# PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM AND SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM WHICH IS BEST AND HOW WOULD WE KNOW? 

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## Aim

To review the evidence that some types of executive-legislative arrangements are better then others

## Structure

1.) What are competing claims about the different types of executive-legislative relations?
2.) What is the evidence to support such claims?
3.) What is the status of this evidence?
4.) Conclusion

## What are the competing claims about executive-legislative relations?

1.) Presidentialism

Where there is a directly elected fixed-term president, where there is no prime minister, where the cabinet is not responsible to the legislature, and where the legislature serves for a fixed term
e.g. US, most of Central and South America

## What are the competing claims about executive-legislative relations?

1.) Presidentialism

- The president and assembly have competing claims to legitimacy
- The fixed presidential term is too rigid
- The presidential election is a zero-sum contest
- Presidents believe they are above politics
- Presidential elections encourage populist candidates

Source: Mainwaring and Shugart (1997)

## What are the competing claims about executive-legislative relations?

2.) Parliamentarism

Where there is an indirectly elected fixed-term president or a figurehead monarch, where the PM and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature, which can (usually) be dissolved
e.g. UK, Canada, Australia, NZ, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Hungary, Czech Rep, Turkey pre2007

## What are the competing claims about executive-legislative relations?

2.) Parliamentarism

- Parliamentary elections can be zero-sum if one party wins a large majority
- Populists can still win power under parliamentarism
- Very divided legislatures can lead to instability
- There can still be conflicts of legitimacy


## What are the competing claims about executive-legislative relations?

3.) Semi-presidentialism

Where there is both a directly elected fixed-term president, and where the PM and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature, which can (usually) be dissolved
e.g. France, Portugal, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, ex-Yugoslavia, much of ex-USSR, inc. Russia, francophone and lusophone Africa, Iceland, Ireland, Austria, Turkey post-2007

## What are the competing claims about executive-legislative relations?

3.) Semi-presidentialism

- The dual executive creates problems of executive coordination
- Dual legitimacy can cause problems of coordination between the executive and the legislature - cohabitation
- Divided minority government
where neither the president's party nor the PM's party enjoys majority support


## What is the state of current thinking?

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4.) Some forms of semi-presidentialism are better than others
Semi-presidentialism with a weaker president is a better choice than semi-presidentialism with a stronger president

## What is the state of current thinking?

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2.) Parliamentarism is a better choice than presidentialism
3.) Semi-presidentialism is a bad choice
4.) Some forms of semi-presidentialism are better than others
Premier-presidentialism (where the PM is responsible only to the legislature) is a better choice than president-parliamentarism (where the PM is also responsible to the president)

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

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1.) In rich democracies, the form of executivelegislations relations does not affect the prospects of democratic survival
e.g. Przeworski et al. (2000), 1945-1990 - Once a country has a democratic regime, its level of economic development has a very strong effect on the probability that democracy will survive

Above \$6,000 per capita income (in 1985 PPP US\$), democracies are impregnable and can be expected to live forever

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

1.) In rich democracies, the form of executivelegislations relations does not affect the prospects of democratic survival

Good evidence

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

2.) Parliamentarism is a better choice than presidentialism

All else equal, unconsolidated democracies are more likely to collapse under presidentialism than parliamentarism

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2.) Parliamentarism is a better choice than presidentialism
e.g. Przeworski et al. (2000), 1945-1990-14 democracies (or $28 \%$ of 50 cases) died under a parliamentary system; 24 (52\% of 46 cases) died under presidentialism

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

2.) Parliamentarism is a better choice than presidentialism
e.g. Svolik (2009), 1789-2001 - only about 1 in 6,800 presidential democracies will consolidate at median levels of other covariates compared with 6 in 7 for parliamentary democracies

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Parliamentarism is associated with a better quality of democracy

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## 2.) Parliamentarism is a better choice than presidentialism

Gerring et al (2009), 1951-2000 - parliamentarism is associated with $45 \%$ more telephone mainlines, a 5\% reduction in import duties as a percentage of imports, $30 \%$ more trade openness, an increased investment rating of more than 6 points (on a scale of 100), a 30\% higher per capita income, a nearly 23\% lower infant mortality rate, and a greater life expectancy of more than $2 \%$

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

2.) Parliamentarism is a better choice than presidentialism

Parliamentarism is associated with a better quality of democracy

Limited evidence

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

3.) Semi-presidentialism is a bad choice

Most of the evidence relating to semipresidentialism is based on country case studies, or studies of particular regions

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

3.) Semi-presidentialism is a bad choice

Young democracies are more likely to collapse under semi-presidentialism than parliamentarism

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

3.) Semi-presidentialism is a bad choice

Moestrup (2008), 1974-2005 - parliamentary regimes have a statistically significant positive impact on the level of democracy, compared to semi-presidential regimes

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

3.) Semi-presidentialism is a bad choice

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Very limited evidence

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

4.) Some forms of semi-presidentialism are better than others

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President-parliamentary semi-presidentialism is more dangerous for unconsolidated democracies than premier-presidentialism

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

## 4.) Some forms of semi-presidentialism are better than others

e.g. Elgie and Schleiter (2010), 1919-2008 where the PM is accountable to the assembly and the president the risk of democratic breakdown is increased by a factor of 5.24 compared to semi-presidential countries where the PM is accountable only to the assembly

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

## 4.) Some forms of semi-presidentialism are better than others

President-parliamentary semi-presidentialism is more dangerous for unconsolidated democracies than premier-presidentialism

Good evidence

## What is the evidence to support the competing claims?

## 4.) Some forms of semi-presidentialism are better than others

Elgie (2011), 1919-2008; President-parliamentary democracies have a lower level of democracy than premier-presidential democracies

Limited evidence

## How good is the evidence?

1.) There are now more large-n controlled studies as opposed to individual country studies or small-n descriptive comparisons of particular regions

Large-n controlled studies should produce more reliable results

We should be wary of anecdotal arguments

## How good is the evidence?

1.) There are now more large-n controlled studies
2.) These studies are always contested
e.g. Boix and presidentialism

Cheibub and presidentialism
Cheibub and Chernyk and semi-presidentialism

The results vary because of how regimes are defined, cases selected, statistical method used, variables included

## How good is the evidence?

1.) There are now more large-n controlled studies
2.) These studies are always contested
3.) Even if large-n studies are more reliable, the findings are probabilistic not deterministic

We can make recommendations based on the general effects of institutions
We cannot guarantee that those effects will be observed in individual cases

## Conclusion

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2.) We have to be very careful when making recommendations for particular countries
e.g. I would not recommend that Kenya adopt a presidential system

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2.) We have to be very careful when making recommendations for particular countries

I would hesitate to recommend what system Turkey should adopt
If pushed, and if democratic survival is the key outcome, I would recommend either a parliamentary system, or a semi-presidential system with a figurehead president

