in this area, so small entrepreneurs developed an organization model to address the issue. The sewage system is similar. They cannot build sewage systems in a city. What do they do? They make local residents dig holes, they lay pipe drains in it, and dump it in the nearest river. Furthermore, it cannot create employment, so the informal sector emerges. The book that some friends and I wrote back then, titled "Gecekondu, Dolmuşlu, İşportalı Şehir" (The City with Squatters, Shared Taxis and Catchpennies) characterizes this period. Indeed, in order to understand urbanization of the period, it is not enough to know the spontaneous formations that remain outside this modernity.

In fact the modernist section of society or those who grow up within the framework of the given modernity model were undergoing important changes as well. Just as the word "gecekondu" was an original term created by Turkish people, a similar term is created by the modernist section: "yap-satçı (lit. builder/seller, i.e. property developer)". "Yap-satçı" is a very interesting entity. It is closely related to the circumstances of capital accumulation and the construction perspective of the period. "Yap-satçı" solves the following problem: There is a plot of land and you will construct a building on it. In accordance with the legitimacy established in the 1930's, only one building can be constructed on one plot. But the city is growing, land prices are increasing, middle classes cannot afford to buy a plot of land. So the housing problem remains unresolved. Hence you have to build apartments; share the cost by building many residences on one plot. This is in contradiction with the 1930's' legitimacy model because you cannot solve the ownership problem. How will you solve the problem of ownership once you have constructed your building? Here, the law of apartment ownership appears. The law of apartment ownership is a way of legitimization in the Turkish context. Interestingly, the debate on the law is first initiated in 1948 by Ebül'ula Mardin. Ebül'ula Mardin has a book on the Law of Apartment Ownership published by Istanbul University Press. This is never implemented. But as you know, Ebül'ula Mardin isn't an expert on modern law. He is an expert on Ottoman Code of Civil Law. He senses the need and solves it in the framework of modern law. However, in practice, sales are handled via notary deeds until 1954. But the sales via notary deeds expire in 1964 or 1965 since notary contracts are valid for 10 years. The Law of Apartment Ownership comes into effect in 1965. It is possible to read the development of Turkish law on our topic through the development of the problem. The transition to apartment buildings in the modernist section happens via two mechanisms: Either by becoming a cooperative or via "yap-satçı" agency. I will not go into the details of these mechanisms.

In the end, an urban form appears. Hence the dominant urban form between the 1950's and 1980's is established by mechanisms with underlying economic reasons. As urban planners, we define such a city as follows: A city that grows like an oil stain; i.e. a city form that spreads

along main roads, just like the way oil spreads through rough paper when you drip it. This city form is one that grows by adding buildings one by one. When I talk about the second period, I will explain that the city doesn't grow by adding individual buildings, but rather by the constructing large blocks. The dynamics and the city form are very different in the latter period. Automobile ownership is not common in the midst of the city that grows like an oil stain. The rich are at the core. Shanty towns are in the periphery. This city is in fact a product of "yap-sat" type of housing supply. It destroys the former city structure, i.e. it demolishes the detached houses on individual plots of land, allows the property owner a given number of floors and converts them into apartments. In a way, this is the second time after the 1860's that the city goes through a transformation after 1950's. This is the transformation of the city by the activities of small entrepreneurs. A demolition process spread all over the central part of cities, as a result of increased development rights on parcels and institutionalization of multiple ownership over each plots. A big destruction appears in the middle of this city. The population density increased, the traffic is jammed. A city with very weak social infrastructures is formed.

Both the city and its social structure have a dual form: They are divided in two as a squatter section and modern section on the one hand, and an urbanized citizens section and non-urbanized citizens section on the other. Indeed just as "gecekondu" and "yap-satçı" are interesting concepts, so is "kentlileşme". This concept, "'urbanized'ization", has not emerged in the urbanization process of the West, a slow process of that took almost 250 years. However it emerges in our urbanization process, implying that a new cultural group will migrate from rural to urban areas and will be "urbanized" in the city. Sociologically, it is not supposed to be expected. When two cultures meet, they affect one another, both change to an extent. But in Turkey, the section that doesn't want squatter residents to come to the city, the section that says "They shouldn't come, they should leave", exclude that group for failing to become urbanized enough. Another concept used in this period, "the peasant in the city", indicates that the modern section can't keep the other section at their villages but they create a rural image in their minds, where they imprison these people. So the concept "'urbanized'ization" (becoming urbanized) doesn't work. We see the clearest example of this in arabesque music. Arabesque music emerges. Arabesque music becomes popular in the market as a genre embraced also by the nouveaux riches of the city. Interestingly, the cultural traits of the isolated "gecekondu" section do not only affect the other section that excludes the former via music. While illegal construction, construction without permit did not exist at all among the modernist section before World War 2, it reaches very high rates in this period. Indeed the "gecekondu" section's phenomenon of unlawfulness begins to be perceived as normal in the other section as well.

How the Cities are Transformed Their Structures After 1980's

A new urban transformation begins after 1980. It has interesting characteristics. On one hand, populist modernity begins to be replaced by an erosion of modernity, on the other hand elements outside modernity begin to flourish in both politics and culture. Of course urban growth creates the traffic problem, environmental problems, massive air pollution. Natural gas is yet to be used. A destructive approach and housing shortages are witnessed. Economic policy paradigm of Turkey had changed after January 24 1980 decisions and September 12 1980 military intervention. Turkey embraced neo-liberal politics. The hegemonic position of the left wing among Turkish intelligentsia is highly eroded.

