Unfortunately, the curtains did not close on the polarized state of politics with the 2011 elections.

The elections were held safely and soundly. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) raised its votes to 50 percent and came to power alone for the third time. The Republican People's Party (CHP) grew stronger as the main opposition party and raised its number of votes in 46 provinces. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) entered parliament despite all speculations. The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) proved that it is the main representative of Kurdish politics. The votes of other right-wing parties decreased to 5 percent, from 13 percent in the 2007 elections. Votes were to a large extent consolidated. It became clearer why the election system has not altered. The votes were consolidated in the two largest parties. Today let me draw some conclusions from the election results with relation to the economic policy priorities in the period ahead.

The first conclusion I drew is that the votes have been consolidated in the two large parties in the last two elections. The sum of the votes of the two largest parties in the 2011 elections was 76 percent. The ratio stood at 66 percent in 2007, 53 percent in 2002, 39 percent in 1999, 40 percent in 1995 and 51 percent in 1994. Particularly in the last two elections, voters increasingly have preferred two parties. The first underlying reason is the election system. The 10 percent election threshold forces the voters to concentrate on the two largest parties. Why? Due to the rising political polarization. The milieu of political polarization that forces voters to concentrate on the two largest parties is not an incidental but a structural phenomenon for Turkey. And it appears that the continuation of this phenomenon is necessary. In this context, political polarization is of great use in completing the political project. This is the first point to state.

And the second one. The referendum coalition formed in the previous year is the underlying reason for the ruling party achieving 50 percent of the votes at the end of its second term in the office. Therefore, the political polarization caused by the referendum in 2010 is the main determinant of the current votes. Erdoğan managed to consolidate the "yes to the new constitution" coalition around "yes to the AKP." Transferring the referendum coalition to the elections without wasting time served the purpose. The magic formula should be sought somewhere in this parallel. This is the second point to state.

Then, when will we see economic decisions taken with determination? These refer to measures to deal with the record-high current account deficit, protecting the achievements of the post-2001 crisis reforms and solving the structural problems in the growth process. However, it is already evident that the political agenda of the country will not leave space for the economic. 86 percent of the referendum coalition at 58 percent was maintained for one year. In this context, it would be wise to enter the presidential elections following another referendum. Ahead of Turkey are a couple of years full of referendums and elections. In this process, economic matters will be of secondary importance and will have to shout their needs each time, as the squeaky wheel gets the oil. This is the third point to stress.

How the European crisis is solved is also a determining factor concerning the economy, the current account deficit, and is a challenge that requires immediate action. Turkey can bear the record-high current account deficit thanks to the debt crises in South Africa. As long as the IMF and the large European powers succeed in sustaining the temporary equilibrium in the region, Turkey will have the chance to defer the solution of the high current account deficit problem. The savings surplus caused by the deepening of the crisis in Europe helps Turkey bear the historic-high savings gap. I remember writing with this perspective that the Arab spring would be to the benefit of Turkey. Therefore, Turkey has the opportunity to somehow manage the immediate challenge. If the Europeans manage the situation, Turkey also can. This would be the fourth point to state.

The fifth issue to take into account is Turkey's medium-term growth performance. It is becoming increasingly more difficult to manage the game in this regard. Let me focus on this some other time.

Unfortunately, the curtains did not close on the polarized state of politics with the 2011 elections; new episodes are ahead.

This commentary was published in Radikal daily on 14.06.2011