## State of the Turkish Economy

Emre Deliveli TOBB ETU, October 11 2005

### Agenda


- Overview of the Turkish economy
- Risks and priorities
- New anchor: EU
- What are the policy implications?

## Turkish Economy: Basic Facts

- GDP US\$ 300.6 billion (end- 2004)
- GDP per capita US\$ 4,187
- Highest growing country in world with 9.9 percent growth in 2004
- Population 71.3 million, population growth rate 1.5 percent
- Population living in urban cities 60 percent, urbanization rate 32 percent
- Labor force 24.3 million
- Labor force participation rate 48.7 percent
- Unemployment rate 10.5 percent
- Life expectancy 68.7 years
- Infant mortality 3.8 percent
- Literacy rate 88.3 percent
- Gini coefficient 0.42
- Percent of population living under 1\$ per day 0.2

## **Economic growth**

1977-2004 Gross Domestic Product (billion USD) and GDP growth rate



## Turkish economy in the 1990s

- Despite huge potential, Turkish economy significantly underperformed in the 1990s:
  - boom and bust cycles in growth
  - high and chronic inflation
  - high public sector deficit
  - fiscal indiscipline
  - high levels of uncertainty (political and macroeconomic)
  - very high interest rates



- → three economic crises, internal confict, 1999 earthquake...
- → the 2001 economic crisis = GDP shrank by 10%


# Putting risks into perspective: What has Turkey done so far?

#### **Basic elements:**

- Monetary Discipline
- Fiscal Discipline
- Public Administration Reform
- Banking Sector Reform-Corporate Restructuring

### **Basic Outcomes:**

Relative stability



Structural transformation process

Key: is it sustainable??

### New policy framework after 2001

#### **Public Sector Reforms**

- Granting Central Bank Full Independence
- Ensuring Universality of the Budget
- Public Finance and Debt Management Law
- Indirect Tax Reform (Special Consumption Tax Law)
- Public Procurement Law
- Private Pension Law
- Civil Service Reform
- Pension Reform
- Reform on SEEs' Governance
- Direct Tax Reform (Second Phase of Tax Reform
- Tax Administration Reform
- Public Financial Management and Financial Control Law

#### **Creation of Regulatory Authorities**


- Electricity Market
- Natural Gas Market
- Sugar Market
- Tobacco Market
- Telecommunication
- International Arbitration

#### Financial Sector Reform


- Creation of Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (2000)
- Non-performing banks transferred to Savings Deposit Insurance Fund.
- Transition to more bank activities.

### A new process following the 2001 crisis?


- Growth without inflation
- Interests rates are falling down
- Productivity is rising



#### Inflation and Interest Rates



#### **Productivity and Employment Trends**



### Turkey's Recovery since 2001

Transformation 
Relative Stability 
Superior Economic Growth


GNP (billion \$)
Growth (%)
Inflation (CPI%)
Public debt (% of GNP)
Budget Deficit (% of GNP)
Exports (billion \$)
Foreign Reserves (billion \$)

2001	
150	
-9,4	
70	
95%	
17	
31	
19	

2004
300
9,9
10
65%
10
60
35

### Stability Implies Higher Maturity

Weighted Average Maturity of Domestic Borrowing Raised Through the Market



### , but depends on risk management

Relative stability

Structural transformation

### political stability



### Risks:

- Need for above average growth rates for net job-creation.
- Risks due to structural transformation.
- 3. Need for a credible and longlasting anchor: EU?

### Inherent risks

- Structural transformation risk
- Growth sustainability risk
- Risk of policy credibility
- Governance risk

structural risks

■ Macroeconomic vulnerabilities


triggering factor

## Risk 1: Structural Transformation of the Turkish\_economy An example from retailing




# A projection for the future: Comparison of Spain and Turkey

Spain - retail market structure (1988-1995)




Turkey - retail market structure (2000-2004)



Source: Consumer's Co-operative Institute, Japan.

Source: AC Mielsen


# Market Shares in Retailing: Decline of Traditional Shops



## Winners and losers in retailing

	Winners	Losers
End-points	Organized chains	Groceries, traditional shops
Distribution	Suppliers	Wholesalers
Transportation	Logistic firms	Individual truck- owners
Production	Brand-names	Informal producers (quality??)

Risk 2: Sustainability of the Growth Process (1)



### Sustainability of the Growth Process (2)


- Productivity increase not sustainable?
- Current Account
  - → Imports of intermediate and capital goods are increasing... more than exports
  - → Rising Trade Intergration has not led to an adequate Financial Structure
  - ... yet patterns & trends seem promising
- FDI inflows
- Unemployment

# Risk 3: EU anchor is different from IMF anchor

IMF	EU
When you agree with the IMF, IMF is <i>actively</i> overseeing the performance.	When you start the negotiation process, EU Commission is <i>passively</i> overseeing the performance.
IMF <b>stands by</b> and actively <b>participates</b> as a guarantor of policy credibility.	EU <b>stands apart</b> and actively criticizes long afterwards.

# Any anchor is not a guarantee for superior economic performance

#### FDI Inflows to Turkey (million US\$)



Source: Foreign Investment Directorate, Treasury

### without accompanying reforms


- Investment Climate Problems:
  - → Tax System and Administration
  - → Labor Regulations
  - → Informal Economy and Anti-competitive practices
  - → Access to and Cost of Finance
  - → Access to Land
  - → Local Administrative Barriers (i.e. Licenses and permits)
  - → Corporate Governance and Restructuring
  - → Low Technological Base
  - → Lack of Innovative Capabilities
  - → Lack of Skills

### A doomsday scenario

- Economic program lacks in new job-creation.
- Losers from structural transformation attack the economic program.
- Expansionary monetary policy and giving up fiscal discipline to increase domestic demand.
- National unrest against EU.
- Lose of anchor, political turmoil.
- Triggering factors become active

### Framework for sustainability of reforms

- IMF program only provides minimum requirements.
- More is neccesary for sustaining a politically viable reform program.



How to support the new *modus operandi* and enhance the *competitiveness* of the Turkish corporate sector?

### Reforms on the public side


- Reducing costs: competition in infrastructure markets.
- Gaining legal flexibility: reform in bankruptcy and liquidation laws.
- Localization Regional Development
- Monitoring and regulating state aids

# Changing patterns of behaviour on corporate side

- Technological transformation
- Skills-training for the new technologies
- New governance structures

### **Outcomes:**

- Sustaining productivity gains
- Keeping high dynamism of firms



### We need:

- Foreign direct investment
- Better financial intermediation for domestic firms

# Sustaining the reform: Social Policies to ease structural transformation

- Social security reform: implementation of social assistance programs – poverty alleviation
- Education reform
- Health reform

EU Framework?

Active labour market policies: bearing the costs of skills training

### Where's the catch?

- Governance structure
- Flexible and fast policy making
- Rule of law and credible enforcement

### Conclusion: A policy agenda

- We should have policies targeted to higher growth rates, rather than being afraid of it.
- We should have more than IMF program to attain above-normal growth rates:
  - → More reforms targeted to corporate sector.
  - →A stronger internal commitment to EU anchor.
  - → Introduction of social policies.