A new capacity begins to develop after 1974: Turkish contractors begin to do business abroad; a strong construction capacity, a strong sector comes about. Parallel to Turkey's

opening up and the change in the economic paradigm, capital markets are formed. Turkey gains the following capacity as a result of these developments: The capacity to put together large amounts of capital for big projects. This comes about via an increase in the revenue of metropolitan municipalities, the formation of real estate investment partnerships, etc. For the first time, Turkey has the capacity to produce different solutions for the bottleneck in housing as well as other areas by using state of the art technology with large amounts of capital, rather than trying to solve these problems with modest amounts of capital. Meanwhile, a new housing model emerges in Turkey: collective housing. This incident completely changed the dynamics in Turkey. Collective housing emerged in two stages. As there are 18 years between the emergence of the “gecekondu” phenomenon and the use of the term “gecekondu” in laws, also there are 15-16 years between the emergence of the term collective housing and the institutionalization of collective housing. The term “collective housing” was first used in the Second Five Year Development Plan in 1967. Late Tuglar Can used that term, I remember, but it was not until the 1980’s that they were put into practice first by cooperative unions, then via a re-regulation by Özal. Collective housing projects were open for contractors as well.

Throughout the same period, collective housing projects solved some problems on the one hand and public transportation projects were initiated on the other. For the first time, rather than solutions invented by small capital like the “dolmuş,” subways, i.e. large public transportation solutions and expensive urban infrastructure come into the picture. Because environmental problems were on the rise, investments had to be made in this area etc. The change in economic policy and economic capacity, as well as the change in the structure of housing models, alter the dynamics of urban formation and forms. We suddenly see the following: Transportation terminals, organized industrial zones, free trade zones, university campuses, hospital campuses, collective housing etc. are established. Rather than growing by adding buildings one by one - like oil stains as I mentioned before-, the city begins to grow by discrete shifts via the articulation of large building blocks.

There are three principal mechanisms that creates these observed growth pattern First mechanism is related with decentralization of Central Business District (CBD). Either by planning decisions or due to economic reasons, different functions of CBD move to the periphery. Second mechanism that contributes to decentralization is increases of private automobile ownership and construction of high quality highways. The third mechanism of decentralization is related with urban land prices. The extraordinary rise of land prices in the CBD pushes the growing enterprises to the periphery in order to avoid from payment of high land costs in their investments. That means after 1980’s while cities are growing some functions of their CBD’s are decentralizing by buildings of large urban pieces

The scarce resource in this type of city growth is large plots of land. If the city grows outwards in large blocks, you need large plots of land. Yet there isn’t any because your former planning system had divided the land around the city into small parcels. Or farmers’ land begins to be opened to urbanization or squatters by being divided into joint-owned deeds. However, small land is no longer useful under the new land organization. Here, you have two options: If the Treasury has undivided land, you usually move over there, or you bring small lands together to make a big one. The latter is very difficult under the provisions of the Civil Code. In order to establish mechanisms to create large plots of land, metropolitan municipalities and later the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ) are thus granted excessive authority, somewhat in contradiction with the provisions of the Civil Code.

If you take a look at planning theories, former Chicago theories I mean, there are specific urban forms. However, we are talking about a city, where central business areas spread outside.

Is this a consistent city? How can we deal with this city? Here, a characteristic of the city emerges and gains importance: The city is a self-organizing system. The city re-shapes itself consistently in line with this crazy spread. What does it do while re-shaping itself? It uses small capital groups like the good old “yap-satçı” and others. In a way in this period, by attaching around large capital group activities, operational forms of the previous period help achieve internal consistency of the self-organizing system. All of the blocks that spread around have site plans but being planned doesn't stop them from spreading around like crazy. What stops them from being a problem is that the city form has a self-organizing character.

Here we have a problem emerging as well: the problem we call urban transformation. There used to be a city, a central business district. There were houses around these business districts, and squatters belt around these residential areas. We spread the city to the periphery via large projects. What happened? The area full of squatters became a highly accessible area within the city and very conducive to the generation of large land. The organization of urban transformation by TOKİ comes around to make use of this situation. But it is worth noting that interestingly, urban transformation today is the most important issue on our agenda in terms of shaping our cities – and it is one of the most bitter issues.

Urban transformation in Turkey can in fact be considered as an indicator that the modernist concerns of Turkish intelligentsia underlying their attitude toward “gecekondu”s prevail to date. We see the first example in Amnesty Law No 2981, enacted during the Özal period. There was a major shift from the amnesty laws that had been enacted since 1948. Other amnesty laws had affection for worse-off groups that took shelter in cities; they guaranteed that they would have a chance to improve their lodgings. Law No 2981 made an important change. The law (of course these are not written in the preambles, they are there if you read in between the lines like I do) brought along the following: “If people living in the rest of the city have the right to acquire stakes out of land speculation, squatters also do”. Implementation of this understanding is realized by the preparation of improvements plan (imar ıslah planı). This led to transformation came about here. This transformation took place in a way similar to modernity's legitimacy framework. The other day I was driving somewhere and the taxi driver said “let's take this road”. Big apartments have been constructed at İlker, Sokullu, old squatter areas. They are highly accessible locations. But the roads.... There you see the entire transformation. A city planner cannot draw such roads. However, existence of old cadastral paths influenced the design of routes in new improvement plans.

But since TOKİ has been granted excessive authorities, its first implementation was to take “gecekondu” residents away from the city. It opened former squatter areas to high income groups. It gentrified newly established areas and didn't take into account people while doing so. It assumed that the problem is only a problem of housing; that if you take away a house and give another one instead, the problem will be solved. However the housing problem doesn't mean that. The location of a house determines employment of its residents. When you change its location, you leave the residents jobless and you did it. 70% of this population became unemployed and were left on the streets because they had not paid their premium for 3 months. The security provided by the “gecekondu” was taken away. For sure, this isn't something that can easily be accepted. A resistance emerged. Today, no political establishment can make urban transformation via relocation. It should make the transformation at the same location. Moreover the first urban transformation before the AKP was carried out in the Dikmen Valley. Everyone stayed in the Dikmen Valley. It had a different sense of morality. The moral sense behind that the plan wasn't the same as that behind TOKİ's urban transformation projects. It gains a new form as a result of social struggles. Let me keep it brief. In sum, there are other problems related to this new model of structuring in large blocks.

Cities became decentralized around business areas. What did this cause? City centers were vacated. When city centers were vacated, and conservationist ethics developed in Turkish city planning morals or value judgments, city centers faced the danger of becoming depressed zones. Istanbul should have been the biggest example of such collapse, yet it didn't take place in Istanbul because Istanbul's position in tourism activities was changed in this period. Istanbul, which already had a potential, developed as the second largest tourism center after Antalya and this paved way to revitalization the abovementioned depressed areas. Gentrification of residential areas near these collapse zones, for instance Cihangir took place.

My time is almost up. I would like to say a few words of the structure of the newly-shaping city. This big urban pieces that left the city center, with their "self-organizing" characteristics ,around them formed new residential areas. Big cities gained a multifocal structure and became an urban region. Metropolitan cities of industrial societies that have one hegemonic center anymore doesn't exist. In knowledge societies as a new phenomenon a multi focal urban regions emerged.

While CBD's of metropolitan cities was shifting along the direction of high income housing zones, today Central Business Districts began to decentralize within these new foci following the sudden emergence of shopping malls. The shift of CBAs along main axes was hence constrained. A new phenomenon emerged in this new formation: gated communities. So communities with closed gates, which real estate investment partnerships sell with mottos such as "We are selling a new way of life ", were created. In Istanbul, their number grew into the thousands. The city withdraws behind closed gates with limited contact with each other. Anthropological studies indicate that groups within a "gated community" do not get into contact with each other that much either. They don't form a community. Besides, they do not make use of the entire city. For instance when someone living in Zekeriyaköy goes to the city, she/he prefers only Nişantaşı, nowhere else. The city is divided into living spaces. In addition, separate ghettos are formed by newcomers in accordance with religious belief or by eastern migrants. In a way it is not possible to talk about an integral life in cities today. The urbanized citizen that we wanted achieve in the 60's lost its meaning. Where is going to be urban? Zekeriyaköy or somewhere else? Indeed the concept "urbanization" becomes vague as a society evolves into the postmodern.

Responsibility of Success or Failure is Belong to the Totality of the Society

This story is going on. It belongs to us, for better or worse. However, I don't think that Turkey has failed in this great transformation. This success owes much to our policy-makers. It owes even more to the people. If the people hadn't made the initial urban transformation cheaper, we could not have reached this point today. A while ago, they asked me to give a speech on what Turkey has accomplished. Everyone expected that I would say "industrialization, etc." and talk about it. I said that it accomplished two things. Although we don't emphasize the first one that much, I think it is a huge success. Today wherever there emerges an opportunity in the world, both labor and capital bundle up and go there and use that opportunity. This is a performance that we couldn't even imagine in the 60's, and I think it is an extraordinary performance. The second one is that Turkey has brought urbanization to a certain point in one way or another. Yet each of these has underlying social dynamics. This isn't a dynamic guided by intellectuals. It is rather self-invented. Then the politicians face the following question: If we have such apt public with a massive capacity to produce solutions, with what skills did we as politicians demand the right to guide the public?

I am at the end of my speech. I would like to say a few additional words. First of all, what does this experience show us? If we assume that society produces, then we can ask, how can we include this consideration in to our analysis. I can give an example from my works. When I am telling the housing story of Turkey. The central concept that I use is “mode of housing supply”. I think that it is a very useful concept to relate housing problem with urban development.. It turns out Turkey has developed the capacity to develop new mode of housing supplies. In the development of new modes contribution of peoples was high. I think that contribution of the intelligentsia decreased due to its adherence of modernist concerns.

One of the reasons why these ongoing events seem like solutions to us is because the city is a “self-organizing” system. I think that the system’s “self-organizing” characteristic is very important. Although it has occasionally been interrupted, I believe that the democratic system and populist policies prevented crises. Don’t assume that the military regime did not implement populist policies. Military governments were also highly populist in urban areas. The reason for the onset of transformation into apartment buildings is apparent in the Ankara example. After the Jansen plan, another plan was drafted in 1957: the Yücel-Uybadin plan. In this plan, the heights of apartment buildings were identified. The transformation into apartment buildings was speeded up by the military; in the 1960’s, they developed a concept called the “floor development master plan”. It is not a concept compatible with planning. For instance, if the former plan said that the apartment would be 3 floors high, they erased and changed the number to 7, and it suddenly was a “floor development master plan”. Our military coups were different than Latin American Countries examples, because our juntas announced that 2 or 3 years later there will be elections. When it says so, it engages in populist policies in order to sustain support to the military regime. This populism can be envisaged as an offense if you sanctify planning but if you take a step further and have a look like I do, say at a timeframe of 50-60 years, it wouldn’t seem like an offense.

Is it possible to define being urbanized citizen in a different manner? Cultural transformation or acculturation theories explain that when two cultures come across, it isn’t possible for one to transform completely into the other. Theoretically, it isn’t possible but we expected that because the elitist section wanted to reproduce its superiority. I wonder, if we define being urbanized citizen in a different manner, can we reach different results? I think being urbanized can be defined as follows: being urbanized citizens is the ability of newcomers to take advantage of the opportunities of the city. According to this criterion, which is more urbanized: the modern section or the old squatters section? Let’s say in the 1965’s, a middle class man from the modern section could buy a flat, that flat is still a flat. If he had built a squatter house in Yıldız (Ankara) back then, however, he could have had 6 flats now. So the question may seriously be raised: Who took advantage of the opportunities of the city better?

I’ll end my speech as follows: if we are going to continue to talk about and criticize the city as we live in it, we should not identify a guilty party and manipulate the political repercussions. How can we voice criticisms that will contribute to the quality of the city in the future? Recently, I think 3 different judgments compete over the issue. One of them is a discussion on developing the quality of life. The second may be a discussion on aesthetic quality. The third discussion could be over the quality of place. In fact if human rights are implemented in practice, it takes place via our lives in the city. If we want to develop something based on that foundation, we should be able to talk about it. We should talk about it in a way that will contribute to the development of the city. One of these is to improve the quality of life. But today this is defined based on consumption, in a trend prevalent all over the world. Could quality of life be defined the way Amartya Sen defines it, i.e. based on capacity building and performance? The second

is aesthetics. I used to think that aesthetic-quality could be very important. I don't think so any more. I think that the main motive is to improve the "meaning of place" because aesthetics can form justification for dictatorial interventions to the city. However, when we live somewhere, we attach some meanings to it when it has the quality of "being a place". When we destroy somewhere in the city, we destroy an area of meanings. For instance for one man's aesthetic values, you destroy an entire area of meanings for the residents of that place. Hence the main issue is how to improve the place of meanings.

Of course this is produced in cultural terms over time. Presented by real estate investment partnerships as new lifestyles, there are mostly "gated communities" in our cities. We invest largely in these areas. I ask the following: Do these communities have the capacity to be "places"? Can they ever be places? Of course this is a major area of criticism. I think that brings me to the end of my speech. City is such a topic that you can talk about for hours. Thank you so much for listening to me. I may now take questions.

Guest:

As far as I know, you live in Ankara. You know we have had the same mayor for 20 years. Most probably, you remember the ones before him. You mentioned certain recent trends. How much do you think Ankara is the "place" that it is owing to municipal policies, and how much does it owe to general trends?

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli:

Yes, all right. Let's have some more questions and answer all at once.

Guest:

First of all, thank you very much. Your speech was very comprehensive and included many novel, thought-provoking elements. I would like to ask: This "self-organizing" characteristic should of course be taken seriously, but what has happened in terms of competing with the world, in terms of improvement of knowledge?

Guest:

For sure, there are success stories but some people completely draw misinterpreted results from these stories. Could assessing them lead to worse situations that we have never thought about, instead of compensating for other mistakes?

Guest:

Professor, I am going to ask a short question. You said "Radical modernity and the intelligentsia couldn't find solutions. The public produced their own solutions". Then you explained urbanization via the ability of the public to take advantage of these opportunities. You said "Perhaps a different definition is better". But I draw such a conclusion from all this information: Noncompliance becomes general culture and opportunism and pick-pocketing become a lifestyle. Do you think that the problems we face today, from economic capital accumulation to social policy, are partly because of this opportunism and short-sightedness?

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli:

There can't be such an irresponsible system. A system that does not enact laws in accordance with the capacity of the newcomer to the city, but incriminates the newcomer. This is not a defensible matter of the law. I don't defend opportunism. I am only against society asking for things that don't coincide with people's capacities. After squattersemerged in Turkey, the first

positive article was written by Gerhard Kessler. It was published in 1949 in *Architect* journal. The younger generations don't know Gerhard Kessler at all. Let me talk about him, he is a very important man. In 1933, he escaped from Hitler and came from Germany to Turkey. Two years after coming to Turkey, he began to deliver lectures in Turkish. He came for the economy institute established in Istanbul University during the 1915 reforms. There were a lot of books waiting in chests, no one even put them onto shelves. He made the institute library out of those books and wrote all of the tags himself. This man was a social democrat. He was the head of the most important residential initiatives in Germany. When he came to Turkey, Bahçelievler was constructed between 1933 and 1935. Bahçelievler is a cooperative. They say "Guide us, Mr. Kessler". Gerhard Kessler replied: "What you have done is not a cooperative of sorts. A cooperative is built by the savings of limited income groups; it is a residential presentation form that these people make and use themselves, without being anyone's private property. But you get 100% loans. You purchase all of the land. You built luxury residences on it and make it private property". Had cooperatives been established in Turkey the way he said, we would have been in a different place. Anyway...In 1949 he writes an article, where he said "In the upcoming municipal elections, choose all city councilors out of squatter builders. Because you can't solve your problems, they can". Here, were squatter areas innocent? Weren't these areas used by opportunists? But what I defend isn't opportunism, I defend something else. In the 1960's or towards the 1970's, there was a scholar named Kemal Kartal at METU. Then he went to Malatya University. He conducted research on squatters. Of course, the first research on squatters was Hart's, conducted in 1958, but Kemal's research demonstrated something very interesting. People living in squatters invested in squatter areas. So he ends up owning 9 squatters.. You may think that this is not rational. But they can't invest anywhere else. Defending opportunist values is something, defending legal frameworks that became tools of using bureaucratic force on people and force people to become criminals is another.

Guest:

Thank you very much, Professor. It was a lovely speech. I will make a comment. I am an economist, so maybe my comment will be more economic. Your presentation reminds me of David Ricardo's concept of rent. Especially the emergence of rent in times where you have or don't have technology... As you and most of the guests here know, Ricardo's concept of rent is mostly related to land and in particular land that can't be expanded. The urbanization between especially 1950 and 1980, up to 1980 as you explained made me think of Ricardo's rent, where there is no technology, so land can't spread, is valuable, hence requires "intensive" use so that apartments are built. Yes. What happened? In the end if we follow this conceptualization, this analysis, it was blocked after a while because technology was not present. All that land was entirely used and capital accumulation began to slow down and stop. New technologies resulted in some accumulation around. An automotive industry was developed. Accordingly, capital began to be able to move to other areas and make money there. This time the state entered the market as a new party because it wanted to get some rent as well. The old state didn't seek rent so much. I thought it might be interpreted as a more modernist state.

Guest:

Sir, you register the point that Turkey has reached a certain point in the urbanization process successfully. You set 3 criteria for the future: life, aesthetics and quality of place. Regarding quality of life, you underlined performance instead of consumption and concerning aesthetics, I sensed that it should not be like the old perspective, i.e. the perspective in the beginning of the Republic... We also sensed what you meant by "being a place" but we couldn't get concrete information about it. What do you mean by "quality of place"? I would appreciate it if you explain it in a more concrete way.

Guest:

I would like to continue the question. You said “How did you develop this area of meaning?” On the other hand, let’s think: There are two districts in the middle of Ankara, one of them is the Aktaş neighborhood, right next to the Çiğçi neighborhood. There was a collective housing project in the Aktaş neighborhood. A collective housing area was formed there. Is there an area of meaning in the adjacent neighborhood, Çiğçi? Yes, it has a meaning because the municipality and the police can only make operations in the dawn via helicopters. In terms of spatial meaning, a meaning area has been established there. On the other hand you say that if you relocate these people, you make them unemployed, jobless and create new social problems. Then how shall we overcome this contradiction? I mean, is that place urbanized? Or should urban transformation projects be implemented there? Or how can we solve the problem optimally?

Guest:

Sir, meaning is really a critical factor. Let me give an example. For instance there was the concept, “neighborhood”. In fact it was a concept integral to urbanization. People our age and older have a very good grasp of the meaning of neighborhood but especially for young people between 15 and 20, there isn’t a set of values or meanings that fill in this concept. In this respect, perhaps we should further explain the difference between “place” and “space”. I would ask you to elaborate on this. And of course as planners, we think that we have to intervene at some point. So what should we do to regain these set of meanings? How should we intervene in the course of affairs? I mean how can planning intervene to regain these set of meanings for the society, the place itself as well as the city?

Guest:

You explained that cities change via mutual interaction. Indeed this means that we don’t make designs for cities but we do in fact have a series of policy decisions, right? For example, if we decide to build a factory somewhere, we have to make arrangements for the workers’ transportation, as well. I mean, probably problems became acute because this mechanism doesn’t function well as a whole. So how will the future look? This reminded me of the collapse of apartheid. When we take a look back at apartheid, we see a system based on segregating black and white people but then white industrialists said “We need workers, don’t segregate them into separate districts”. Hence the transformation begins. First they begin to carry the black people by cars and buses. Then they say “These people should be better educated. Our industry now requires educated people”. Then it changes...

Guest:

I would like to thank you first of all. For an economist, listening to you is like a shortsighted person wearing glasses for the first time. You answered the question about Ankara in the first part, but I would like to repeat it. My second question is about Istanbul. The third bridge is about to be completed. Will the area between the second and the third bridge develop as a “self-organizing” system like you said? Can you share your projections?

Guest:

Professor, when you say “self-organizing” in your democrat attitude, you always define the “self” as urban and therefore define the 1950 -1980 period as a success.

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli:

I don't recommend it. I am making an observation. Yes.

Guest:

Okay. Because at the moment, what seems like "self-organizing" can also be seen as big capital and this big capital doesn't in fact function by its "self" but together with the central state. To make new areas, yes. But at the moment, similar to urbanization in the least developed countries, in some of our cities, a cheap labor economy has been formed. Yet you have defined it as accessing resources. In this framework, a city that rapidly exhausts its resources and improves by new large integrations doesn't appear to me as a success. I mean even if it was a success in the previous period, what we see in the more recent period... At this point how could the transition to a "self-organizing" – a human-centered "self-organizing" system – or an insistence on that front, take place?

Guest:

My question is about the cultural aspect of this story. As you mentioned, the urbanization rate reached 80% and the story that we are going to tell from now won't be about urbanization. Now it will be about the problems of a big city. What kind of positive or negative aspects will our experience bear from now on? What can we say about sustainability and what will this story lead to?

Guest:

I am an economist so this may be a reductionist question but you said that urbanization was partly successful. Perhaps you have implied that we have a limited area of intervention as the Turkish urbanization experience has been "self-organizing".

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli:

No, no, I implied that the area of intervention is vast.

Guest:

Oh, is that so?

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli: Sure

Guest:

I see, but let me say this still: We know that Turkey has fallen behind the countries with similar development and growth experiences, at least behind countries that were at a close level with Turkey when it started this race 50 years ago.

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli:

How do you know it? I don't.

Guest:

For example, compared to examples such as Korea, at least, our long term growth rate isn't that high. It is slightly above 2.5% in terms of per capita income. I wonder, could urbanization follow an autonomous path, autonomous from this path of modernization. Or does it have to be integral with it? Could you please clarify this point?

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli:

All right, this is a long list of questions. I'll try to sum up.

The issue with the third bridge... I don't know if you know it but I was the main opponent of the first bridge in 1968. Digging into this story, where should we locate the third bridge? What did we say then? We said everything that has happened. One bridge won't be enough, there will be another one, then another one, etc.... And there was indeed. Back then we said that if you build the first one, it will go on. So how do they position against the opposition in this last case? "Eh, they opposed the first bridge, too." Did we prove that wrong? No, we proved it to be right. This is, of course, related with the negotiations in the public sphere. One can make such a judgment. I am not speaking against the bridge. I had already made that point in the beginning. I see the third bridge as an example of the practice to make Turkey live with a lie. What does living with a lie mean? I think that today, we are living with lies in Turkish politics. They say that this is a perfect democracy but I see a dictatorship. They say that there is historical consciousness, and then they set up artificial history. This bridge is about that. How do I comment on the bridge? In advertisements, or in speeches rather, it is said that thousands of trees were cut. Weren't they cut? Yes, they were. But we can't comment on the bridge only based on this event. "Truck traffic will be rechanneled. Other bridges will be relieved." What is the percentage of truck traffic in overall traffic? This doesn't seem to be a valid motive either. Something else is happening, in fact. İstanbul's entire form is being changed. İstanbul has a rectangular shape. There is the Bosphorus in the middle. İstanbul isn't something that develops in a circular form on a plane like Ankara. Since it is stuck and there is a green axis on the north, it constantly presses upwards due to being stuck in the narrow area in the south. In fact it is possible to think like this: You create an axis in the north and an urban belt in the north just as in the south. This belt is in fact being created. This belt is being created without saying that a belt is being created. This belt opened very large areas to the land speculation. They ask me in various places "Do you have any demands for the enhancement of the Turkish democracy?" I want one right: the right to information. I want to know the deed transfers at land offices to be included in the context of the right to information. Over the last 5 or 10 years, what is going on concerning the deed transfers in that belt in the north? Can we make a judgment about this before knowing that? I think the issue of living with a lie is there as a characteristic of Turkish politics.

The second issue is about rents. Of course Ricardo is the founding father but our area of urban planning also develops over a rent problem. Our theories on rent are very rich. What I called growth like oil stain in the 1960's led to a question: In Turkey, the rich live in the center and the poor in the periphery, whereas in developed countries the poor live in the center and the rich in the periphery. One of the main issues included in the economics classes that we as planners take is how to use the theory of rent in explaining the city form. At that time, Alonso created the concept of "bid-price curve" to explain it. I don't want to give a lecture here but there is an issue: The theories of rent developed in the West assume, as in Ricardo's definition of rent, "The price of using the land for 1 year". Alonso's theory of rent is also based on this definition, the price of using land for 1 year and assumes that the price of transferring land increases in parallel to the price of using land. They don't need to be treated separately. However when we talk about land speculation, there are two prices. One of them is the price of the transfer of the ownership of property, the other one is the price of using the land. It is possible to formulate such a theory. I have a PhD student who wrote a thesis in this field. You may go to the field and make a research on how to build a relationship between the theory of rent and what is actually going on. Yet we need a new theory of rent that will make us familiar the urban phenomenon.

There are questions about Ankara. Çiğcin is a special neighborhood. If you look at it with police mentality, you would destroy this neighborhood, demolish it. It will die away. Yet it does not. It groups somewhere else, turns into something else. So how can we interfere in areas organized as criminal spaces? Can urban renewal solve this problem? These are serious questions. Let me tell you an anecdote from İstanbul. It happened in Sulukule, interestingly. You know Sulukule went through urban transformation and the residents were sent to Taşoluk. In fact the issue was to move Sulukule out of the surrounding Islamist neighborhoods, and they achieved this goal. But only 3 or so families that were moved to Taşoluk could keep on living there because it was economically impossible. They lost their houses, they came to the city as renters. Where did they reside? In the Islamist neighborhoods around Sulukule. It seems that it is impossible to interfere via relocation.

“Self-organizing” drew attention, I see. That subject is open to misinterpretation. I am not talking about the “self-organizing” characteristic as a problem of design. You intervene in the city; what is the characteristic of the city that you intervene in? If it is a system with strong internal ties, it breaks down. A bunch of arbitrary investments made by politicians in İstanbul so far should already have broken down the system but they didn't. Why doesn't it break down? Because it is “self-organizing”. It creates harmony in itself. It isn't a problem of design. It is a problem that decreases risk for the intervener, whoever it may be. In fact it is a characteristic that may also weather the negative consequences of the errors made by planners. But we don't build our theories of planning based on the assumption that the system is “self-organizing”. This may lead to changes. As a planner, how would you behave faced with this situation? If a planner is into social sciences, her social science is different from that of a regular social scientist. Social scientists confine themselves to making observations and explanations about a phenomenon. There, their work is done. But our job as planners begins here. They ask us: “What should we do next?” This is a very important question. How will we reply? There are different alternatives. Will I reply as an elitist planner, or will I reply as a participatory planner? These two will have very different answers. We deal with the following subject: How can we think about the good qualities of the city of the future, not the form of the city of the future? This is the point to start from. What is good society to you? We aren't a society that thinks on this question enough. If you call a planner and ask him/her to make a city, he will. To me, this isn't very important. But if you ask him “Describe a good city”, he will have a hard time describing it. Two factors become critical here. I should have a strong critical position in order to produce new ideas and imagine a new city. When I have that critical position, if I refuse an elitist attitude and prefer a participatory one, I have to see people as co-developers of creativity under governance, rather than seeing them as subjects to be governed. Then and only then, with a participatory process with creativity and locality in mind, we should begin to work on how to enact a city plan. I work as a consultant for İzmir Municipality in some projects. I try to fulfill this notion. I mean how can I enrich İzmir's, İzmir residents' relations with history? How can I enrich their relations with the sea? What kind of participatory processes should I follow to decrease the stress of life? The planner doesn't have a prescription. It is something that can be developed by working on it. But of course as planners, we can't stop at a point like social scientists do. I can't say “I explained why what happens ; my work here is done”. My favorite professor, Mübeccel Kiray, the doyen of sociologists and a close friend, and I always argued about it: “Ma'am, tell us what to should we do?” “No, that's not my job. You should do it”. This means making the future something pondered together with society, something exciting rather than something given.

I have recently been thinking that our main problem in many areas is in producing enthusiasm. When I compare the university with that of the 1960's, I see that the main weakness is the inability to produce enthusiasm. We can't produce enthusiasm, we write and publish articles, but there's no enthusiasm.

Yes, I can keep talking like this. Let's continue with some more questions.

Guest:

Professor, thank you so much. It was an enlightening presentation. Why did we wait until the 2000's for urban transformation? Did we have to wait for capital accumulation until the 2000's? Is that why we waited? Or is it because of other factors? Why did the main transformation occur after the 2000s? This is one of my questions.

The second is that Turkey's urbanization story as you narrate it is very interesting to me. When I read your articles, I see the following problem: This story is mainly based on metropolitan cities and in this respect, it fully coincides with what I read and experienced. However, there are small and medium-sized cities in Turkey. Does the story that you tell apply to them one-on-one or are there discrepancies? Can we only read Turkey's urbanization experience through the metropolitan cities? Is the other one possible?

Guest:

Could areas that don't have the capacity to become "places" be parts of social relations that we don't know about yet? And accordingly, could it give way to a new conceptualization about "place" in social sciences, at least in major regions of the city, where place lacks meaning because of social non-interaction?

Guest:

I would also like to ask a question about the capacity to be a place. Both throughout your speech and in the case of relevant questions, I have been wondering, when we take into consideration this question, the meaning of urban areas or the city in general, the question for me is "for whom?" I mean if the city is a living area with multiple meanings, some areas will likely have more meaning for certain people or groups, and other areas will have more meaning for others. Hence it is crucial to contemplate which of these meanings are more worthy of protection, more important, and what kind of a hierarchy will be observed while protecting them. In a study that we carried out some 6 or 7 years ago, we asked people living in the closed community of Bilkent or some of the better-off districts of Çankaya, "which neighborhood would you prefer to live in or which neighborhoods would you never go to?" All of them cited Çiğir in a single voice, and this despite the fact that they had no idea about it, they wouldn't be able to answer if asked about what was going on there. The only difference was that people living in Bilkent would never consider living in another part of the city whereas those living in Çankaya considered "gated communities" as better options. You know, fear of crime etc. Up until now, we never mentioned the class concept, however it may be defined. We said big capital, obviously, but cities are divided or united along the lines of class as well. I think this may be a mechanism that functions independent of residential areas.

Guest:

Recently while I was researching urbanization on the internet I came across a very interesting map. It was a map of location choices or residential locations in the Turkish peninsula in the ancient times. The population of Turkey was around half a million. It had almost 50 centers.

It's 2014 and we see that there has been relatively little change in settlements. This was approximately 10,000 years ago. In our classes we were provided with many theses on the relationship between settlements and transportation networks. How places in the US or Britain grew, shrank, multiplied etc. after the Industrial Revolution... these are also interesting topics. I am very curious as to whether the reasons underlying settlement choices were similar to those 8000 years before Christ. Are we going to observe significant changes in this issue due to technological advances over the past 50 years?

Guest:

In line with the perspective that you presented, I would like to ask about the increase in urban population rates from 20 to 80% and of course the corresponding decrease in the rural population. When we discuss rural and urban experiences, we should never overlook the changes and the pressure in the rural areas. Our urban development and urban experiences are like our economic development. Although we are the 17th or 20th largest economy in the world, we are also a country that has hit the bottom in terms of human development indexes. This is contradictory. It is similar to the relationship between our economic development and urbanization. Discussing our urbanization experience, what happened in small settlements? What happened in terms of stratification? We shouldn't overlook what happened in medium-sized settlements. I just wanted to make a contribution.

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli:

I guess that's all. Let me try to answer these questions.

Why do we study big cities but not small cities? There is a reason. I wrote some articles on small cities as well. Çorum, Muğla etc. However it isn't possible to develop a theory based on small cities because high levels of "differentiation" take place only in big cities. The class "differentiation" in land usage that I see when I look at Istanbul, I can't observe it in small cities. The main dynamics of the system emerges in Istanbul first. When the dynamics change, the change becomes visible in Istanbul first. So if I study Istanbul, I can explore changing dynamics in advance. You know Murat Güvenç. Although we are METU scholars based in Ankara, we have recently chosen to research Istanbul rather than Ankara. When foreigners cite the research in Turkey, they use the phrase "the Istanbul studies of the Ankara school". Everyone who would like to work in our field in Turkey will have to study Istanbul at some point. It is difficult to detect what happens or will happen in other places before you study Istanbul.

Why didn't urban transformation take place until the 2000's? Let me ask you something: Could the system continue to function without urban transformation? Yes, it could. You know that Dikmen is at the 4th and 5th stages of transformation. The local people resist it. I took a cab the other day. The driver had been living there. He was complaining: "My good old big gecekondulu..." He misses his squatter house because squatter housing means a cheaper life. Once you move elsewhere, you have to go to big stores, shopping malls, etc. They don't sell on personal credit. You can't grow plants in your garden. Life in squatter houses wasn't unsustainable. Hence we can't explain why transformation started in the 2000's from within the squatter areas; we have to look at external issues. This reason has to do with the construction sector. A couple of years ago I carried out a research project. I will give some figures from it. Mind you, Turkey's capacity in construction sector must be higher now. The sector needed demand for 800,000 houses per year in order to remain alive. Altogether, i.e. Turkey's urbanization rate, normal demographic processes, marriage rates etc., this demand is 400,000 per year. There is a gap of 400,000. If your economy is only dependent on the

construction sector, you have to bridge that gap of 400,000. Look at TOKI's urban renovation rates. 7 million extra houses in 20 years, 350,000 houses per year... The remaining gap is 50,000. So the urban transformation... You know it isn't in fact called urban renovation; it has a name that has to do with earthquakes given the day that it was enacted or the following day when another related law was enacted. The Land Registry Law included clauses on the sale of real property to foreigners, who bridge the remaining gap of 50,000. Hence urban renovation isn't carried out on grounds coming from within squatter areas but it is a program necessary to maintain the construction-based vitality of the Turkish economy. That's why it began in 2000. There were other questions, mostly on the problem of "being a place". After 1968, geography became a multi-paradigmatic area. When especially phenomenologists entered the field, the perspective focusing on cultural meaning of areas was inherited from phenomenology. For instance I just mentioned Izmir, our work on the coast. Generally, politicians have destructive tendencies to say "Knock down old buildings and build new ones instead". However, we had this research conducted there and 10 out of the 11 areas in question were meaningful to the public. People living there thought that only one of the areas lacked any meaning. It was a hub of highways; people couldn't walk through it. That's why we tried to develop a design that would enrich the meanings of the 10 areas, and create meaning for that one area. Meaning is something that is culturally produced in time. You live there, you get to know the people living there, you say hello. You remember the construction of the building there, you know the people living there. The symbols begin to make sense to you. The place that you live in becomes something related to your identity. Who has the right to interfere in this area and how? If this is something about your identity, does a mayor – a politician – have the right to say "knock it down"? This is a direct intervention to my right to live in dignity. In Ankara, they changed all of the scenery on the way to the airport. On what grounds? An architect designed that building, and designed it as an identity. It is as ridiculous as it would be if someone came and painted your face red. When you acknowledge that the area is a "place", when you pay attention to its meaning, the degree to which you can interfere in that area changes. You can only knock it down by saying that it is ugly and you will build a more aesthetic one. But how can we know that what you'll build will be aesthetic? You knock it down with a presumptuous aestheticism but you can't knock down an area of meaning. Seeing the future from a perspective of places of meaning involves a certain dose of conservation in itself.

The debate on urbanization is endless, so thank you.